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Thesis Abstract 
The Equity Risk Premium Puzzle Revisited: The Case of the UK Stock Market 
Andrew J. Vivian 
This thesis stimulated and inspired by failings in the current literature investigates a 
series of issues relating to the UK Equity Risk Premium Puzzle. The UK market is 
focussed upon given prior research is heavily concentrated on the US market. The 
prior literature also focuses upon the aggregate equity premium. This thesis makes 
another important extension to prior work by analysing the equity premium for 
portfolios formed on cross-sectional characteristics such as size or industry. 
Specifically, it addresses the following three main issues. Firstly, is the historical 
equity premium an appropriate proxy for the expected equity premium? Secondly, 
does the use of the ex-post equity premium overstate the magnitude of the ex-ante 
equity premium puzzle? Thirdly, do low frequency equity returns follow different 
regimes over time? 
The main results indicate that the alignment of ex-post equity returns with 
fundamental measures of equity returns depends upon both the time period considered 
and the measure of fundamental used. Empirical evidence also supports the view that 
the expected equity premium follows different regimes and thus does vary over time. 
This low-frequency time variation in expected returns appears to, in general, be 
systematic, affecting portfolios within the market at a similar time. Our results 
contribute to the academic literature and also have important implications for 
practitioners by offering insight into the nature of the Equity Premium Puzzle and the 
appropriateness of using ex-post returns as a proxy for ex-ante returns. 
The material contained in this thesis has not been previously submitted for a degree in 
this or any other university. 
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CHAPTER 1: THESIS INTRODUCTION 
The Equity Risk Premium is of central significance within the field of 
financial economics. It is of key importance to fund managers for investment 
decisions, corporate executives for financing decisions as well as to many other 
economic agents. The Equity Risk Premium is simply defined as the return on the 
aggregate equity market minus the return on the risk-free rate. This central role played 
by the Equity Premium in no small part stems from the numerous applications that 
this single figure is used for within Finance. 
For corporate financial managers the equity premium is a key determinant of 
the firms cost of equity and hence plays an important role in determining the overall 
cost of capital of the firm. The firm's overall cost of capital is used for instance when 
the company is attempting to decide which new investment projects to undertake and 
particularly is used to evaluate the present value of future cashflows. The equity 
premium will also play an important role for corporate managers in relation to 
financing decisions, since it's a key determinant of the cost of equity and this plays an 
important role in deciding the appropriate mix of debt and equity for the firm. 
Investment analysts also rely upon the equity premium when making portfolio 
asset allocation decisions. Equities are typically one of the riskiest classes of assets 
and hence the equity premium, the return per unit of market risk is a crucial factor 
when analysts recommend what proportion of assets to be allocated to equities and 
what proportion to be allocated to other asset classes such as bonds, money, 
commodities or property. Investment analysts also use the equity premium for 
performance evaluation purposes of individual equities, portfolios or funds. For fund 
managers their performance relative to the benchmark is an absolutely vital, since it 
measures whether or not they have actually managed to create value for their investors 
relative to what could be expected. 
Actuaries also require an accurate estimate of the equity premium for long-
term financial planning purposes particularly in relation to personal pension funds. In 
recent decades the shift towards private provision of pensions from state provision 
means that individuals are more than ever today having to decide how much to save in 
order to adequately provide for themselves during retirement. Since, the long-term 
performance of equity markets has been extremely strong then increasingly pension 
funds tilt their asset allocation towards equities. Therefore, this places ever more 
significance on the equity premium estimates in the dual interrelated roles of 
projecting members pension payouts during retirement and determining members 
appropriate pension fund contributions. 
Therefore the equity premium is of crucial importance and key significance for 
a plethora of diverse purposes and applications within the sphere of financial theory 
and policy. However, a question is how do we determine what the reward per unit of 
risk from investing in equities should be or what it can be expected to be? Similar to 
other financial phenomena research efforts within the current paradigm have 
attempted to explain the value of the Equity Premium through using rational models 
developed in economics. However, the Equity Risk Premium is just one example of a 
growing number of observable empirical results within financial economics which 
appear inconsistent with current financial theory. The current finance paradigm seeks 
to explain the behaviour of financial markets and the behaviour of agents participating 
in these markets by using rational models developed in economics. Over recent 
decades, though, areas and topics have emerged where rational economic models 
appear unable to fully explain the behaviour we observe in finance. Perhaps, this is no 
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truer than in the case of equity premium puzzle. Standard economic models predict an 
Equity Risk Premium of less than 1% p.a., however long-term historical premia earnt 
by equities in the post-war period exceed 6% p.a. Thus, the huge difference between 
these estimates has generally been interpreted as a major failing of macroeconomic 
theory to provide an equity premia estimate in the vicinity of the historical equity 
premia. A vast literature has emerged that seeks to rationalise and attempts to explain 
these findings. 
Since the seminal paper of Mehra and Prescott ( 1985) outlining the equity 
premium puzzle, an extensive literature has emerged attempting to shed light on the 
puzzle and ultimately to offer a plausible solution. Nevertheless, there has yet to 
emerge an explanation for the equity premium puzzle that appears to have gained 
widespread support. In this thesis we focus on one particular area upon which the 
analysis of Mehra and Prescott (1985) is based, namely are historical returns an 
appropriate proxy for expected returns. In order to investigate this assumption, we 
examine alternative measures of returns based upon economic fundamentals which we 
suggest are perhaps better indicators of expected returns than historical returns. 
Relatively few studies in our context have considered this issue of the appropriateness 
of historical returns as a measure of expected returns. 
This assumption that historical equity premia are on average equal to expected 
equity premia is in fact only one of the assumptions made in the analysis of Mehra 
and Prescott (1985). Actually, most of the other assumptions made by Mehra and 
Prescott relate to the "standard" macroeconomic model they use. Therefore they make 
assumptions such as the economy consists of a single representative agent who 
maximises a power utility function and lives in a world where markets are both 
perfect and complete. The overwhelming majority of the equity premium puzzle 
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literature that has emerged over the last two decades attempts to adapt and modify this 
standard macroeconomic model in order to provide an equity premium prediction 
closer to the historical average. Therefore models with heterogeneous agents or 
market imperfections or alternative utility preferences or incomplete markets have 
been formulated. However, none of these modifications have yet provided a 
prediction from the theoretical model that approaches the empirical reality. 
We examine another possible explanation for this anomalous result that the 
empirical reality of an equity premium exceeding 6% p.a. could not have been 
expected by rational investors. Our primary area of focus for this thesis is the 
assumption that on average and in the long-run historical returns will equal expected 
returns has implications far beyond the equity premium puzzle. This assumption does 
not only underlie the analysis of the equity premium puzzle but is also made in the 
overwhelming majority of empirical studies in finance. Although, little mention of 
this assumption is usually made, it is necessary in order to conduct conventional asset 
pricing tests using historical data. Thus, the subject matter of this thesis and the 
implications of this thesis stretch far beyond its focus upon the equity premium 
puzzle. This thesis is of wider and much more general applicability to the field of 
finance since it examines a key assumption underpinning numerous empirical studies. 
As mentioned the focus of this thesis is on examining the assumption made in 
the equity premium puzzle analysis of Mehra and Prescott (1985) that historical 
returns are on average equal to expected returns. The paper closest to the approach 
followed in this paper is. that of Fama and French (2002). Fama and French (2002) 
argue that if dividends and prices are in a stable long-run relationship then dividend 
growth will provide an approximation of the price appreciation that could be 
expected. They suggest such an approach would also be applicable to variables other 
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than dividends that were in a stable long term relationship with prices, such as 
earnings. Fama and French find that in the US since 1951 the historical average equity 
premium has far exceeded the equity premia implied by dividend growth and earnings 
growth. Hence they contend that since 1951, a substantial part of the historical 
average US equity premium was unexpected. In subsequent analysis, they find that 
recently ratios of dividend-price and earnings-price have hit historical lows and they 
interpret such a result as indicative that there has been a decline in the discount rate 
and hence a decline in the expected equity premium. A corollary of Fama and 
French's analysis is that since 1951 it appears that the historical average equity 
premium was a poor proxy for the equity premium investors' could have rationally 
anticipated. 
However, thus far little research has emerged attempting to tackle the general 
Issue of the appropriateness of the assumption that the historical average equity 
premium IS an appropriate proxy for the equity premium investors' could have 
expected, let alone follow the approach of Fama and French (2002). The focus of this 
thesis is on the UK market, another of the world's major financial trading centres. 
Therefore whilst little is thus far known about the appropriateness of historical equity 
premium as a proxy for the expected equity premium in the UK context, some 
literature has emerged in relation to the UK equity premium puzzle. In Campbell's 
studies (1996, 2000, 2003) of the equity premium puzzle in international markets, he 
finds that the equity premium puzzle is very much in existence for the UK both over 
the MSCI period post-1970 but also in longer annual data series dating back to 1919. 
Dimson , Marsh and Staunton (2003) provide another international study of equity 
premia during the course of the 20th Century, however, they simply report historical 
returns rather than examining directly the equity premium puzzle. Hence, Dimson , 
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Marsh and Staunton (2003) provide evidence that the UK was one of the best 
performing equity markets during the 201h Century, although the UK didn't quite 
match the searing performance of the US. 
Hence this thesis seeks to fill some of the void left in the existing literature on 
the UK equity premium and lead to a substantial deepening of our understanding of 
this phenomenon. Furthermore, we attempt to extend the approach used in the prior 
literature and thus arguably the biggest contribution of the thesis is to extend previous 
analyses of the expected equity premium to industry portfolios and to size portfolios. 
Thus, in contrast to the extant literature we consider not just the expected aggregate 
equity premium but perform cross-sectional analyses. The key motivation in this is to 
attempt to identify if any divergences discovered between the aggregate market results 
are driven by a systematic factor. If discrepancies were caused by a systematic factor 
then such an effect should also be present in the time-series of portfolios formed on 
cross-sectional characteristics. Of course, the impact on the cross-sectional portfolios 
will depend on their exposure to the risk factor, but all portfolios should be affected 
nonetheless. Specifically, we consider how the collective performance of firms 
grouped according to industry membership or firm size differ from the market overall. 
We address the equity risk premium in the UK, which appears to have been 
rather overlooked given the american centred nature of the current literature. 
Specifically, the first main objective of this thesis is to examine whether or not the 
historical UK equity risk premia of the magnitude observed is a suitable and fitting 
proxy for the expected UK equity risk premia could have been anticipated. Since 
expected returns are essentially unobservable, we shed light on this topic by 
examining the fundamental performance of stock market constituents. The rationale 
for this approach is that dividends are the only returns buy-and-hold investors receive 
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from holding a stock and these dividends are in the long-run dependent upon firm's 
earnings. Hence, the expected capital gains of the company should reflect its expected 
fundamental performance. Overall, company fundamentals fluctuate much less than 
share prices and thus company fundamentals should provide more accurate estimates 
of expected capital gains than historical share price appreciation. 
We therefore examine a number of key issues relating to this general topic. 
We attempt to shed light on this topic by considering a range of issues: 
• To what extent have historical equity premia been supported by the 
underlying performance of fundamentals? 
e Are there any discrepancies between historical returns and those implied 
by fundamentals? 
• Do alternative measures of fundamentals yield results that are consistent 
with each other? 
• Do the specific characteristics of the UK market lead to results that differ 
from other markets? 
• Are the results for the aggregate market generalisable to portfolios formed 
according to cross-sectional characteristics? 
If there are discrepancies between the historical equity premium estimates and 
those implied by fundamentals then we need to consider the factors which could have 
caused this to occur. For this issue our analysis is based on the insight of the present 
value model of stock returns. We especially draw upon the derivation of Campbell 
· (1991) that demonstrates that deviations of actual returns from expectations can be 
attributed to either a change in expectations of future fundamental growth rates or a 
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change in expectations of future expected returns. Hence this naturally leads us to ask 
the following auxiliary questions: 
• Are deviations of historical returns from those implied by fundamentals 
due to a change in expectations of future fundamental growth? 
• Is there time variation in expectations of future fundamental growth? 
• Are deviations of historical returns from those implied by fundamentals 
due to a change in expectations of future returns? 
• Have there been any structural changes in the relationship between prices 
and fundamentals? 
Chapter 2 surveys the growing literature which has emerged in relation to the 
topics covered in the thesis. It begins with the establishment of the equity premium 
puzzle by Mehra and Prescott ( 1985) with their seminal paper. Then it proceeds to 
discuss the risk-free rate puzzle attributed to Weil (1989) but which is implicit in the 
formulation of the equity premium puzzle. Both these initial studies focus purely on 
US data for their empirical analysis, however, Campbell (1996, 2000, 2003) illustrates 
that these puzzles apply not only to the US but in almost all of the international 
markets he surveys. The assumptions under which these puzzles exist are stated and a 
review of the proposed modifications of these assumptions in an attempt to solve the 
puzzle. Therefore models with heterogeneous agents, differing and newly developed 
utility functions as well as incomplete and imperfect market scenarios are all 
examined and evaluated. However, even after such model modifications the puzzle 
still appears to remain in the sense that agents must be extremely risk averse in order 
for the proposed solution to match the empirical reality. 
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The literature review then examines the individual strands most pertinent to 
the topics covered in the thesis. Given that the current literature on the equity 
premium puzzle has largely focussed on attempting to modify the theoretical model to 
try and match the historical data, and research efforts have thus far failed to produce 
an adequate or acceptable solution then this leads one to question whether the 
historical equity premium could in deed have been expected. Therefore, we examine 
in considerable detail previous work that has examined and questioned the 
appropriateness of using historical returns as a proxy for expected returns. This part of 
the literature points to a sizeable gap where little work has yet been produced for 
markets outside of North America. 
The literature review also includes a final section examining the size 
'anomaly' given our focus on portfolios characterised by market capitalisation in 
Chapter 5. The size premium itself has proved in its own right to be something of a 
puzzle to financial economists since it is unclear why small firms should in fact earn 
higher returns than large corporations especially given that no firm foundation has 
been provided for the higher risk that small firms might expose investors to. Perhaps 
surprisingly we find in our review of the literature on the size premium that there has 
been virtually no evidence yet produced as to whether or not the historical size 
premium was expected by investors. 
In Chapter 3 we examine the UK equity premium in the context of more than a 
century of UK data. This therefore makes an important contribution by examining the 
equity premium over an extremely long period, which is in fact longer than previous 
studies looking outside of the US have considered. We empirically examine if the 
historical equity premium is supported by growth in dividends. For the earlier part of 
the 20th Century it appears that historical average equity premia are commensurate 
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with those implied by dividend growth. However, we find that this is not the case for 
the latter part of the 20th Century and therefore examine what could have caused this 
discrepancy between equity premia estimates. It could be ascribed to either a change 
in expectations of returns or a change in expectations of dividend growth. Thus we 
provide further empirical analysis of both these issues. This chapter makes further 
contributions to the literature on both the predictability and forecastability of dividend 
growth. However, ultimately we find little evidence to support the hypothesis that a 
change in expected dividend growth caused the divergence in equity premia results. 
We do find evidence to maintain the hypothesis that there has been a change in 
expected returns. Our analysis on the structural stability of the dividend-price ratio 
reveals there was a permanent decline in the early 1990s. This is indicative that 
expected returns permanent fall in the early 1990s. Such a fall in expected returns can 
reconcile and explain our equity premia results for the post -1950 period. 
In Chapter 4 we examine the equity premium across industry portfolios over 
recent decades. This is an important innovation since little attention thus far has been 
paid to the industry dynamic of the equity premium. As a matter of fact, the 
overwhelming majority of studies on the equity premium puzzle only consider the 
aggregate market. We contend that there have been widespread and dramatic changes 
in the nature of the industries comprising the market index over recent decades, which 
could potentially shed light on the nature of the puzzle. We provide evidence that this 
is in actuality the case. The results presented here question the extent to which 
historical returns deviated from that which could be justified on the basis of growth in 
fundamentals. In Chapter 4 we also consider earnings growth as an additional measure 
of fundamental growth alongside dividend growth utilised in Chapter 3. We find that 
the results of the expected equity premium model are dependent upon whether 
10 
dividends or earnings are used as the measure of fundamentals. For most industries, 
when earnings growth is used as the measure of underlying performance then equity 
premium estimates are approximately the same as the historical average equity 
premium. In contrast when dividend growth is used we find that equity premium is in 
almost all cases smaller than the historical average, similar to the aggregate market 
results reported in Chapter 3. 
In Chapter 5 we examine the equity premium across size and size-value sorted 
portfolios over 1966-2002. This chapter provides an investigation of the size 
premium, one of the most famous stock market anomalies. Of course the size 
premium can simply be viewed as just the equity premium on small firms minus the 
equity premium on large firms. Hence the size premium is closely related to the equity 
premium, the central theme of this thesis. We begin by revisiting the evidence on the 
scale of the ex-post size premium in the UK, providing evidence that questions the 
conventional wisdom which maintains the size premium either disappeared or 
reversed following its discovery. However, the major innovation of the chapter is to 
examine the degree to which the size premium is supported by underlying 
fundamentals. There is virtually no prior research, thus far, that examines whether or 
not this cross-sectional return could be expected - at least in terms of the differentials 
between fundamental growth rates of small and large firms. This chapter seeks to 
bridge this gap in the literature by specifically focusing upon this issue of whether a 
size premium is expected on the basis of differentials in growth rates between small 
and large companies. We find that in fact the size premium is supported by a 
differential in underlying fundamental growth between large and small firms and 
hence such a premium can be expected. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 EQUITY PREMIUM PUZZLE LITERATURE REVIEW 
The current finance paradigm is based upon a couple of key basic 
fundamentals. The first is the existence of a linear relationship between risk and 
expected return for the asset pricing model considered. The second draws upon the 
economic framework that financial economics has evolved from. This assumed 
economic environment is based upon the belief that almost all behaviour can be 
explained by assuming that rational agents with stable well-defined utility functions 
interact in well-functioning markets. In such a framework, an empirical result 
qualifies as an anomaly if it is hard to explain using standard models or if implausible 
assumptions are necessary to solve it within the paradigm. One such example of an 
empirical result which is believed to be an anomaly is the equity risk premium. 
The equity risk premium is the reward, in terms of the difference between the 
return on the equity market portfolio and a risk-free asset, for exposing oneself to the 
risk of the market portfolio. The theoretical price of bearing this risk can be derived 
from the consumption capital asset pricing model (CCAPM). The CCAPM assumes 
investors use financial securities to transfer consumption opportunities from periods 
when they are plentiful to periods when they are scarce. In equilibrium, this model 
asserts that the current utility foregone by investing is exactly equal to the expected 
utility gain from future consumption when the asset pays off. 
Pru'(Cr) = Er[/Ju'(Cr+l)xr+l] 
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The current utility forgone is given by the price of the asset or amount 
invested (p1) multiplied by the marginal utility of current consumption [u '( c1)]. P 
determines how much future consumption is less desirable than current consumption, 
u'(ct+ 1) is the marginal consumption of future consumption at time t+l and Xt+I is the 
future payoff received at time t+ 1. Therefore the product of these 3 terms gives us the 
expected utility gain from consumption in the next period from investing p1• 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) took a rather circuitous route to analyse the equity 
premium. Their approach employs a general equilibrium model, based upon Lucas' 
( 1978) pure exchange economy. In such an economy, the joint process governing the 
growth rates in per capita consumption and asset prices are stationary and clearly 
defined. The economy has a single representative agent, who decides upon his optimal 
consumption plan according to its utility function. It's assumed that the agent has a 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function. Thus the current value of 
oo Bs (C )1-a 
expected future utility is expressed as: E, ~ ( l ~:) , where a>O, where £ 1 is 
the expectation at time t, B, is the discount factor of future consumption, C1, is the 
random consumption stream, and a, is the coefficient of risk aversion 1• 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) demonstrate that within standard models of the 
CCAPM and by making only plausible assumptions that the reward for investing in 
stocks is far greater than can be justified by the degree of risk taken. They assume 
there is a representative agent, who has an additively separable utility function, and 
constant relative risk aversion. 
1 a the coefficient (of relative risk aversion), which is the percentage that the marginal value of a dollar 
income must increase to offset a I% fall in consumption, for equilibrium to hold. 
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They used data from 1889-1978 for their study. The start date was the earliest 
for which reliable consumption and growth data available. For this sample period, the 
average real rate of return on bonds is 1% but is 7% for stocks, yielding an equity 
premium of 6% per annum. Actually, Mehra and Prescott found the maximum 
admissible value for the equity premium to be 0.35%, obviously this is completely 
inconsistent with the observed historical rate of 6%. In this model, a would need to be 
approximately 30-40 to explain the historic equity risk premium. Many empirical 
studies have estimated the coefficient of risk aversion since it's of importance in many 
fields of economics and the general consensus is that its value should be around 1-22• 
Hence, a of 30 or 40 is believed to be an implausibly high level of risk aversion, it 
implies individuals desperately want to smooth consumption over time. 
Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) developed volatility bounds as a diagnostic 
for asset pricing models. This places a limit on the maximum (or minimum) possible 
mean of an asset for a given asset's variance. If an asset is placed outside of the 
volatility bounds then it can be deemed inconsistent with the data or anomalous. 
When evaluating the return on equities using the Consumption CAPM then the Equity 
Premium is plotted staggeringly far outside of the volatility bound. This method is a 
very direct way to assess if a given data set is consistent with the model under 
consideration and consequently it has been used extensively to assess the equity 
premmm. 
Weil (1989) extends the analysis to look at the risk-free rate and concludes 
that actual bond returns are puzzlingly low compared to the prediction of the model. 
This points to a second puzzle, the low risk-free rate. This leads Epstein and Zin 
2 Arrow (1971), Friend and Blume (1975) 
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( 1991) to comment that "existing results suggest that explaining bond and stock 
returns jointly poses a problem for the expected utility model." 
Campbell (1996, 1999, 2003) documents that the equity premium and risk-free 
rate puzzles are not merely confined to the US market. Using the Hansen-Jagannathan 
(1991) bounds method, Campbell shows that these puzzles are also prevalent in all 10 
international security markets he considers throughout the world based on data from 
1970 onwards. They are also apparent in longer datasets for the UK and Sweden 
dating from 1920 onwards. Campbell also provides evidence that these puzzles are 
robust to the use of long-term bonds in place of treasury bills as the relatively safe 
asset. Thus, he also finds that a bond premium and equity-bond premium puzzle exist 
in all 10 international stock markets. 
2.2.1 DEFINITION OF THE EQUITY PREMIUM PUZZLE: 
The equity premium puzzle has spawned a huge literature that attempts to 
provide a solution to the puzzle. Much of this research has questioned the underlying 
assumptions of the model and the rational economic paradigm. The analysis of the 
Equity Premium Puzzle by Mehra and Prescott, and Campbell rests upon are the 
following assumptions: 
i) Asset markets are complete. 
ii) Financial markets are perfect. 
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iii) Investor preferences can be well described by a power utility 
function. 
iv) There is one homogeneous agent who invests in the stock 
market. 
v) Realised returns are on average equal to investors' expected 
return. 
vi) Consumption is the agent's ultimate aim (or if wealth is 
investor's ultimate aim then consumption is a suitable proxy for it). 
vii) Economic agents can't rationally be so risk-averse as to have a 
coefficient of relative risk aversion (a) of 10, let alone 20 or 40. 
Any solution to the equity premium puzzle must relax at least one of these 
assumptions, each of which tends to be very commonly made within the financial 
economics paradigm. In fact, in the literature that has emerged on the equity premium 
puzzle each of these assumptions have been challenged by researchers. Some 
assumptions have been examined particularly extensively, whilst others have received 
relatively little attention. We examine the literature relating to each assumption in tum 
in the following sections. 
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2.2.2 MODIFICATIONS TO THE UTILITY FUNCTION 
The analysis of Mehra and Prescott (1985) makes the assumption that investor 
preferences can be well described by power utility functions. Although, such Constant 
Relative Risk A version Utility functions are used widely in economics there have 
been at least a couple of major flaws documented relating to them. Whilst these 
critiques are general criticisms of these type of utility functions, they are of course of 
pertinent to all applications where they are employed. Thus, these critiques have 
important implications for many separate and disparate areas of economics of which 
the Equity Premium Puzzle is just one topic. They have been seen as of particular 
relevance in the Equity Premium Puzzle literature given the formulation of the puzzle 
by Mehra and Prescott ( 1985) is based upon the assumption that the representative 
agent has a utility function with constant relative risk aversion. The two major failings 
of the Constant Relative Risk A version Class of Utility functions are expounded 
below: 
Firstly, Constant Relative Risk Aversion restricts the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution to be the inverse of risk aversion. Since the equity premium 
puzzle requires investors to be implausibly highly risk averse; it also implies that 
investors are also incredibly reluctant' to transfer consumption from one period to 
another. i.e. the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is implausibly small. There is 
some debate in the literature as to what the appropriate value for the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution is. For instance, a recent study by Yogo (2003) suggests the 
US elasticity of intertemporal substitution is approximately 0.2. Vissing-Jorgenson 
and Attansio (2003) contend that when one looks at only households which are 
stockholders then the intertemporal elasticity rises to 1 or more. Nevertheless, models 
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that restrict the value of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to equal the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion tends to be strongly rejected by the data. 
Secondly, Rabin (2000) and Rabin and Thaler (2001) passionately argue and 
provide illustrations that investors do not behave as if they face constant risk aversion. 
They demonstrate that if an investor rejects a gamble when a small loss is involved 
then if he behaves consistently with that level of risk aversion he will reject gambles 
when larger losses are possible even when huge possible gains are probable (that no 
sane individual would reject). Thus, they convincingly suggest that individuals do not 
exhibit the same degree of risk aversion for large gambles as they do for small 
gambles! 
2.2.3 RATIONAL ECONOMIC MODIFICATIONS TO THE UTILITY 
FUNCTION 
The first group of theoretical explanations to the equity premium puzzle 
modify the utility function of the representative agent. One approach used by Epstein 
and Zin (1989 and 1991) was to use a generalised expected utility (GEU) function. 
This utility function can be expressed as: 
[(1-B) CPt + B(Et(Uat+s)p-a](l/pl. This is where the elasticity of substitution equals 1/(1-
p). Thus utility is a constant elasticity function of current consumption and future 
utility. This breaks the link between relative risk aversion and the elasticity of 
intertemporal substitution, which is important because the relationship assumed by the 
original utility function does not seem to hold. It also means that this utility function 
18 
doesn't view economic growth as disutility, which Mehra and Prescott's does. Hall 
(1988) corroborates the findings of Epstein and Zin (1991) that the elasticity of 
substitution is small. The GEU approach is capable of explaining approximately one 
third of the premium and it is able to explain the low risk-free rate puzzle by allowing 
intertemporal substitution and risk aversion to be high simultaneously. 
More recently Melino and Yang (2003) adapt recursive utility functions to 
include state-dependence. Their model allows for (counter-) cyclical variation in risk 
aversion and cyclical variation in intertemporal substitution. Their results suggest that 
cyclical variation in risk aversion alone adds little prospect of resolving the puzzle. 
However, in a setting with strong counter-cyclical variation in risk aversion and 
modest cyclical variation in intertemporal substitution the first two moments of the 
returns on equity and the risk-free rate can be matched. Nevertheless it still appears as 
if investors' are required to be extremely risk-averse in recessions for the model to 
appropriately fit the data. 
Another utility function that can lower the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution is habit formation. This is the concept that the utility of future 
consumption is sensitive to our current consumption. For example, if an individual 
that has high consumption today will become accustomed to high consumption and 
will have a greater longing for consumption in the next time period. This is expressed 
~ Bs (Ct+s - Ct+s-1)1-a 
by the utility function: Et ~ (l- a) . As consumption today increases, 
utility tomorrow decreases. Thus, it will take more consumption tomorrow, to yield a 
given level of utility, if he consumes more today, than he is accustomed to. 
Constantinides ( 1990) and Heaton ( 1995) claim that habit formation could be 
the key to explaining the difference in returns between stocks and bonds. This is 
19 
because habit-forming functions allow for a high variability of the marginal 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution with low variability of consumption. However 
while this is the case, the representative agent is indifferent between stocks and bonds, 
only if he is highly averse to consumption risk. Thus, habit formation, by itself is 
unable to resolve the equity premium puzzle. 
However, Chapman (2002) demonstrates that the encouraging performance of 
the Constantinides ( 1990) intrinsic habit model in respect to the resolution of the 
equity premium puzzle is due to pre-1948 consumption data. Since 1949, 
consumption growth has been much less volatile and thus the intrinsic habit model is 
unable to reconcile asset returns with consumption growth mean and standard 
deviation for reasonable values of the curvature parameter. 
Abel ( 1990) asserts that our utility is sensitive to the consumption of our peers, 
which he refers to as keeping up with the Joneses'. In this model the utility function is 
~ Bs (Ct+s/Xt+s )1-a 
defined as: Et ~ (l- a) Here, the parameter X1 is the habit level, 
determined by average social utility, or the influence of past consumption on today's 
utility. Thus if society in general has high consumption, then we will require much 
higher consumption to yield a set level of utility than if our peers' consumption is 
low. He finds that an a of 6 can provide a reasonable estimate of bond returns and the 
equity premium. Nevertheless, even an a of 6 could be thought of as being 
excessively high. The model also gives levels of volatility, particularly of the risk-free 
rate that are too large relative to the levels observed in reality. 
Campbell and Cochrane ( 1999) extend the model of habit formation 
introduced by Abel (1990). However, they capture the relationship between 
consumption and habit by making use of the surplus consumption ratio (S1). This is 
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defined as: S 1 = C
1 
-X 1 , which is simply the excess of current consumption over the 
cl 
habit level divided by current consumption. They demonstrate that if the habit level is 
fixed then if consumption rises then risk aversion falls. Thus, during economic 
expansions investors are less fearful of consumption shocks than during periods of 
recession. They represent the log consumption growth process as a random walk with 
an iid error term: ~CI+1 = g + £c,l+t. The evolution of the habit is governed by the log 
surplus consumption ratio and evolves over time according to an AR(l) process: 
S1+1 = (1- (/)) s+ {/JS 1 + A(s1 )cc,l+l (/)is the persistence parameter of the log consumption 
ratio, while A(s1 ) determines the sensitivity of habit and so surplus consumption to 
innovations in consumption growth. This is a complex non-linear function of current 
and past consumption. A linear approximation can be given by: 
~ 
X 1+1 ""(1-(j))a+ qtx1 + (l-(jJ)c1 = a+(l-(j))L (/Jj C 1_j • However, linearising 
j=O 
the model in such a manner has a potentially serious defect. This model may well lead 
to a highly volatile risk-free rate. However, when consumption falls below the habit 
level utility cannot be determined, which could quite possibly occur given the 
exogenous consumption process assumed by Campbell and Cochrane. Campbell and 
Cochrane therefore restrict the model so that the risk-free rate is constant. 
There are a couple of flaws with the Campbell-Cochrane model, which lead to 
it being unable to offer a full rationalization of the equity premium puzzle. Firstly, 
Guvenen (2003) notes that the Campbell-Cochrane model restricts the risk-free rate so 
it is constant, i.e. a(R 1 ) = 0, however, this is at odds with the US historical volatility 
of 5.44%. Secondly, although their utility function has time-varying risk aversion, in 
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order for it to rationalise the equity premium puzzle risk aversion would still need to 
be greater than 50 during "bad" economic states; thus this still requires an excessively 
high coefficient of risk aversion in order to explain the puzzle. 
Chang (1990) demonstrates that using time-varying risk aversion provides a 
solution to the puzzle. He used multiplicative separable preferences instead of the 
time-additive preferences used by Mehra and Prescott (1985). Chang (1990) found 
this to explain the equity premium puzzle with reasonable values of risk and time 
preference parameters. The use of time varying relative risk aversion appears to be an 
important ingredient to explain the puzzle. However, this approach is unconventional 
since it is generally assumed that risk aversion is constant over time. Further, for 
short time periods, it is very difficult to estimate risk aversion accurately or precisely. 
Thus, it does not offer convincing evidence that the equity premium puzzle can be 
resolved in this manner. Finally, whether or not economic agents truly behave in a 
manner consistent with multiplicative utility functions is a disputed issue; it has yet to 
be adequately established that agents do behave in such a fashion. Melina and Yang 
(2003) demonstrate if utility is addiditive rather than multiplicative then time-varying 
risk aversion alone offers little improvement over the power utility model. 
Bakshi and Naka (1997) conduct an empirical investigation of the 
performance of models using various different preferences for the Japanese market. 
They consider time non-separable utility, external habit formation utility (Abel, 1990) 
and recursive utility (Epstein-Zin, 1991). Their tests suggest that the habit formation 
utility function of Abel (1990) is the best performer. They further find that the 
recursive utility preference structure is rejected by their data. 
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2.2.4 BEHAVIOURAL FINANCE APPROACH 
Another approach has looked at departing from the consumption-based model. 
Instead of attempting to adapt the utility function to explain consumption, another 
approach is to consider changes in financial wealth. Financial wealth fluctuations are 
deemed to be of direct concern to the investor and thus should be incorporated into 
agents' preferences. This can be seen as an extension of the traditional asset-pricing 
framework. [Barberis, Huang and Santos, 2001]. However, such studies not only 
depart from the established consumption-based model but also tend to depart from the 
established style of utility functions commonplace in economic studies. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) question the validity of traditional utility 
functions. They argue that the value function differs from that assumed by 
conventional economic models in a serious manner. They claim the function of wealth 
(or payout) is kinked at a reference point. Below the reference point the function has a 
steeper slope than above. If the reference point is 0, this indicates that reductions in 
financial wealth cause a proportionately larger sense of dissatisfaction than the 
pleasure generated from an increase in financial wealth. In other words, investors are 
more averse to losses than to gains. Tversky and Kahneman ( 1991) estimate 
empirically the degree of loss aversion. Their results indicate that the disutility of 
giving something up is twice as great as the utility from gaining it. From this research 
you can derive the utility function: U(x) = x, x>O; U(x) = 2x, x<O. This demonstrates 
that financial losses hurt agents more than gains yield pleasure relative to a reference 
point. 
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Benartzi and Thaler ( 1995) make the contribution of utilizing this concept of 
loss aversion, developed from psychological investigations and applying it to the 
equity premium puzzle. This is based on the idea that agents are concerned with 
financial wealth fluctuations, thus to analyse the performance of loss aversion we 
need to determine the investment horizon of our agent. What is the time-frame our 
representative agent uses to evaluate the performance of his investments and derive 
utility from them? If the investment horizon is 20 years then we make the supposition 
that stocks will, on average, be much more attractive than bonds; equities will tend to 
earn far higher returns over this period than bonds and thus yield far superior levels of 
utility. However, if our agent evaluates utility every day, investing in stocks is very 
unattractive because they fall almost as much as they rise. Thus, for loss aversion to 
explain the premium puzzle, the investor would need to be indifferent between stocks 
and bonds i.e. they would need to yield the same level of utility. 
Benartzi and Thaler's approach is to find the evaluation period that makes 
investors indifferent between stocks and bonds. They generated distributions of 
returns for various time-horizons from CRSP time-series data. They used this to 
calculate the prospective utility of the given assets. This approach identifies that an 
evaluation period of just over one year leads to the equalization of prospect utility 
between stocks and bonds when nominal returns are used, while real returns require 
an evaluation period of 11 months. Thus it can provide a solution to the puzzle. 
Fielding and Stracca (2003) also examine loss aversion and make the contribution of 
identifying the level of risk aversion necessary for investors to be indifferent between 
stocks and bonds. Consistent with the findings of Benartzi and Thaler (1995), they 
report that loss aversion can only explain the puzzle for very short time horizons, such 
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as one year. If agents have longer investment horizons then this explanation would 
rely upon individuals being implausibly risk averse. 
A second form of the Kahneman-Tversky value function, disappointment 
aversion, has been developed by Gul (1991). In this model utility is not evaluated 
according to negative or positive fluctuations in financial wealth, but rather realized 
returns are evaluated against expected returns. The difference between the theories is 
that the reference point is no longer zero but is now equal to the level of expected 
returns. Thus returns in excess of expected returns are deemed surprises while lower 
than expected returns are called disappointments. Disappointments are more painful to 
agents than surprises are beneficial. Thus the logic underlying the utility function is 
identical to loss aversion. Fielding and Stracca (2003) also evaluate the ability of 
disappointment aversion to explain the US equity premium puzzle. They report that 
disappointment aversion can resolve the equity premium puzzle over both short and 
longer time horizons. Even over 10 year horizons the utility derived from bonds and 
equities can be equated with plausible levels of risk aversion. 
Benartzi and Thaler (1995) asserted that an evaluation period of approximately 
one year is reasonable given the tendency of mutual funds to report to their investors 
on annual basis. Thus, the loss aversion solution to the premium puzzle is to "combine 
a high sensitivity to losses with a prudent tendency to frequently monitor one's 
wealth." However, if investors are actually averse to disappointments rather than 
losses, then even if individuals have longer time horizons the puzzle can be explained; 
disappointment aversion only requires agents to be more sensitive to returns that fall 
below expectations than to returns that exceed expectations. 
However these behavioural finance approaches do have drawbacks. Firstly, 
they examined preferences over returns per se not over consumption. There is a strong 
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preference amongst financial economists for a unified approach that can link asset 
returns to the macro-economy (Campbell (2000), Cochrane (2007)). An integrated 
model (such as the CCAPM) has the benefit of allowing us deeper insights into the 
interaction between financial markets and agents' consumption, investment and 
savings decisions. Furthermore, academics and practitioners are yet to be convinced 
that preferences derived from psychological studies are more useful or more realistic 
than traditional utility functions. For example, Campbell (2000) refers to the 
"modeling of nonstandard investor behaviour" (p1552) to describe utility functions 
developed through 'behavioural finance.' Many are still to be convinced of the need 
to have different functions for gains and losses. A further practical problem with 
implementing this approach is ascertaining what the representative agent's time 
horizon is. This is very difficult to assess this with any degree of certainty. 
Shrikhande (1997) proposes a model of non-addictive habit formation which is 
formulated in a continuous time framework, which also incorporates the notion that 
investors dislike disappointments more than they enjoy surprises. This complements 
the work of Constantinides (1990) who models addictive habit formation. However, it 
builds on the notion of Duesenberry (1967) that the degree of deprivation from a 
decline in the consumption rate is much stronger than the sense of euphoria from a 
corresponding increase in the consumption rate. Thus, the utility function incorporates 
a penalty based approach when consumption falls below the past habit-forming 
consumption rate. "in my model all the weight is placed on the most recent habit-
forming consumption rate." (p295) 
The function employed is consistent with the Kahnenian-Tversky value 
function, and as mentioned above, incorporates the behavioural notion that gains yield 
less pleasure than the sadness induced by a corresponding fall in consumption. The 
26 
reference point is this case is the past habit-forming consumption rate. Thus, these 
preferences do reflect the findings of experimental tests on investor behaviour. 
Shrikhande's model relies upon constant relative risk aversion 
Non-addictive habit formation complements and extends prior research. For 
example, unlike Constantinides (1990) the real riskless interest rate is endogenised. 
Furthermore, for a fall in consumption below the habit level there is a finite rather 
than an infinite penalty as in the models of Constantinides (1990) and Sundaresen 
(1989). Habit formation provides a strong justification for a consumption series that 
is smoother than the wealth series. 
Non-addictive habit formation does provide a resolution to the equity premium 
puzzle. The parameter values required to resolve the puzzle appear to be reasonable. 
2.2.5 INDIVIDUALS REALLY ARE EXTREMELY RISK A VERSE 
Mehra and Prescott's formulation of the equity premium puzzle permitted a 
maximum coefficient of relative risk aversion of 10, which appeared a somewhat high 
upper bound given the extant microeconomic literature. Since Mehra and Prescott find 
a coefficient of risk aversion much greater than 10 is required to generate a risk 
premium of the magnitude observed historically in the US they state the equity 
premium is puzzling. 
Kocherlakota (1996) argues if utility functions are to explain 
the equity premium puzzle within the current paradigm, "Individuals 
must either be highly averse to their own consumption risk or to per 
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capita consumption risk if they are to be marginally indifferent 
between investing in stocks or bonds." 
Nevertheless, some economists contend that agents in certain circumstances 
actually are extremely risk-averse. Kandel and Stambaugh (1991) subscribe to the 
view that individuals are highly averse to their own consumption risk. They claim the 
equity risk premium isn't a puzzle because individuals can really be extremely risk 
averse for very small shocks to investor wealth. They believe a equal to 29, which is 
the necessary figure their analysis requires to solve the puzzles, is possible. They 
illustrate with the example of an investor facing a gamble with a 50% chance of 
winning but also a 50% chance of losing. In this case the gamble is for 0.5% of the 
investors' wealth, $375, then the investor would be willing to pay $1.88 to avoid the 
gamble if alpha equals 2, whereas if alpha is 30 he would pay $28. It would appear 
that the second result appears more plausible and investors could be highly risk 
averse. However, they also demonstrate that for a similar gamble for 113 of the 
investors' wealth, then if alpha is 30 the investor would pay $24,000 to avoid losing 
$25,000 whereas if alpha is 2 then he will pay $8,333. Clearly, alpha equal to 2 
appears more sensible in this case with alpha equal to 30 yielding an absurd result. 
These illustrations demonstrate that risk aversion can be sensitive to the size of 
gamble considered. Thus, they believe one should not automatically disregard such 
high values of relative risk aversion as 29. Hence they find that "the key ingredient in 
obtaining a high equity premium is a high aversion to small gambles." 
Rabin (2000) shows that standard expected utility theory has serious failings if 
an individual turns down a gamble where s/he might lose only a small amount. If an 
individual for example turns down a 50-50 gamble of winning £11 but losing £10, 
then they would always reject a 50-50 bet of losing £100, no matter what the potential 
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gain were. Even if it were £2.5 Billion! Thus, there appears to be some seriously 
disturbing and seemingly implausible implications of risk aversion in the expected 
utility framework. 
Consequently Rabin's study suggests that assuming that risk aversion is fixed 
for small and large gambles is incompatible with what we would believe to be 
'normal' or 'rational' human behaviour! Reasonable behaviour over small gambles 
implies unreasonable behaviour when large gambles are considered. However, for the 
equity premium puzzle we have seemingly unreasonable behaviour when substantial 
funds are invested, which would suggest if we apply the same risk aversion 
coefficient to small gambles we would have doubly unreasonable outcomes. 
Nevertheless, until we are aware of the proportion of individuals' wealth 
invested in securities it will fall short of offering an acceptable solution to the equity 
premium puzzle. Is the proportion of wealth invested in equities low enough to justify 
high a values? If not, then it can't help explain the equity premium puzzle. Our 
representative agent, one would surmise is not concerned with investing tiny sums of 
money but rather economically substantial amounts. The saving decision is one of the 
key economic decisions agents make and the equity market is a large and increasingly 
important vehicle for saving. Thus, this anecdotal evidence would suggest that the 
analysis of Rabin (2000, 2001) does not appear to considerably aid the search for a 
solution to the Equity Premium Puzzle. 
Furthermore, even if some empirical support for the hypothesis were to 
emerge, it is likely that a great deal of further evidence to verify this solution would 
be necessary because generally very high levels of risk aversion are not commonly 
accepted. For example, Lucas (1994) claims that any proposed solution that, "does not 
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explain the premium (with) Alpha < 2.5 ... is ... likely to be viewed as a resolution that 
depends on a high degree of risk aversion." 
Papers which claim to provide solutions to the equity premium puzzle, but 
require relative risk aversion to be 10 or 20 or 40, are likely to be simply viewed as 
insufficient to persuade the majority of economists that an adequate solution to the 
equity premium puzzle has been provided. For risk aversion to be 30 or larger then 
investors would have to be terrified of the potential downside potential of their 
portfolio. In fact it has been suggested that if one accepts a level of risk aversion of 30 
or more as a solution to the equity premium puzzle then this should be deemed the 
"smelly" solution. This is because if someone truly was that risk-averse then they 
would never take a bath as they would be far too worried about the risk of slipping 
and falling over getting into the bath. Mehra and Prescott (1985), thus conclude the 
premium is far too big, in fact puzzlingly massive and is unable to be explained by a 
standard consumption-based model. 
2.2.6 MARKE'f IMPERFECTIONS 
Another explanation could be that transaction costs might remove the apparent 
utility benefits of trading stocks. This relaxes the seemingly unrealistic assumption 
made under perfect markets that trading is costless. Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) refer 
to the 3 main transaction costs involved in dealing shares as: a) brokerage commission 
costs, b) bid-ask spreads and c) information costs. For individual investors the largest 
fees appear to be the brokerage fees which when Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) wrote 
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tended to be about five to eight per cent of the total value of the transaction. The bid-
ask spread costs are smaller and were about 0.5% for the largest 50% of firms but they 
increase as firm size decreases to average 1% for the smaller 50%. However, for the 
very smallest firms the spread can be more than 5%. These are the main financial 
costs involved in trading, but managing a stock portfolio is neither costless nor 
effortless in terms of the information costs involved. However, transaction costs can 
only be a way to explain the equity premium if one can assert that there are significant 
differences in trading costs across the stock and bond markets. Can transaction costs 
for stocks really be that much higher than for bonds? They would appear to be higher. 
Equities are more frequently traded and brokerage, spread and information costs for 
bonds would be smaller than for stocks. Further, Bogle (1999) finds that the cost of 
holding a mutual index fund is approximately 1-2% of total investment per annum, 
which is a substantial expense. Taking account of this would reduce equity returns 
and the equity premium by the same amount, going some way to explain the puzzle. 
However, transaction costs have not yet been incorporated into models of the 
CCAPM. Thus it is difficult to examine the extent to which, they can help explain the 
equity premium, unless we make seemingly arbitrary adjustments to returns, which 
we would prefer to avoid. At best, transaction costs can provide a partial explanation 
for the magnitude of the premium; it is difficult to see how they can offer a full 
solution to the puzzle. 
The He and Modest (1995) trading costs model has the impact of lowering 
returns. Consequently, the imposition of market frictions reduces the incentive for 
consumers' to invest in assets and thus substitute future consumption for current 
consumption. He and Modest provide specifications of the fundament valuation 
relationship when there are market imperfections. They identify the case of short-sale 
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constraints, borrowing constraints and transaction costs. Estimations of the Hansen-
Jagannathan volatility bound are performed for each type of market friction and for 
many combinations. It appears that market frictions are capable of stretching the 
mean-variance volatility bound outwards for assets that are negatively correlated with 
consumption, but has only a marginal impact upon the bound for assets that are 
positively correlated with consumption. Stock returns are positively correlated with 
consumption and thus consequently this model of market frictions looks doomed to 
fail in explaining the equity premium puzzle. 
Luttmer (1999) uses a different approach which focuses upon fixed trading 
costs, whereas much of the costs in He and Modest (1995) varied with the size of 
transaction. Luttmer (1999) estimates that a minimum fixed cost of 5.75% of monthly 
consumption would be required to rationalise the equity premium, if the other 
assumptions in the traditional formulation of the equity premium puzzle are made. 
However, he notes that if risk aversion is increased or if habit-forming preferences are 
introduced then the scale of the fixed cost reduces substantially. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that introducing market frictions alone in Luttmer' s model is insufficient to 
resolve the puzzle; fixed costs of 5.75% of monthly consumption are far higher than 
could reasonably be observed in reality. Even with habit-forming preferences, it still 
appears that the fixed costs involved are likely to be rather high. Thus, again unless it 
is assumed that investors are highly risk-averse then fixed trading costs appear not to 
offer an adequate solution to the equity premium puzzle. 
Maki and Sonoda (2002) examine the Japanese equity market using a data set 
of over 20 years of monthly data from January 1975 to November 1995. They report 
the real return for secure assets is 3%, while it is 6% for risky assets. Thus the 
Japanese equity premium is a mere 3% during their sample period. A model that 
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doesn't allow for market imperfections performs very poorly and can only explain a 
small proportion of the observed equity risk premium. However, once trading costs 
are incorporated into the models they perform much better providing close 
approximation of the actual equity premium, with very low levels of risk aversion. 
Thus the authors claim to provide an empirical solution of the equity premium 
puzzle if there are market frictions. Nevertheless, they concede that there is still some 
variation between the trading cost model results and the observed data. However, this 
is not the major flaw with their approach; they claim their model is based upon that of 
He and Modest (1995) but in actuality they fundamentally alter the model, in a 
manner that is difficult to understand, let alone justify. They propose that trading costs 
for risky assets include several components including wealth and risk factors, using 
these factors to estimate the bounds within which the price should lie. This is very 
different from the estimation technique of He and Modest and it appears difficult to 
understand why Maki and Sonoda have adopted the model specification they use. 
Maki and Sonoda infer the expected equity premium and risk-free rate from Euler 
equations based upon parameters of the lifetime utility function. 
2.2.7 INCOMPLETE MARKETS 
A complete market is a market where agents are able to buy or sell assets so as 
to protect themselves against any possible future outcome. If markets are not 
complete, as Mehra and Prescott assume, then this might cause there to be deviations 
from the behaviour our model would rationally expect. Constantinides and Duffie 
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(1996) point to the insurance market for unemployment being incomplete. For 
example, investors are unlikely to be able to fully insure against the risk of 
unemployment. Consequently, this will affect their preferences when they choose 
their investments. For example, they will strongly favour assets that have high returns 
in bad states when the risk of unemployment is highest. Thus, they would seek to 
avoid assets which offer relatively low returns in difficult economic conditions, unless 
they offered extremely high rates of return in other states of the world. If it could be 
demonstrated that equities offer poor returns during bad states then this would provide 
a rationale for a high (average) equity premium. 
Another market that could be argued is incomplete is the borrowing market. 
Constantinides, Donaldson and Mehra (2002) investigate the impact of this. They 
suggest that middle-aged investors tend to be easily able to borrow money, but 
generally young investors find it much more difficult. Since 'junior' will desire to 
consume almost all his current income, the borrowing constraint, prevents them from 
being as active in financial markets as s/he would wish, in fact they claim it almost 
excludes young people from the market altogether. They argue that this has an 
important impact upon the security markets. Firstly, the young would particularly 
wish to borrow and invest in equities. Secondly, middle-aged investors, who are 
active in financial markets, aren't as attracted to equities as 'junior' would be because 
they suggest the correlation of equity income with consumption changes over the 
lifetime of an individual. Consequently, it is claimed if 'junior' didn't face a 
borrowing constraint then the mean equity premium would decrease while the rate of 
interest would increase. 
Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (2002) test if complete insurance markets 
could rationalise the equity premium. They find that the hypothesis by itself is unable 
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to solve the premium with plausible levels of risk aversion. However, if it is combined 
with the limited market participation we know exists then it does provide a solution 
albeit with a high level of risk aversion. Their evidence is interesting because it covers 
a more recent period than Mehra and Prescott's study, during which they find the 
premium puzzle is still in existence. 
This strand of the literature poses several interesting questions. Could 
borrowing constraints and uninsurable income shocks really have such a large impact 
to justify an equity premium of this magnitude? Can agents really be so desperate to 
smooth their income so as to ignore such high returns on equity investments? Could 
stocks really be that unattractive to any agents or could any agents be so risk averse? 
While there might be separate sets of investors with different preferences, such 
explanations still rely upon tbe investors most active in the market being extremely 
sensitive to consumption shocks in order to justify the excess returns received by 
equity holders. This area of research is intriguing and while it is important to analyse 
the impact of markets not being complete or agents being heterogeneous it doesn't 
appear to alter the conclusions of Mehra and Prescott. These models do not appear 
capable of explaining the difference in performance between stocks and bonds, 
without requiring investors to be extremely risk averse. 
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2.2.8 ARE INVESTORS HOMOGENEOUS? WHY DO SOME 
INVESTORS PARTICIPATE IN CAPITAL MARKETS WIDLE THE 
MAJORITY DO NOT? 
A further issue with the Mehra-Prescott model is that it is a representative 
agent model. However, there are a multitude of different agents active in any real-life 
economy. Furthermore, and particularly pertinent for our field of interest not all 
agents are active in the stock market. In fact, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) find% of 
individuals do not hold stocks except for pensions. Obviously, agents active in 
security markets should be affected by market movements much more than inactive 
members. Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) find individual's that hold stocks have 
consumption three times more sensitive to stock market fluctuations than the 
aggregate data and their consumption is more correlated with the equity index returns. 
They find that the, "implied coefficient of relative risk aversion based on stockholder 
consumption is only about 1/3 of that based upon the consumption of all families." 
Thus it is important to recognize that agents who do hold securities will be more 
affected by market returns than others. This should be taken into account in empirical 
modeling and could lead to more 'sensible' estimations of the representative agent's 
relative risk aversion. 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), investigates the intertemporal preferences of asset 
holders and non-asset holders. She finds that asset holders have statistically and 
economically significantly higher elasticities of intertemporal substitution relative to 
non-asset holders. Perhaps, intuitively this result is unsurprising, that asset holders 
smooth their consumption through time much more than non-asset holders. However 
it demonstrates a substantial difference in intertemporal preferences between asset and 
36 
non-asset holders and thus can motivate the use of asset holders consumption in asset 
pricing models. The implications of this are that asset holders consumption is much 
more volatile than aggregate consumption and thus will mean the equity premium 
puzzle can, ceteris paribus, be resolved with lower levels of risk aversion. 
Guvenen (2005), proposes a model with two agents which features both 
limited stock market participation and heterogeneous elasticity of intertemporal 
substitution. His model suggests that with relative risk aversion of 2 an equity 
premium of 3.1% can be generated along with other empirical results such as a low 
risk-free rate that are consistent with the data. However, the equity premium estimate 
of 3.1 %, is still somewhat short of the historical average but at least such a figure can 
be generated with appropriate levels of risk aversion. 
Brav et al. (2002) as already referred to m the section on market 
incompleteness report that the combination of market incompleteness and limited 
market participation can aid the standard model, although such a model still requires a 
high level of risk aversion to resolve the model. Constantinides, Donaldson and 
Mehra (2002), is another study earlier referred to which examines the joint impact of 
market incompleteness and agent heterogeneity, which also finds such a model can 
reduce the level of risk aversion necessary to solve the puzzle, however, not to the 
extent where it really provides an adequate solution to the puzzle. 
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2.2.9 CONSUMPTION-BASED ASSET PRICING IS A 
FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED IDEA? 
Firstly, the consumption based asset-pricing model can be questioned on its 
implications regarding the way agents view investment decisions. It has been claimed 
that agents simply do not act in the manner the consumption model proposes. For 
example, Shiller (1999), Welch (2001) and proponents of behavioural finance would 
propose that agents view investment and labour income separately and they consider 
each in isolation for decision-making purposes. This position is based on the notion of 
different mental compartments developed in other social sciences. 
A second cynical view, would note that the CCAPM has performed 
atrociously badly in empirical tests until very recently. As such maybe it should come 
as no surprise that the model is incapable of explaining the equity premium, since it 
has almost universally been close to entirely ineffective at describing financial market 
behaviour. In light of this, perhaps we should see this evidence as that of further 
failings of the consumption based model, rather than as a puzzle. 
Critiques of the use of aggregate consumption in empirical models have been 
articulated. For instance, one such criticism relates to the use of consumption as the 
objective function in the economic model. Black (1990) claims that consumption data 
is an inappropriate proxy for wealth when used for risk purposes. This is because 
people smooth their consumption when their wealth fluctuates. In fact, wealth 
volatility is approximately three times greater than consumption volatility. Thus, it 
appears empirical testing so far has been flawed because it has been unable to 
adequately match shareholders' returns to their wealth. Since the Mehra and Prescott 
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model implies aggregate consumption growth is too smooth to justify the historic 
equity premium, the use of changes in wealth instead of consumption potentially 
offers an important step to resolving the puzzle. Therefore, using aggregate wealth 
would lower a to a more acceptable and plausible figure. Thus, future investigations 
of the equity premium puzzle could examine if using wealth fluctuations rather than 
consumption fluctuations then what level of equity premium could be justified given 
plausible parameters of other variables. 
2.2.10 CONCLUSION 
Kocherlakota (1996) argues there are only 2 theoretical rationalisations for the 
large equity premium. Either investors actually are much more averse to consumption 
risk than we thought or trading stocks is much more costly than trading bonds. In fact, 
neither explanation has yet provided persuasive evidence that it can resolve the equity 
premium using economic models. Further research into transaction costs and risk 
aversion are needed to provide scientific evidence that the puzzle can be resolved by 
either approach. There is a third possible theoretical explanation, that investors exhibit 
some sort of loss or disappointment aversion. However, this theory has yet to be 
widely recognized as a plausible explanation for the premium puzzle, largely because 
it is outside the realms of the consumption based asset pricing model and rests on the 
dirty notion of 'non-standard' investor preferences. A fourth proposed area, which 
could have an impact upon the puzzle is the assertion that markets are incomplete. 
Perhaps, heterogeneous investors facing borrowing constraints and uninsurable 
income shocks might have some impact upon the puzzle. However this research is 
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still at an early stage. Furthermore, despite all the endeavours of researchers to modify 
the theoretical model, any resolution of the equity premium puzzle within the rational 
economic paradigm seems reliant upon economic agents having extremely high levels 
of risk aversion. 
Secondly, building on the work of Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and Black 
( 1990), it can be suggested that empirical modelling of consumption has been flawed 
because it has looked generally at stock returns upon consumption, rather than 
examining the impact of stock returns upon stockholders' wealth. The key fact is that 
stockholders' wealth is much more volatile than aggregate consumption. Thus 
previous empirical studies would over-estimate the level of risk aversion necessary to 
explain the puzzle. Attempts should be made to incorporate these factors into future 
research, to allow a clearer picture of the state of the equity premium to emerge. 
There are areas that require further research and which appear like they 
plausibly could have the potential to rationalise and explain the equity premium 
puzzle. However, the equity risk premium will remain a puzzle, for the time being, 
until persuasive evidence can be provided that it can be resolved in a manner 
acceptable to academics and practitioners. Still, it could be contended that rather than 
being labeled a puzzle the equity premium is actually merely additional empirical 
evidence of the deficiencies of consumption-based asset pricing models. If, after 
almost 20 years of intensive research conducted by many of the most respected and 
well reputed financial economists on the planet, few, if any, substantive solutions to 
the puzzle have been provided, then we might have to start considering an 
uncomfortable conclusion that the equity premium is indicative that the general 
approach of the consumption CAPM model employed is unsuitable and inadequate. 
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2.3 - LITERATURE REVIEW ON CALCULATING EQUITY 
PREMIUM 
2.3.1 EMPIRICAL MODELING OF ASSET RETURNS 
In relation to the equity premium puzzle, the case has been made that there are 
empirical factors which need adjustment. Firstly, with regard to the return on the 
relatively riskless asset. There is persuasive evidence indicating that outside the 
period investigated by Mehra and Prescott (1889-1978), the real rate of return on 
bonds has been substantially higher than the 1% found in their sample. Siegel (1992) 
provides reliable evidence that the risk-free rate was 3% between 1870-1890 and 
between 1980-1990. Thus, Ceccheti, Lam and Mark ( 1993) findings that the risk free 
rate was 2.11% for the period 1871-1987 are unsurprising. A risk-free rate of 2-3% 
would substantially ease the risk-free rate puzzle, as well as reduce the scale of the 
equity premium puzzle. 
Siegel ( 1992, 1999) looked at real equity and bond returns between 1802-
present. He reports that the annual excess returns on the stock market have risen from 
2.9% in 1802-1870 to 4. 7% for 1871-1925 to 8.1% for 1926-present. However, the 
real rate of return of equity has remained remarkably constant over time. He found the 
"primary source of this equity premium has been the fall in the real return on bonds, 
not the rise in the return on equity." The implication is that Mehra and Prescott's data 
might not provide a suitable estimation of the historic value of the risk-free rate or of 
the equity risk premium. In a historical context, it appears the period from 1926 until 
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the new millennium has been one where an abnormally high equity premium has been 
observed vis-a-vis previous periods. 
Siegel (1999), "the degree of the equity premium calculated 
from data estimated from 1926-1980 is unlike I y to persist in the 
future". Thus, Siegel (1999) argues "given transaction costs3, I assume 
that equity investors experienced real returns of 5-6% historically 
rather than the 7% calculated from indices. Assuming a 3.5% real 
return on bonds, the historical equity premium may be more like 1.5% 
to 2.5%, rather than the 6% recorded by Mehra and Prescott." An 
equity premium of 1.5 or 2.5% with a risk-free return of 3.5% would 
be much more easily explained by economic models. Thus, it is 
possible to claim that equity premium puzzle was spurious and merely 
a facet of Mehra and Prescott's unrepresentative data set. 
There are two major flaws in this argument of Siegel (1999), that the equity 
premium puzzle is spurious. Firstly, Mehra and Prescott used the longest period for 
which reliable consumption data was available and it was a large sample of almost 
1 00 years. Hence, their data sample will contain useful and meaningful information 
about the equity premium puzzle during this period and thus their findings can't 
simply be disregarded and overlooked. Secondly and more importantly, it appears that 
Siegel is manipulating the data in ari attempt to make the equity premium appear, as 
small as possible, or as easy to explain as possible. His use of a risk-free rate of 3.5% 
is very high compared to the estimate of 2.11% for 1871-1987, made by Cecchetti, 
Lam and Mark, which appears to be more representative. Further, reducing equity 
1 Bogle ( 1999) estimates the costs of mutual index funds are 1-2% per annum. 
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returns by including transaction costs based upon holding mutual funds may not be 
accurate since not everybody holds mutual funds. It would certainly be preferable to 
incorporate transaction costs into a model to explain the data rather than make 
immediate adjustments to the data. 
Nevertheless, for future analysis we should extend the data sample to the 
current time. This would include the better recent performance of bonds. It will also 
be important to include post-Millenium poor performance of stocks in the sample 
since bull market in equities of the 1980s and 1990s was one of the longest in history. 
This should make it easier to explain the performance of bonds and stocks during the 
whole sample period. It is plausible that the scale of the equity premium puzzle could 
be much reduced once such an extended period is used for analysis. Nevertheless, 
Brav, Constantinides and Geczy (2002) performed analysis on the period 1982-1996, 
which is outside that of Mehra and Prescott's study, but still found there was an equity 
premium that could only be explained with very high levels of risk aversion, once 
uninsurable income shocks and limited market participation had been accounted for. 
However, it would still be of considerable interest to see the impact that several years 
of sharply falling markets has had on the premium puzzle. 
2.3.2 ARE HISTORICAL, REALISED RETURNS AN ACCEP'fABLE 
PROXY JFOR INVESTORS' EXPECTED RETURNS? 
The equity premium is most commonly measured and forecasted using our 
observations of historical returns. However, caution should be urged upon this 
43 
approach. The sheer scale of the equity premium observed historically is a puzzle for 
financial economists. In their seminal study, Mehra and Prescott (1985) demonstrated 
that the Consumption CAPM within a general equilibrium model of a pure exchange 
economy predicted an equity premium of less than 1% p.a. This is far less than the 
annual average historical premium of more than 6% p.a.; the Mehra and Prescott 
model can only reconcile the empirical facts with the theoretical model if investors are 
exceptionally risk-averse, far more risk averse than most economists would deem to 
be plausible. Hence an equity premium of the enormity observed historically is 
deemed to be a puzzle. 
One of the assumptions made by Mehra and Prescott in the formulation of 
their model is that returns observed ex-post at the end of the sample were on average 
equal to ex-ante returns formed by investors at the beginning of the sample period4. 
They make this assumption in order to operationalise the model since asset pricing 
theory in particular is based upon investors' expectations of risk and return. However, 
they use historical data in order to test the model. Such an assumption is a key 
supposition made not just by Mehra and Prescott but rather the overwhelming 
majority of empirical work that tests Asset Pricing Models. Thus, the assumption that 
observed historical values of risk and return are on average equal to investors' 
expectations underpins the overwhelming majority of empirical studies in Finance. 
This, often implicitly made assumption, that empirical observations of risk and return 
are on average and in the long-run equal to investors expectations are necessary in 
order to operationalise the asset pricing model. However, the assumption is far from 
innocuous and critiques have emerged. 
4 Or prior to the beginning of each period in time. 
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Rietz (1988) argues that empirical observations don't fully capture agents' 
expectations. This is because investors may be rationally very concerned about the 
small chance of an economic catastrophe, such as a stock market crash, which should 
be included in the agent's expectations. Another example is that of 36 stock 
exchanges established in 1900, half experienced significant interruption or were 
abolished. Hence, estimated risk is biased downwards in the US because it is a 
survivor. When, this is incorporated into Mehra and Prescott's model, Rietz claims it 
can explain the high equity risk premia and low risk-free returns. He finds it can do so 
with reasonable degrees of time preference and risk aversion, provided crashes are 
plausibly severe and not too improbable. Mehra and Prescott (1988) responded to the 
article by Rietz claiming his, "disaster scenarios are undoubtedly extreme." Firstly, 
they suggest that the consumption shocks used in Rietz's study, the smallest a decline 
of 25% are too large, since the largest fall in US consumption in the last 100 years has 
been 8.8% and only 4 times has there been a decline greater than 5%. It should be 
borne in mind that the Wall Street Crash (1929) and following depression occurred 
within this period. 
Mehra and Prescott (1988) also point to the fact that bondholders have not 
been immune to falls in return, especially if unanticipated inflation has been high. 
They give the examples of French and German bondholders during the 1920s and 
Mexican bondholders during the 1980s. Thus during economic crises, bondholders 
appear to suffer just as much as stockholders do, rendering disaster scenarios unable 
to explain the difference between bond and equity returns. 
Goetzman and Jorion (1999) suggest that US market returns are subject to a 
survivorship bias in their study of 39 countries from around the world. They find that 
the US is the best performing financial market of any country and suggest that this is 
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in part due to its economtc success during the 20th Century. Therefore, how 
representative the US market experience is of other markets around the world is 
clearly an area which would benefit from further research, especially given the 
extremely strong performance of US equities. However, Goetzman and Jorion do not 
directly address the equity premium puzzle as such since they do not report how 
treasury bill or bondholders fared in the countries studied. Furthermore, for the 
premium puzzle consumption volatility is a key factor for determining the permissible 
area for equity premium to lie within the Hansen-Jagannathan bounds. The equity 
premium puzzle analysis originated based purely on US data and so further 
examination of this issue is necessary. It is plausible that within at least some of the 
countries surveyed by Goetzman and Jorion an equity premium puzzle5 will not exist. 
Nevertheless, the Goetzman and Jorion study underlines the importance of examining 
international equity markets and considering markets outside the US. 
This critical issue of how we should calculate the equity risk premium has 
been raised again in the literature by several recent papers. [Jagannathan, McGrattan 
and Scherbina, (2001 ), Fama and French (2002) and Donaldson, Kamstra and Kramer 
(2003)] They again question the usage of simply the realized historical time-series of 
ex-post returns. Is this the most appropriate way to establish the magnitude of the 
premium? Is it the best approach we have at our disposal? 
It is important to examine the equity premium over extended periods of time 
since stock market returns are extremely volatile. Thus, estimates derived from short 
time periods will prove extremely unreliable. Furthermore, while the equity premium 
is suggested to be time-varying, particularly over the business cycle, it very much 
remains the case that annual ex-post returns inevitably contain a large random 
5 as defined by Mehra and Prescott (1985) 
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component. Such random movements in equity returns hence makes ex-post returns 
difficult to predict at short horizons and will mean that ex-post returns at short 
horizons will deviate from agent's expectations ex-ante. However, it is generally 
maintained that over longer horizons under the assumption that the random 
component of returns is mean-zero then ex-post returns should closely approximate 
ex-ante returns. 
Black (1993, p36) however argues "if we are willing to use theory (and data 
other than past returns), we can estimate expected return without even looking at past 
returns." In recent years, deriving the expected returns implied by fundamentals has 
received considerable attention in the literature. 
Alternative methods to estimate expected returns have emerged over recent 
years that uses of fundamentals such as dividends and earnings rather than historical 
returns. Jaganathan, McGrattan and Scherbina (2001) and Fama and French (2002) 
suggest that using fundamental measures to assess the scale of the equity premium are 
perhaps a more suitable method of assessing investor's expectations of returns. Such 
protagonists suggest that such fundamental models provide a figure closer to agents' 
true unobservable expected returns than the established method based on using ex-
post returns. In usual circumstance, estimates from these alternative methods would 
ideally yield similar figures for the equity premium unless some event or some data 
abnormality has occurred to cause them to diverge. 
Jagannathan et al. (2001) calculate the equity premium using the Gordon 
dividend discount model. They look at stock yields compared to long term 
government bonds yields rather than relative to treasury bills. Before 1970, they find 
premiums consistent with those calculated using ex-post returns. However using 
discounted dividends they find the equity premium has shrunk since 1970. Over the 
47 
last 30 years their method indicates the expected equity premium has been a mere 
0.7% p.a .. Thus their model suggests that since 1970 the expected equity premium 
appears to be none too different from the theoretical prediction of Mehra and 
Prescott's model. They suggest this could be due to dramatic technological 
improvements which have reduced market imperfections. For example, it is 
increasingly easy for investors to access information, communicate and transact with 
others. 
Fama and French (2002) develop a different approach to estimate and analyse 
expected returns. They calculate the US equity risk premium from fundamental data 
using dividend growth6 and earnings growth to proxy for capital gains thereby 
deriving a dividend based model and an earnings based model. They suggest the true 
level of the annual expected equity premium between 1951-2000 is likely to be closer 
to 2.5% or 4.4% their estimates from their dividend growth and earnings growth 
models respectively, rather than the 7.5% average of historical returns. The 
divergence of the realised equity premium from that implied by fundamentals they 
attribute primarily to declining expected returns during the latter part of the 20th 
century that stimulated unexpected growth in the market index. 
Fama and French (2002) demonstrate that there is a discrepancy between 
average stock returns and the returns implied by discounted dividends or earnings 
increases. Over the second half of the 20th Century stock prices grew much more 
quickly than dividends or earnings. Thus, their results indicate there is a gulf between 
the returns expected from fundamentals and those achieved by investors. The story 
that is suggested for these surprising findings is that the equity premium has been 
inflated due to declining discount rates. The mechanism by which this occurs is that if 
6 The Gordon Discounted Dividend Model and the Fama-French Dividend Growth model are identical 
BUT are stimulated from different frameworks and derived in a different manner. 
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the discount rate falls then (ceteris paribus) expected returns will increase; 
consequently current stock prices will rise so that expected returns will be restored to 
equilibrium levels. If this occurs over an extended period, this will leave an 
unexpectedly large realised return in the historical data set. Thus Fama and French 
(2002) contend that this indicates that stock returns and thus the equity premium will 
be lower in the future than they have been in the past. 
Fama and French (2002) also suggest accounting fundamentals such as return 
on investment and book to market ratio, are much more consistent with the equity 
premium estimates of the dividend model than the historic time-series of returns. For 
instance, the historical physical return on book equity is lower than the historical 
equity return and thus implies typical corporate investments have a negative NPV and 
thus shouldn't have been undertaken. This therefore implies the premium generated 
from realised stock returns is too high. However, the dividend and earnings growth 
model estimates are consistent with appropriate corporate investment decisions having 
been made. 
However, the estimated expected returns from dividends might not be as 
closely linked to true ex-ante expected returns as we might first think. There are issues 
that stem from the nature of the dividend decision and there being some puzzling 
issues relating to why firms pay dividends. The dividend issue is arbitrary and as such 
. . 
it is especially susceptible to there being systematic trends in payout policy. This 
limitation is no doubt even more acute when looking over extended periods of time as 
in studies such as Jagannathan et al (2001) and Fama and French (2002). 
Firstly, not all firms pay dividends anyway, so using the dividend discount 
model to value them is inappropriate anyway. Secondly, the proportion of US firms 
paying dividends declined substantially over the second half of the 201h Century. 
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Fama and French (2001) themselves demonstrate that while 67% of firms paid 
dividends in 1978; only 21% of firms paid dividends in 1999. Since less than a quarter 
of US firms paid dividends in 1999 this cast serious doubts on the reliability and 
suitability of estimate expected returns using the dividend growth methodology of 
Jagannathan et al (2001) and Fama and French (2002). 
Thirdly, dividends are not the only means by which firms transmit funds to 
their shareholders. Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Ackert and Smith (1993) 
demonstrate that share repurchases have become a hugely popular method by which 
companies distribute funds to shareholders and has grown rapidly since the 1970s; 
over exactly the same period that dividend payouts have declined. In fact, Grullon and 
Michaely show that, in actuality, the payout ratio of US companies has been 
effectively unchanged since 1980. Therefore, to accurately assess the expected equity 
premium then we need to take into account all payouts firms have made to investors 
and not just dividends. 
Thus, the conclusions reached by Jagannathan et al (2001) and Fama and 
French (2002) based upon their use of the dividend growth model may prove to be 
unreliable. We cannot be certain that the discount rate has declined over recent years 
because dividends are no longer the only way in which firms redistribute their wealth 
to investors as the traditional formulation of the dividend growth model assumes. 
Thus particularly the claims of Jagannathan et al. (2001) that expected returns were as 
low as 0.7% p.a. since the 1970s and as thus the equity premium puzzle has largely 
disappeared appear to be of dubious substance and should be re-assessed on a basis 
which incorporates share repurchases as well as cash-dividends in the definition of 
"dividends". 
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Donaldson, Kamstra and Kramer (2003) take a different approach and try to 
examine the ex ante premium which is most consistent with the ex post premium and 
other characteristics of the US economy. They ask what is the most plausible value of 
the ex ante equity premium given the ex post premium, interest rates, Sharpe ratios 
and dividend yields? They simulate many economies over the second half of the 20th 
Century. From these simulations they find that while it is easily possible the ex post 
premium of 6% could have occurred with an expected (ex ante) premium of 6% it 
would also be statistically insignificant from an ex ante premium of 2%. However, for 
a high equity premium, high Sharpe ratio, low dividend yields and low interest rates 
to have been generated in the same economy, they find that the ex ante premium 
should lie in a narrow range around 4%. This would mean that the actual realised 
equity premium has exceeded the expected equity premium by approximately 2% per 
year. However, such findings would be consistent with Fama and French's 
proposition that (unexpected) declines in the discount rate over the past 50 years have 
yielded capital gains to shareholders. Thus, a situation is created where rational price 
adjustment inflates the equity premium measure ex post and could lead it to be 
substantially larger than investors' would have expected ex ante. 
The approach of Fama and French (2002) and Jagannathan et al. (2001) are 
both backward looking attempting to help explain and understand historical 
phenomena which has already occurred. They are effectively asking have realised 
returns equalled investors' exp.ectations during their sample period? However, a 
number of authors have examined a similar but nevertheless interesting question: Are 
historical returns a reliable predictor or at least a useful indicator of future expected 
returns? In other words, they try to estimate the forward-looking or prospective equity 
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premium. Arnott and Bernstein (2002) suggest that there is also good reason to 
suppose that historical returns could be a poor guide to future expected returns. 
"It is dangerous to shape future expectations based on extrapolating (these) 
lofty historical returns. In so doing, an investor is tacitly assuming that valuation 
levels that have doubled, tripled, and quadrupled relative to underlying earnings and 
dividends can be expected to do so again." (Amott and Bernstein, 2002 p80) 
Gebhardt et al (2001) look at the equity premia implied by the residual income 
model for the US market and industry sub-sectors. They calculate the implied rate of 
return based upon the constant discount rate necessary to equate future forecasted 
earnings and a terminal value with the current price. They provide evidence that 
industry membership is an important characteristic in determining a firm's cost of 
capital. They also find that the book/market ratio, forecasts of the firm's long-term 
growth prospects and the dispersion in analysts' forecasts are important variables to 
explain cross-sectional implied costs of capital. 
Claus and Thomas (2001) use analysts' earnings estimates in order to derive 
conditional estimates of the equity premium. They suggest the expected value of the 
equity premia may be as little as 3% per annum. Whilst their paper does include an 
international study of the equity premium their sample period is restricted to little 
more than 10 years for most countries due to the availability of IBES cashflow 
forecasts. Hence although they suggest that conditional equity premia are small, they 
have only a very small sample taken from the recent bull market upon which to base 
these inferences. 
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There is an important contrast between these papers that focus on the 
prospective equity premium with papers that focus on the unconditional historical 
equity premium. The approach of Fama and French (2002) and Jagannathan et al. 
(2001) has a couple of key benefits. In contrast to the studies of Claus and Thomas 
(2002) and Gebhardt et al. (2001) which are limited by data availability of analysts 
forecasts to little more than 15 years of data, historical data is available for much 
longer periods. For instance, historical data for international markets are typically 
available for periods of in excess of 35 years during which financial markets have 
experienced periods of both bull and bear markets. Whereas prior studies of the 
prospective equity premium have purely analysed periods relating to the 1980s and 
1990s bull market. Furthermore, studies of the prospective equity premium are based 
upon analysts' forecasts of future fundamentals. However, Abarbanell (1991 ), 
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) and Claus and Thomas (2001) document that analysts' 
earnings forecasts are upwardly biased. Thus using these inflated growth rate 
projections would provide us with overly optimistic estimates of the equity premia. 
By using only historical data our results are free from any bias that would be induced 
from using analysts' forecasts. 
2.3.3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mehra and Prescott's findings have stimulated a huge stream of research 
which attempt to provide a solution to the equity premium puzzle7• However, this 
7 Especially, modelling investor heterogeneity (see for example Maniw and Zeldes [1991], 
Constantinides and Duffie [1996] or Constanides, Donaldson and Mehra [2002])and alternatives to the 
standard power utility function (see for example Epstein and Zin [1989], Abel [1990] or Campbell and 
Cochrane [ 1999]) have received extensive attention in the literature. 
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review here scrutinises the assumption that historical returns are actually accurate 
proxies for shareholders' expected returns. If the high level of historical returns 
themselves are something of a conundrum then the reliability of forecasts utilising this 
data are going to be decidedly suspect. Since the historical equity premium has been 
so far below that observed in the historical data then this should lead us naturally to 
question whether or not historical returns is an appropriate proxy for the expected 
returns prescribed by theoretical asset pricing models. This is particularly so for the 
latter part of the 20th Century when equity markets internationally, but especially in 
the US performed extremely well. 
Therefore at least part of the potential explanation for the equity premium 
puzzle can be advanced on grounds of the representativeness of the empirical data 
employed in such studies. Firstly, research by Siegel (1992 and 1999) and Cecchetti, 
Mark and Lam (1993) indicate that the historical risk-free rate is actually substantially 
higher than found in Mehra and Prescott's sample. Thus the inclusion of a longer time 
period should reduce the magnitude of the puzzle, as well as providing us with the 
best possible reflection of security returns. 
There does appear to be a substantial gap in this strand of the literature, 
particularly in relation to the examination of the whether historical returns are 
appropriate proxies for expected returns. Firstly, the evidence generated thus far in the 
literature is entirely focused upon the US market, whereas nothing is known about the 
behaviour of other markets elsewhere in the world. This is particularly important 
given the findings of Goetzmann and Jorion (1999) that the US equity market's 
performance during the 20th Century was exceptionally strong relative to other 
countries equity markets. Therefore this strengthens the case for the examination of 
other international markets on this issue. 
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Consequently, in this thesis we will focus upon one of the world's other major 
financial markets, namely the United Kingdom. Our first major issue will be to 
investigate if historical returns in the UK have been considerably higher than those 
expected by investors over recent years as has been found by Fama and French (2002) 
and Jagannathan et al. (2001) for the US? If our estimates of expected returns are 
lower than actual returns, then the equity premium puzzle is not as large as has been 
previously documented in the literature. The difference between the expected equity 
premium and the theoretical prediction may not be as great as we first thought. In that 
instance there would be a second puzzle. Why have realised returns been so far above 
the expected returns implied by the earnings growth or dividend growth models? 
If, in fact, expected returns have been below realised returns then this has 
important implications for financial practitioners who use historical returns to forecast 
future returns. Financial managers will utilise too high a discount rate when assessing 
investment opportunities and thus are likely to reject projects that would be expected 
to increase shareholders wealth had a more appropriate discount rate been used. 
Pension fund providers are likely to find the value of these funds fall below that 
expected by their actuaries and their clients. Likewise, Asset Managers and their 
clients could well be disappointed by the returns their investment portfolios produce. 
Therefore the results from such a study would have widespread applicability. 
A second important area which appears to have received no prior attention in 
the literature is how representative is the aggregate market experience of the various 
different segments of the market. As far as I know all studies relating to the equity 
premium puzzle per se only use aggregate data. However, the model can be equally 
applied to the cross-section. Furthermore, it is plausible that the aggregate market 
55 
results are driven predominantly by particular components of the market be it specific 
industries within the market or perhaps the largest corporations. 
Thus an important issue and one which appears to have been almost entirely 
overlooked in the literature thus far is how pervasive are the aggregate results across 
the portfolios formed in the cross-section? This is a major insight future research 
should be able to offer. In this thesis we provide the first preliminary steps in this 
direction. We consider two main characteristics by which to categorise firms in the 
latter chapters of this thesis. In Chapter 4 we split firms into portfolios on the basis of 
industry classifications, whilst in Chapter 5 we examine size portfolios. To our 
knowledge, this thesis provides the first empirical examinations of the historical 
equity premia using the Fama and French (2002) approach to consider individual 
portfolios of firms. 
In Chapter 4, we firstly examine if the disparity between the estimated equity 
premium from fundamentals and realised return over the period 1966-2002 is evident 
across industries. We wish to ascertain if the behaviour observed in the market as a 
whole is widespread amongst many industries or have the models continued to yield 
similar results in most industries with the disparity being due to extreme capital gains 
in one or two sectors. Over the last 40 years there have been industries that have 
grown from being tiny or non-existent on the LSE to becoming or major importance, 
whilst others have suffered decline. For example, the telecoms or technology 
industries have grown rapidly since the 1980s becoming some of the largest sectors 
by market capitalisation by the tum of the 21st century. We seek to ascertain if it is 
just in industries such as these, which have experienced unprecedented growth that 
realised returns have exceeded those implied by the dividend and earnings growth 
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models? Or are we able to generalise the finding of a disparity between the estimates 
of fundamental models and historical returns across the majority of industries? 
In Chapter 5, we set out with many of the same goals as in Chapter 4 except 
that we examine size portfolios in Chapter 5 rather than the industry portfolios 
considered in Chapter 4. Our first objective again will be to ascertain if there are 
pervasive patterns in the equity premium estimates using fundamentals or using 
historical return data across firms of different sizes. This is an issue of interest and 
pertinence, since aggregate market indices are typically examined on a value-
weighted basis in studies of the equity premium puzzle. Consequently, the highest 
weight is firmly placed on the very largest firms, with little emphasis on smaller 
firms. Hence, it is quite plausible that the experience of the smaller firms in particular 
could differ for the picture portrayed by the aggregate market. There is also a 
literature on the "size premium" that there have been systematic return differences 
between small and large firms. Given this literature it will be of interest to apply the 
approach of Fama and French (2002) to these portfolios in an attempt to ascertain to 
what extent the equity premia eamt by individual size portfolios could be expected 
and the extent to which a size premium could be expected. A more detailed literature 
review on the size premium follows in Chapter 2.4. 
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SECTION 2.4- LITERATURE REVIEW ON THE SIZE PREMIUM 
The size effect is one of the most well-known and earliest documented stock 
market anomaly. Banz (1981) is widely credited with the first paper identifying the 
tendency for small firms' shares to substantially outperform large companies. In his 
study he regresses individual firms' stock prices on the CAPM beta and the natural 
logarithm of firm size. He finds a highly statistically significantly negative coefficient 
on firm size. This indicates that not only do small firms tend to have higher returns 
than large firms, but moreover that this phenomenon persists even after market risk is 
controlled for. Hence, this study was also one of the first suggesting the CAPM is 
mis-specified. 
Subsequent research by Fama and French (1992,1993,1996) demonstrated that 
size is a pervasive variable for explaining cross-sectional returns in the US even after 
other variables found to predict returns in the literature are included, such as the book-
to-market ratio, earnings-price ratio or dividend yield. 
In a paper published at the same time as Banz (1981)8, Reinganum (1981) also 
provided evidence that small firms outperform large corporations. His approach 
differed from that of Banz however. Reinganum created portfolios of stocks on the 
basis of market capitalisation. His results indicated that the size premium, the 
difference between returns of the smallest and largest decile portfolios, was 
approximately 30% p.a. 
8 In fact in the same issue of the Journal of Financial Economics 
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The size effect has been found to exist in many countries around the world 
when examined in a manner similar to Reinganum (1981 ). In fact Hawawini and 
Keirn (1995, 2000) list 13 countries representing most of the developed world where a 
positive size premium is identified. In essence this evidence adds considerable weight 
to the view that the size premium is an international phenomenon present across 
national borders. 
Levis (1985) is the first known study to allude to a size effect being present on 
the London Stock Exchange. He, "documents an average 6.5% per annum premium 
for smaller UK firms over the period January 1958 to December 1982." (Levis (1985, 
p26)). More recently, Dimson and Marsh (1999) examined the performance of UK 
small firms relative to the FfSE All Share Index. For 1955-1986, the small cap index 
(HGSC) outperformed the All-share index by 6.1% p.a., whilst the micro-cap index 
(HG1000) had a size premium of 8.7% p.a.9. This further underlines the substantial 
difference in return characteristics of UK large and small firms. 
2.4.1 SIZE EFFECT VARIES OVER TIME 
Keirn and Ziemba (2000, pxviii) note, "A characteristic of these cross-
sectional patterns in returns is that their magnitude varies considerably over time." 
Brown et al. (1983) using the same sample of Reinganum (1981) find "ex ante 
excess returns attributable to size are not constant through time" (p 11 0). A view 
9 The Hoare Govett Smaller Companies (HGSC) Index covers the smallest 10%·offirms by market 
capitalisation, whereas the Hoare Govett 1000 (HG 1 000) Index covers the smallest 2% of firms by 
market capitalisation. 
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supported by Keirn (1983), who notes that while the size premium varies over time, it 
is stable within time periods. Keirn points to 1974-1979 as a period of stable positive 
size premium and 1969-1973 as a period of a stable negative size premium. Thus he 
finds the premia are unstable leading him to suggest there is a, "reversal of the size 
anomaly" (Keirn, (1983 p27)). 
Black (1993) also suggests that the size premium has varied over time. More 
specifically his assertion is that the size effect in the US disappeared after its 
discovery in 1981. Dimson and Marsh ( 1999) suggest that for 1983-1997 the small 
cap premium (relative to the largest 50% of firms) had reversed that is for the post-
discovery period there was a large cap premium of 2.4%, which was statistically 
significant. Furthermore, Dimson and Marsh (1999) find this phenomenon of a size 
reversal not only occurred in the US, but also in the UK. They find that following the 
launch of mutual funds attempting to exploit the size effect, small cap indices 
underperformed the all-share index by more than 6% p.a. over 1989-1997. The 
magnitude of the reversal in the size effect is slightly larger in the UK than the US. 
Therefore there is considerable evidence that the size premium varies 
substantially over time (as in fact the market equity premium appears also to). 
Particularly, since the discovery of the size premium there is little evidence supportive 
that a positive and statistically significant size premium remains. Since the size effect 
was reported it appears to have disappeared or reversed altogether. However, even if it 
has reversed Dimson and Marsh ( 1999) assert that one should conclude a size effect 
still exists: i.e. the return characteristics of small stocks continue to be different from 
those of large. 
A failing of many studies investigating the size premium is that they fail to 
adjust returns for systematic risk. The suggestion is that the size effect could simply 
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be due to the higher levels of risk borne by small companies. A difficulty for such an 
explanation is in identifying the appropriate source of risk which small companies are 
exposed to. 
2.4.2 CAPM 
In terms of the CAPM there is little support for the outperformance of small 
stocks being due to higher exposure to the market Beta. For the US, Banz (1981) 
found that even after adjusting for market risk, the size effect still remains. Such 
findings are supported by Jegadeesh (1992) and Fama and French (1992), who 
demonstrate that size has explanatory power when added to the single beta model. In 
fact these studies suggest that firm size has greater explanatory power over the cross-
section of returns than the market beta. Such results are therefore indicative that the 
CAPM is mis-specified. 
In the case of the UK, Levis (1985) actually finds portfolios of small firms 
have lower CAPM betas than large firms, even after adjusting these estimates for thin-
trading (using the Dimson (1979) method). Thus adjusting for market risk actually 
deepens the scale of the UK size anomaly. The inability of the CAPM to explain the 
UK size anomaly is further supported by Corhay, Hawawini and Michel (1987), who 
demonstrate a statistically significant positive size premium is still present after 
systematic risk has been adjusted for. Consequently, it appears adjusting returns for 
market risk is unable to explain the existence of a UK size premium. For other 
countries the CAPM is also limited in its ability to explain the size effect. Only in two 
countries out of 13 countries covered in Hawawini and Keirn's (2000) literature 
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review - France (Lou vet et al. (1990)) and Canada (Berges et al. (1984)) - can 
systematic market risk explain return differentials between size portfolios. 
However, it is far from unanimously accepted by scholars that the CAPM is 
unable to explain the size effect. For instance, Handa, Kothari and Wasley (1989) 
indicate that the US size effect is sensitive to the length of time used to estimate beta. 
They demonstrate that if risk is measured using annual betas then the size premium 
becomes statistically insignificant. Whilst, Chan and Chen (1988) argue that large 
measurement errors in the beta estimates, lead to the CAPM being unable to explain 
the size effect. This errors-in-variables problem plagues the two-step approach to 
estimating asset pricing models as noted by Shanken (1992), and this could also 
contribute to inability of market risk to explain the size effect. In actuality, using a 
non-parametric technique to adjust for risk, Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) find 
no significant relationship between market capitalisation and risk-adjusted return on 
the NYSE. Although these studies assert that difficulties in estimating the CAPM are 
a major source of its inability to explain the size effect, recently the CAPM has fallen 
out of favour, due in large part to the emergence of multi-factor asset pricing models 
whic~ appear capable of explaining many of the market anomalies including the size 
effect, despite such difficulties in estimating asset pricing models. 
2.4.3 APT 
The APT proposed by Ross (1976) as an alternative to the CAPM that allows 
for multiple risk factors, which tend to be economic risk factors. Chen (1988, pl83) 
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suggests that economic risk factors might be able to explain the size premium 
because, "small firms tend to be marginal firms, they fluctuate more with business 
cycles, and thus have higher risk exposure to the changing risk premium." An early 
empirical investigation of the APT in the US by Chan, Chen and Hsieh (1985) finds 
that after adjusting for economic risk the size premium is little more than 1% p.a. and 
is statistically insignificant from zero. This leads them to suggest "the firm size 
anomaly is essentially captured by a multi-factor pricing model. The higher average 
returns of smaller firms are justified by the additional risk borne in .an efficient 
market" (Chan et al. (1985 p469)). These results support the prior findings of Chen 
(1983). However, a more detailed study by Lehman and Modest (1988) that employs 
a similar methodology to Chan et al. (1985), but looks at 5 or 20 size portfolios 
provides results contradictory to Chan et al. (1985). Lehman and Modest (1988 p253) 
comment, "the size (and tum-of-the-year) effects have thus far evaded a satisfactory 
risk-based explanation." A view which is supported by Shukla and Trzcinka (1990) 
who also find the APT unable to explain differences between large and small firms. 
Clearly a solution to the size premium that appears to depend upon the number of size 
portfolios used for empirical analysis is unlikely to receive widespread acceptance. 
Why does the APT only explain the size effect across size deciles, but not size 
quintiles or 20 size portfolios? 
There are a number of methodological issues with these empirical 
investigations of the APT. Firstly, the APT specifies that risk factors should be 
unexpected movements in the specified variable. Studies such as Chan et al. (1985) 
use the simplistic approach of assuming that any change in the economic variable is 
unexpected. This seems to be a rather unrealistic assumption and more sophisticated 
methods have been used in more recent studies to generate these unexpected 
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components, such as time-series models or kalman filters. A second methodological 
critique is that these asset pricing studies also use two-step approach to calculating the 
model which means it too can be plagued by concerns of errors-in-variables bias. 
Therefore finding the appropriate measure of the unexpected component of the series 
will be a key issue for future research examining if the size premium can be explained 
by the APT. 
As a matter of fact this appears to be a fertile area for future research. There 
are very few if any published studies that the author is aware of that seeks to explain 
the size premium using the APT outside of the US and thus an international study of 
the issue appears to be overdue. 
2.4.4 SIZE PROXIES FOR AN UNOBSERVABLE RISK-FACTOR 
Fama and French (1993, p4) contend, "that if assets are priced rationally, 
variables that are related to average returns, such as size and book-to-market equity, 
must proxy for sensitivity to common (shared and thus undiversifiable) risk factors in 
returns." 
Thus they argue that the generally higher returns of smaller firms is due to 
exposure to systematic risk factors outside the scope of established asset pricing 
models. A proposition is that firm size could proxy for relative distress. He and Ng 
( 1994) and Shumway (1996) provide evidence that this is related to delisting from the 
stock exchange. Dimson and Marsh ( 1999) find that there cases of small UK firms 
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becoming valueless every year, although even at their peak such companies account 
for just 1% of the small-cap index by market capitalisation. Thus, this doesn't appear 
sufficient to explain the UK size premium. 
Another explanation is proposed by Knez and Ready (1997). They find the 
"negative relation between firm size and average returns is driven by a few extreme 
positive returns in each month." (Knez and Ready (1997 p1376)). The return 
distribution is positively skewed, especially for small young firms. Their results 
suggest investors hold small firms anticipating a few major successes and a few minor 
disappointments. "The idea that such firms should carry a risk premium is sensible" 
(Knez and Ready (1997 p1380)). Their suggestion regarding disappointments is 
similar to the distress risk conjecture of Fama and French (1992). However, 
Mackinlay (1995) is sceptical that omitted risk factors can be priced sufficiently 
highly to rationalise the observed size premium. An important point is that while size 
might be priced as a risk factor, this gives little or no insight into the economic factors 
causing this cross-sectional variation. Until a convincing and demonstrable theoretical 
and empirical link between firm size and an economic factor it will not be widely 
accepted as a risk proxy. 
2.4.5 FIRM SIZE AND THE JANUARY SEASONAL 
Keirn (1983 p19) found, "that nearly fifty percent of the (size) anomaly is 
concentrated in the month of January". He reports, "The relation between abnormal 
return and size is always negative and more pronounced in January than in any other 
month." (Keirn (1983 p31 )). In a following paper covering a longer sample period of 
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US data Keirn (1990 p60) finds, "there is no size effect outside of January". This 
analysis appears to have been accepted, for example in a leading textbook Bodie, 
Kane and Marcus (1996 p348) comment, "The size effect is in fact a 'small-firm-in 
January' effect". Thus for the US the size effect appears to be a seasonal effect. 
However this is still perplexing that such a pervasive pattern in stock returns should 
be found and stimulates two vital questions. Firstly, why should there be a size 
premium in January? Secondly, how well does the small-firm-in-January effect 
explain the size effect in international markets? 
For the UK the size effect appears to be distinct from any seasonal effect, thus 
the small-firm-in-January effect found in the US doesn't appear to travel well. 
Although, Priestley (1997) does find there is seasonal variation in UK asset prices, 
January carries a negative premia as does the tax year end, April. Dimson and Marsh 
(2000) provide similar analysis commenting that the UK size anomaly cannot be 
explained by seasonality and thus their evidence corroborates Priestley (1997). Both 
papers thus suggest results inconsistent with the US evidence and thus it appears there 
are some major differences in the nature of the UK and US size premia. 
2.4.6 OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY EXPLANATIONS 
Explanations for the size premium have been advanced on the premise that 
capital markets are less operationally efficient for small firms than for large 
corporations. For example, small stocks tend to be relatively illiquid and thinly traded 
compared to those of large corporations (Foerster and Keirn (2000)). Roll (1981) 
argued that the size effect may have resulted from improperly measuring risk due to 
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the infrequent trading of small stocks. However, there are examples amongst the 
literature where CAPM beta's have been estimated using methods designed to account 
for nonsynchronous and infrequent trading (such as Scholes and Williams (1977) and 
Dimson (1979). In the US, Reinganum (1982) and Hawiwini and Keirn (1995) 
estimate beta this way, while in the UK Levis (1985) did so. These papers 
unaminously reject the conjecture that thin-trading causes errors in estimating market 
risk that can explain the size premium. They conclude a size premium remains 
evident. 
Stoll and Whaley (1983) and Knez and Ready (1996), amongst others, have 
argued that there are larger transaction costs involved in managing a portfolio of small 
firms relative to large companies. Aiyagari and Gertler (1991) argue that the bid-ask 
spreads tend to differ substantially between large and small companies, and so 
consequently do trading costs. They find that spreads average 0.5% for the largest 
50%, but increase to an average of 1% for the smallest 50%, however, for the very 
smallest firms the spread can be more than 5%. An alternative method to examine the 
transaction costs is by analysing the performance of a market index relative to a 
passive tracker fund, since the fund incurs transaction costs whilst the index does not. 
Keirn (1999) finds that such transaction costs are modest in the US, which is 
supported by Dimson and Marsh ( 1999) for the UK, where such costs are estimated to 
be 0.37% p.a. Clearly transaction costs of such a paltry magnitude are unable to 
explain a size premium that averages more than 6% p.a. 
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2.4.7 DATA MINING 
Lo and Mackinlay (1988, 1990), amongst others, argue that anomalies in 
cross-sectional asset returns based on relationships where there is no obvious 
economic justification, may be the result of data mining. Fama (1991 p1575) provides 
an illustration of such an argument, "with many clever researchers, on both sides of 
the efficiency fence, rummaging for forecasting variables, we are sure to find 
instances of 'reliable' return predictability that are in fact spurious ... evidence of 
predictability should always be met with a healthy dose of scepticism." Anomalies 
such as the size effect could be claimed merely to be, "accidental patterns in historical 
data" (Campbell (2000)). 
Black (1993) suggests that, "Most of the so-called anomalies that have 
plagued the literature on investments seem likely to be the result of data-mining. The 
researcher who finds (a profit opportunity) writes it up, and we have a new anomaly. 
But it generally vanishes as soon as it's discovered." Black asserts that it is 
exceptionally difficult to make abnormal returns from using trading strategies based 
upon anomalies. This point is endorsed by Ross (1994) who has, "attempted to exploit 
many of the seemingly most promising 'inefficiencies' ... but has never yet found one 
that worked in practice." Again these scholars would contend that these findings of 
return predictability were purely chance, spurious discoveries and that such 
relationships are not actually apparent in the true return generating process. 
Such an argument appears applicable to the size effect since recent research 
has suggested that this particular anomaly has disappeared or reversed since its 
discovery (see Dimson and Marsh (1999) and Horowitz et al. (2000)). Contemporary 
empirical evidence appears to provide out-of-sample rejection of previous research 
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indicating a positive size premium. Therefore, it could be construed that initial 
researchers were guilty of data-mining and their findings of 'anomalies' were simply 
mistakes which disappeared once they were published. 
2.4.8 OTHER ALTERN A 'fiVE EXPLANATIONS 
A plethora of other explanations for the size effect have been advanced. Berk 
(1995) argues that for two firms with identical expected cashflows if agents are risk 
averse then the firm with the more volatile cashflow will have a lower market value 
(be smaller) and have higher expected earnings per share, and thus have higher 
expected returns. Thus Berk claims the size premium can be explained within the 
existing finance paradigm. However, this analysis relies crucially upon the 
assumption of no positive correlation between expected returns and expected 
cashflows, when expected cashflows vary. In reality empirical studies find that there 
is a positive relationship between expected returns and expected cashflows. For 
instance, Lettau and Ludvigson (2005) advance this as a reason for the inability of the 
dividend-price ratio to predict future cashflow growth. 
Other examples of potential explanations for the size effect include Arbel and 
Strebel's (1983) suggestion that small firms are relatively neglected and thus the 
premium can be justified by their higher information costs. While, Dimson and Marsh 
(2000) suggest that size portfolios have differing exposure to industry sectors, which 
could explain part of the premium. They also suggest relative dividend growth might 
be able to explain some of the premium. Others still suggest the size premium could 
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be linked to merger activity because small firms are more likely to be merger targets 
and merger targets tend earn large excess returns prior to takeover completion. 
2.4.9 SUMMARY OF SIZE PREMIUM LITERATURE 
There is a high degree of controversy and disagreement within both 
practitioner groups and academics alike over the differing explanations for the size 
premium. This debate is one which has yet to be adequately resolved, which in part 
stems from the lack of strongly persuasive evidence in favour of any of the competing 
explanations. 
Finding a rational explanation for the size premium prior to 1980 is made 
difficult by the more recent evidence that has emerged of a disappearance or reversal 
in the size premium since its discovery by Banz (1981). These analyses are 
necessarily based upon a limited sample length. For instance the UK size premium 
reversal documented by Dimson and Marsh (1999) focuses only on 1989-1997. Given 
such a short period of analysis a further examination is justified to examine whether 
such a reversal is still evident when the sample is extended to cover the recent bear 
market. 
Although many of the possible explanations for the size premium have been 
systematically and extensively investigated, we notice there is little prior evidence 
examining the fundamental performance of small firm portfolios relative to large 
firms. This is an opening in the literature that we intend to exploit and fill part of the 
gap by providing some empirical evidence from the UK market. This will enable us to 
examine the general question as to whether or not the past size premium could have 
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been expected on the basis of fundamental growth differentials between portfolios. 
However, we anticipate that by extending our sample period through to the beginning 
of the new millennia this will enable us to shed new light on the recent behaviour of 
the size premium. This will enable us to provide further evidence on and to re-
evaluate the behaviour of the size premium since its discovery that may re-inforce or 
challenge earlier studies which were based on a rather limited sample size. 
An additional important finding of this review is the dearth of literature 
examining whether or not the size premium can be explained by multifactor asset 
pricing models. This is particularly true of the UK where there seems to have been no 
previous research of the ability of APT economic risk factors to explain the size 
premium. There is also little evidence in the UK that reports the nature of the size 
premium across size deciles or that re-examines if the market model can explain the 
return differentials between large and small stocks. 
2.5 LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSION 
In this Chapter we have surveyed various strands of literature related to the 
topics covered in this Thesis. We began with an overview of the equity premium 
puzzle drawing upon the seminal work of Mehra and Prescott (1985). The analysis of 
Mehra and Prescott ( 1985) demonstrates that a theoretical economic model under 
reasonable parameterisations predicts an equity premium that is far too small 
compared with historical data. 
Following Mehra and Prescott (1985), the assumptions made in their analysis 
have been relaxed or adapted in various ways in hope of providing a solution to the 
puzzle. For example, theoretical models that allow for heterogeneous agents or market 
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incompleteness or different forms of investor preferences have been examined. 
Therefore, modifications to the theoretical model proposed by Mehra and Prescott 
(1985) have been extensively investigated and have thus far failed to provide an 
adequate solution to the equity premium puzzle. In other words, a solution has yet to 
be found which does not require investors' to be extremely risk averse. In this thesis, 
we therefore follow a different approach. 
This thesis considers the empirical modelling of the equity premium rather 
than dealing with theoretical issues relating to the equity premium puzzle. An 
important assumption made, not just by Mehra and Prescott (1985), but in numerous 
studies within financial economics is that equity returns on average and in the long 
run equal investors' expectations. However, little prior research has been undertaken 
examining the reliability and suitability of this assumption. A notable exception to 
this is the work of Jagannathan et al. (2001) and Fama and French (2002). In this 
thesis we build on these prior studies and use the framework of Fama and French 
(2002) to examine the UK Equity Premium. 
Fama and French (2002) argue that if dividends and prices are in a stable long-
run relationship then dividend growth provides an approximation of expected price 
appreciation. Similar intuition would apply to other variables in a long-term 
relationship with prices such as earnings or even consumption. Fama and French 
(2002) argue that since 1951 the actual equity premium has been above that implied 
by either dividends or earnings. In other words their analysis suggests that for 1951-
2000, the historical equity premium is a poor proxy for the equity premium that could 
have been expected in 1951. 
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Little prior analysis has been conducted on the long-term UK equity premium 
(Dimson et al. (2003) and Campbell (1996, 1999, 2003) being the most notable 
exceptions) despite London being one of the world's major financial centres. 
This thesis bridges some of the gaps in the current literature on the UK equity 
premium. Firstly in Chapter 3 it examines whether the historical UK equity premium 
tends to be a good proxy for the expected equity premium at the aggregate level. The 
later empirical Chapters of this thesis build upon the aggregate analysis of Chapter 3 
by highlighting the driving forces during periods when historical equity premium are 
imprecise proxies for the expected equity premium. In Chapter 4 we consider whether 
a disconnection between historical equity premium and the expected equity premium 
is pervasive across almost all industries or whether it is driven by a few particular 
industries. 
The literature on the size premium has also been reviewed since in Chapter 5 
we estimate expected equity returns across size portfolios. The review on the size 
premium has highlighted some of the purported sources of the size premium as well 
as the recent debate over whether or not it still exists following its discovery. Possible 
explanations for the size premium include that it is due to risk, liquidity, transaction 
costs or seasonality. Given that the central theme of this thesis is the equity premium 
it is not plausible for us to assess or re-examine these explanations. However, there 
are gaps in the UK literature on the size premium that we intend to exploit in Chapter 
5 in order to shed light upon the equity premium attained by firms of differing sizes. 
In particular, one possible explanation for the size premium is that it is expected, in 
the sense that small firms, on average, generate faster fundamental growth than large 
firms. In relation to the proposition that the size effect has disappeared since its 
discovery, a weakness of the UK literature is that prior studies (such as Dimson and 
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Marsh (1999)) cover only very short periods of time. Furthermore an explicit 
examination of the possibility that the changing nature of the size premium reflects 
changes in expected equity premia has not been conducted. More generally this 
analysis of the equity premium across size portfolios enables us to identify if for all 
size groups the historical equity premium is a poor proxy for expected equity 
premium or if this is only apparent for specific size groupings. These are the major 
issues addressed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE EQUITY PREMIUM: 101 YEARS 
OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE UK. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Equity Premium is the reward in terms of the extra return that investors 
demand for holding risky assets rather than risk-free assets. The Market Equity 
Premium is usually measured as the difference in return between a stock market index 
(such as the S&P 500 in the US or the FfSE All Share in the UK) and a short-term 
Treasury-Bill or Long-term Bond Rate. 
"The Equity Premium is perhaps the single most important number in 
financial economics" remarks Welch (2000, p501). The Premium is of paramount 
importance and plays a central role in Finance partly stemming from the numerous 
applications it has within the field. Financial managers use it for investment appraisal, 
cost of capital estimation and financing decisions, investment analysts rely upon it for 
portfolio asset allocation and investment performance evaluation, while actuaries 
require an accurate estimate for determining pension fund contributions and 
projecting pension payouts. 
Given the pivotal role of the equity premium in finance it is perhaps surprising 
that Welch (2000) notes there is no consensus upon how it should be estimated. 
Rather several different methods have been proposed and applied by practitioners. A 
popular method to estimate the equity premium is to use historical realised excess 
returns observed ex-post. This method has the benefit that data is easily observable 
and readily available. However as Mehra and Prescott (1985) demonstrate the 
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magnitude of these returns are a puzzle and cannot be reconciled with those implied 
by economic theory using a Consumption Capital Asset Pricing Model (CCAPM). 
Perhaps, part of the puzzle is due to asset pricing theory being based upon expected 
returns but being tested using realised returns. The empirical results of Mehra and 
Prescott (1985) and subsequent studies rely upon the assumption that investors 
expected returns in the long run and on average will equal realised returns. If this 
assumption doesn't hold then testing asset pricing models using historical returns is 
inappropriate and provide unreliable results. 
An alternative method is to attempt to examine expected returns more 
directly. This can be undertaken by using fundamentals such as dividends in order to 
estimate the expected return investor's could anticipate, as demonstrated by Fama and 
French (2002) and Jagannathan et al (2001). The empirical analyses of Fama and 
French and Jagannathan et al indicate that in the US, realised returns have been 
substantially above the expected returns implied by fundamentals during the latter part 
of the 20th Century. 
The motivation of this study is threefold. Firstly, this study provides estimates 
of the expected UK equity premia implied by fundamentals using data covering the 
entirety of the 20th Century. We use the dividend growth model approach outlined by 
Fama and French (2002) to derive this estimate of expected returns and compare our 
results with the historical ex-post returns received by investors. We are unaware of 
any previous empirical studies that have been conducted outside the US, which have 
examined expected returns directly over such a long sample period. In fact, there is a 
dearth of empirical research conducted outside of the US market on the equity 
premium that spans the whole of the 20th Century. A notable exception is Dimson, 
Marsh and Staunton (2003) who provide some international evidence that historical 
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returns were higher in the second half of the 20th Century than the first. However 
Dimson et al. (2003) focus purely upon realised returns. In contrast, the focus of this 
paper is upon expected returns and any discrepancy between realised returns and 
expected returns. 
We propose that our method of estimating expected returns, the Fama-French 
dividend growth model, can be more appropriately applied in the context of the UK 
market than the US. This is because American corporations seem to have made 
substantial changes to their payout policy, which could substantially affect the results 
from this model, while similar changes appear not to have been made by British firms 
until much more recently. Recent research by Grullon and Michaely (2002) has 
documented that since the 1970s: a) The US dividend payout ratio has declined 
substantially and b) Share repurchases by US firms have become an increasingly 
important means to distribute funds to shareholders. Such changes in payout policy 
could induce a downward bias upon equity premia estimates implied by dividend 
growth. However, these trends are much less apparent in Britain. Rau and Vermaelen 
(2002) present evidence that until the late 1990s share repurchases by UK firms were 
negligible and Ap Gwilym, Seaton and Thomas (2004) document that the UK 
aggregate payout ratio in December 2001 was above its historical average for 1962-
2001. Thus, the UK market is better suited than the US for the implementation of the 
dividend growth model for estimating equity premia. 
Thus, we examine in the context of more than 100 years of UK data if there is 
a disparity between the historical realised equity premium and the equity premium 
implied by dividends. The discrepancies uncovered in this study between realised 
returns and expected returns implied by fundamentals raise important issues as to their 
source. Campbell (1991) demonstrates that any deviations of realised returns from 
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expectations can be prescribed to either a change in expected dividend growth or a 
change in expected returns or both. 
Secondly, the predictability of aggregate dividend growth is an important issue 
given the deviations between realised and expected returns uncovered by our initial 
investigation of the equity premium in Chapter 3.3. This is because revisions in 
expectations of future dividend growth could potentially provide an explanation for 
the difference between expected returns and realised returns. Dividend growth 
predictability is also a topic which appears to have received relatively little attention 
in the literature. We seek to establish which factors are related to aggregate dividend 
growth and can explain the considerable time-variation that exists in dividend growth. 
In this paper we focus on the ability of the dividend-price ratio, lagged dividend 
growth and lagged returns as a potential predictor variables for dividend growth. Our 
analysis is conducted by means of both in-sample predictability and out-of-sample 
forecasting power. 
Finally we examine if there has been a permanent shift in the time-series of 
expected returns. Several recent articles have posited that future expected returns for 
the early 21st Century are lower than past realised returns (see e.g. Claus and Thomas 
[2001], Arnott and Bernstein [2002]). We seek to provide additional evidence on this 
issue by exploring the behaviour of the dividend-price ratio and investigating 
evidence from structural break tests. The dividend-price ratio is important in its own 
right since it provides important information regarding the income yielded by 
portfolios from dividend payments. However, it has also been an important variable 
for predicting future returns and thus capital gains as documented by Fama and 
French ( 1988) and Campbell and Shiller ( 1988). Thus, we contend that any permanent 
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change in the time-series of the dividend-price ratio will be especially informative 
with regard to future expected returns. 
Why could a change in expected returns lead to a run-up in share prices? The 
argument is that if equities are valued according to the discounted value of their future 
cashflows then a fall in expected returns (the discount rate) will lead to an increase in 
fundamental value. This theory therefore relies on the presence of arbitrageurs in the 
market, who once they observe a fall in discount rate will purchase equity at its 
original price and then hold the equity until they are willing to sell at the new higher 
equilibrium price. The arbitrageurs thus will make a riskless profit in the process. 
Our analysis differs from that of Fama and French (2002) in important ways; 
specifically in terms of how we seek to explain the divergences that occur between 
historical returns and expected returns. Firstly, we examine whether fundamental 
growth can be forecasted in more depth than Fama and French (2002). We compare 
the performance of regression models with the historical average, which lends support 
to the case that the historical average is the best forecaster. Secondly, we examine 
precisely when the fall in expected returns by using structural break tests. This allows 
us to observe when the dis-connect between historical and expected returns occurred. 
Hence in particular in dealing with these two main issues we adopt a more detailed 
and rigorous approach than Fama and French (2002). 
Have historical returns in the UK been considerably higher than those 
expected by investors over recent years as found by Fama and French (2002) and 
Jagannathan et al. (2001) for the US? If so, then ex-post measures of the equity 
premium puzzle will overstate the magnitude of the puzzle. The ex-ante equity 
premium measured using fundamentals may be considerably smaller than the 6% it is 
frequently quoted to be. Thus, the differenc~ between the expected equity premium 
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and the theoretical prediction may not be as great as we first thought. However, there 
may be a second puzzle. Why have realised returns been so far above the expected 
returns implied by the dividend growth models? 
3.2 MODEL AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
In this section we first outline the models used in this chapter, we then proceed 
to describe the data utilised in this study before assessing the statistical properties of 
this data. Finally we examine in detail the methodologies utilised throughout this 
chapter. 
3.2.1 MODEL 
In finance, the return in any time period is given by equation 1. Th~ simple 
proportional return (R1) is the dividend paid (d1) during that time period plus the 
change stock price (p1-p1_1) during that time period expressed as a proportion of the 
original asset price (at prior time period t -1 ). 
Simple Return Equation 
Rr = (dt + Pr- Pr-1)/ Pr-1 
Rr = dJPr-1 + (p, - Pr-1 )j Pr-1 (1) 
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In (1) we can separate the proportional return (R1) into two distinct parts. The 
first part is the dividend yield (d1 I p1_1 ) which is the dividend paid during the current 
time period t divided by the original asset price at time t-1. The second is the 
proportional capital gain (p1 - p,_1 I p1_1 ) given by the change in price between time t-1 
and t divided by the original asset price. 
This chapter focuses upon the expected equity premium following the 
approach of Fama and French (2002) to derive estimates of average stock returns. In 
their average return model, the average stock return (Rt) is simply the average 
dividend yield (dt I Pt-I) plus the average growth of prices (GPt). 
Average Return Model 
(2) 
Equation 2 shows the average return model, where A ( ) is the arithmetic 
average, d1 is real dividend payments during the current time period t, p 1_1 is the price 
index at the previous time period t-1 and d1 I p1_1 is the dividend yield. GP/0 is the 
proportional capital gain in time t as defined in equation 2. 
If the dividend-price ratio (d1 I p1) has a constant mean then over extended 
periods of time the proportional change in equity prices must be matched by an almost 
equivalent proportional change in dividends. Since a constant mean is one condition 
that stationary variables must satisfy, it follows that if we have a stationary dividend-
price series then dividend growth will give us an estimate of the expected growth of 
the share price. Consequently, we can obtain estimates from fundamentals of expected 
capital gains. 
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Similar intuition applies to any other variable that is in a long-term stable 
relationship with prices. Other possible suitable candidate variables might be earnings 
or consumption. However reliable data, especially for earnings dating back to 1900 is 
unavailable for the UK market. Hence we only consider the dividend growth model 
outlined in (3). 
Dividend Growth Model 
A (RD1 ) = A (d1 / p1_1 ) +A (GD1 ) (3) 
In Equation 3, RD, represents the dividend growth model estimate of expected 
return and GD, represents the proportional dividend growth. 
The Fama-French Dividend Growth Model is defined in (3) as the return of 
the dividend model (RD,) being given by the average dividend yield (d1 IPr-1) plus the 
average dividend growth rate (GD1) 11 . 
This approach benefits from its generality and its simplicity. It relies upon 
very few underlying assumptions. The main assumption made thus far has been that 
the ratio of dividends or earnings to price is stationary. Since, then dividend growth or 
earnings growth will provide the researcher with an estimate of capital gains. In fact, 
these fundamentals should provide us with a more precise estimate of the expected 
equity return in any one year due to dividends and earnings fluctuating less erratically 
than stock price indices. However, if the valuation ratios are the same at the sample 
beginning and end then the average equity premium yielded by each method would be 
identical. 
Even if the series are not stationary, Fama and French (2002) claim their 
approach can still be employed provided the weaker condition that the series is mean-
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reverting or mean-reverting during each regime. They make the case that one can 
rationally expect there to be different regimes in the valuation ratios, primarily 
brought about because of permanent or highly persistent changes in factors 
determining asset prices. For example, if investors believed growth of fundamentals 
to have permanently increased then prices would rationally shift upward perhaps 
causing the appearance of a non-stationary section in the dividend-price ratio. 
Therefore, as long as valuation ratios exhibit mean-reversion during regimes it is 
posited that dividend growth and earnings growth will provide reasonable 
approximations of capital gains and the models developed by Fama and French can be 
employed. 
Actually, when there are price shifts caused by rational factors that could not 
be foreseen then Fama and French (2002) suggest that fundamentals are a superior 
way to estimate expected equity returns. Since, in the preceding example the increase 
in the growth rate was unexpected, investors' returns would be inflated due to the 
equity price rise which was due to good fortune in terms of unanticipated favourable 
economic news. 
This, however, poses a challenge for the researcher to demonstrate that their 
use of the dividend model in the place of any non-stationarities in the data can be 
justified on the basis of rational price adjustment to unanticipated factors. If 
movements in valuation ratios were caused primarily by factors other than rational 
price adjustment, such as market optimism or mis-pricing then the Fama-French 
model may prove to be an inappropriate abstraction of reality and yield defective 
results. Hence in section 3.2.5 we address these issues in detail not only conduct 
simple unit-root tests but also examine advanced econometric methods to establish 
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when the valuation ratios are stationary and during which periods, if any, they were 
non-stationary. 
3.2.2 EQUIVALENCE OlF FAMA-FRENCH AND GORDON DIVIDEND 
GROWTH MODELS 
The Fama-French Dividend Growth model outlined in Section 3.2.1 is 
equivalent to the classic Gordon (1962) dividend valuation model. Traditionally, the 
Gordon model gives you the constant return on equity implied by the current price, 
current dividends and dividend growth rate at any one point in time. In a multi-period 
setting simply taking an average of this would give us the result Fama and French 
produce in equation 3. However, the basis of each model is quite distinct and each 
originates from markedly different backgrounds, as illustrated by the derivation of the 
Gordon model. 
In this model share prices are determined by equating the current price to 
investor's expectations of the assets' future cashflows discounted to the present time. 
Consequently the current share price (P,) is determined by the value of the dividend 
paid during the next period (Dr+I) and the asset price at the end of the next period 
(Pt+1) discounted (at rate k). 
p = Dt+l +~+I 
t (l+k) (4) 
In the same way the price at the end of period one is given by the dividend 
expected during period two plus the price expected at the end of period two both 
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discounted back to period one as shown in equation 5. If we now substitute this into 
the initial pricing equation then price at time t is given by the discounted dividends 
paid during periods one and two plus the discounted asset price at the end of period 
two. Assuming the cost of capital is constant we arrive at equation 6. 
p = Dt+2 +~+2 
t+l (1 +k) (5) 
p = Dt+t + Dt+2 + ~+2 
t (l+k) (l+k)2 (6) 
If one continues to substitute recursively for the future price then the current 
price is given simply by the discounted stream of future dividends that the asset held 
pays. Thus, as shown in equation 7, an infinitely lived company can be valued simply 
according to the discounted stream of future dividends that it is believed to pay. 
D D p = t+l + 1+2 + 
t (l+k) (l+k)2 
p = ~ Dt+i 
t Bo+ki 
D + t+~ 
(1 +k)~ 
(7) 
If we now assume that the asset pays a dividend that grows at a constant rate 
then the dividend series follows a geometric progression that can be solved for price 
and re-arranged to be expressed in terms of the required rate of return. 
(8) 
85 
In equation 8, k is the required return on equity and g is the growth rate. 
If we determine the growth rate (g) by the proportional growth of dividends 
during the current time period and take the average of equity return calculations, then 
the Gordon Dividend Discount model and the Fama-French dividend discount model 
are identical. 
Thus, the Gordon Dividend Discount model gives us an alternative way to 
derive an expression for the return on equity implied by dividends that is equivalent to 
the Fama-French Dividend Growth model. However, the assumptions we have made 
in deriving these models are quite different. The Gordon model assumes that the rate 
of return investors' expect is constant, that the company will pay dividends forever 
and thus must have an infinite life and that the dividend payment will grow at a 
constant rate. The empirical validity of these assumptions can be questioned. For 
example, there is substantive evidence that suggests expected returns fluctuate over 
the business cycle. The assumption that the dividend growth rate will be constant is 
also unlikely to hold exactly varying according to the stage of the business cycle and 
the industry lifecycle. Whilst an estimate can be approximated for the growth rate, a 
further drawback of the dividend growth approach is the sensitivity of the required 
return to the growth rate used. 
Furthermore, in this present-value model, the dividend yield is theoretically a 
stationary time-series, thus if empirically we were to discover the dividend yield had 
non-stationary properties then the Gordon dividend discount model will not hold and 
this would be an invalid approach to employ. 
The underlying motivation of these two models is also very different. For 
example, the Gordon dividend growth model is only valid under the assumption that 
the asset price is determined by the sum of all future dividend payments discounted 
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back to the present. The Fama-French dividend growth model presented above is valid 
even if asset prices are determined by an alternative model rather than according to 
agents' expectations of future discounted dividends. In this respect, the Fama-French 
model can be seen as being much more general. 
However, the Gordon dividend discount model does have an important 
advantage. It doesn't stipulate how the growth rate (g) should be calculated in contrast 
to the set way in the Fama-French formulation. Thus it allows for some flexibility in 
determining the appropriate growth. For example, averages of the last 5 years 
dividend growth rate is often employed, or alternatively analysts' 5 year forecasts are 
commonly employed. This flexibility has two main benefits. Firstly, practitioners can 
choose the method to measure of the growth rate they believe to be most applicable. 
Secondly, if the estimates of longer than 1 year are used to calculate the dividend 
growth rate then it will fluctuate less and thus as a result be more precisely estimated. 
3.2.3 DATA DESCRIPTION 
Our data for the sample period 1900-2002 are taken from the Barclays Equity-
Gilt Study12 and is referred to henceforth as Barclays data. It covers firms listed on the 
London Stock Exchange. Since 1962 the data is derived from the FTSE All-Share 
Index. The Barclays equity index for the period 1900-1962 comprises the 30 largest 
shares by market capitalisation in each year and is rebalanced annually. The Barclays 
equity-price index is value-weighted with the weights of constituent companies being 
proportional to their market capitalisation. The income yield on the index is derived 
12 The authors gratefully acknowledge the help of Barclays Capital and in particular Judith Anthony for 
providing a copy of the Barclays Equity-Gilt Study. 
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from all the dividends actually paid by companies during the relevant year divided by 
the year end price (Dr/~). fu this study we refer to this ratio as the dividend-price 
ratio. We define the dividend yield as the dividend paid during the current year 
expressed as a proportion of the prior years price (Dr/ ~-1 ). fu addition to the equity 
price index and income yield, we also collected by hand from the same source the 
treasury bill index and cost of living index. We use the cost of living index as a proxy 
for the consumer price index when calculating inflation. The data gathered thus 
provides us with all the information necessary to enable us to estimate the average 
return model and the dividend growth model. 
fu this study we examine the data in real terms, although our methodology is 
equally applicable to nominal values. Our preference for real terms stems from the 
basic tenet of financial theory that investors' primary objective in investing is to 
transfer consumption from one time period to another. Therefore, we are not primarily 
concerned with the nominal monetary value of our assets but rather with the 
consumption stream that this monetary income will entitle us to. This provides us with 
the rationale for looking at all variables in real terms, thereby investigating the 
model's implications for the purchasing power of investors' income. 
We construct the real values of our series collected in nominal terms by 
adjusting for inflation in the following manner: 
r = (1 + R)j(I +h) -1 (9) 
where r is the real growth rate, R is the nominal growth rate and h is inflation. 
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3.2.4 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive statistics for all the data series were generated using the PC-Give 
software package. This included calculating mean, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis values, plotting histograms of the data as well as testing diagnostically for 
normality. 
The Jarque-Bera test is commonly used to assess if a data series is normally 
distributed. If a data series were found to be non-normally distributed then this causes 
difficulties when regression analysis is undertaken. Specifically, conventional 
distributions of test statistics are generally formed under the assumption that a series 
is normally distributed, thus if a series is not normally distributed then adjustments to 
critical values should be made for reliable hypothesis testing to be undertaken. Whilst 
this is the case the unbiased and minimum variance properties of the estimator are 
unaffected. Even in the presence of non-normally distributed data the annual equity 
premia calculations in Section 3 will be completely unaffected. 
Jacque-Bera (JB) test statistic 
(10) 
In equation 10, n is the number of observations, S is the coefficient of 
skewness, K is the coefficient of kurtosis. The normal distribution has a skewness 
coefficient of 0 and a kurtosis coefficient of 3, so K-3 measures excess kurtosis. Thus, 
the Jarque-Bera test statistic provides us with an indication of how close the series is 
to being normally distributed in terms of skewness and excess kurtosis. If the series is 
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exactly normally distributed the test statistic will be 0. The further the sample 
skewness and kurtosis coefficients are from the theoretical normal distribution the 
lower the probability that the sample data is drawn from a normal distribution. 
The Jarque-Bera critical value follows the z 2 distribution with two degrees of 
freedom. The null hypothesis h0 : is that the residuals are normally distributed. The 
alternative hypothesis h1: is that the residuals are not normally distributed. The 
decision rule is: if the test statistic < critical value; then we fail to reject h0 • Otherwise 
h0 is rejected. A drawback of the test is that the critical value is asymptotic meaning 
the test only holds in large samples. Thankfully we have a relatively large sample 
comprising more than 100 observations. 
Table 3.1 panel A outlines the descriptive statistics of the variables taken from 
the Barclays equity-gilt study. We find that none of the variables are found to follow 
the normal distribution. This appears to be primarily due to there being high levels of 
excess kurtosis present in almost all the series. While this is a concern, it is not 
uncommon for excess kurtosis to be found in financial data series. Returns series are 
renowned for being leptokurtic, that is having a greater number of extreme 
observations (or much fatter tails) than you would find compared to a normal 
distribution. A more fundamental problem might be that there has been structural 
breaks in the series considered that will be identified in section 3.5. Perhaps, within 
each period during which there is no structural change more favourable results would 
be found. 
Table 3.2 panel B provides a correlation matrix for major variables used in the 
empirical analysis. As one would expect dividend growth (GD1) and dividend model 
measures of equity return (RD1) and equity premium (RXD1) are extremely highly 
correlated. Similarly capital gains (GP1) and historical average measures of equity 
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return (Rt) and equity premium (RXt) are also extremely highly correlated. However, 
perhaps surprisingly the contemporaneous correlation between historical average 
equity premium (RXt) and dividend model equity premium (RXDt) is close to zero. 
This suggests that in the short run there is little relationship between the measures; our 
subsequent analysis examines the long run relationship between these measures and 
finds they are positively associated. It is also worth noting the strong negative 
correlation between inflation and the risk-free rate, suggesting a rise in inflation leads 
to low real bond yields. In general, there are a number of moderately high correlations 
between variables. Perhaps the most notable of these is that between the dividend 
yield (D1/Pt_ 1) and historical average measures of the equity return (R1) and equity 
premium (RXt). These correlation results suggest that in econometric analysis then 
multicollinearity could perhaps be an issue. 
TABLE 3.1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATIONS 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable No. of Mean Standard Skewness Excess Min. Max. JB-stal P-lcvel Nom1ally 
Periods Deviation Kurtosis Distributed 
Inf, 102 4.21% 6.93% 0.09 3.70 -26.00% 24.89% 41.52 [0.00]** No 
F, 102 1.18% 6.51% 1.25 9.95 -16.66% 38.65% 79.50 [0.00)** No 
GD, 102 0.98% 16.04% 1.50 10.23 -48.69% 89.83% 62.37 [0.00]** No 
GP, 102 2.25% 19.71% 0.61 3.33 -62.48% 89.21% 26.78 [0.00]** No 
D,/P,.1 102 4.62% 1.20% 1.15 4.94 1.97% 10.41% 27.1 I [0.00)** No 
0 1 /P, 102 4.42% 1.14% 1.35 5.94 1.96% 9.82% 29.12 [0.00]** No 
RD, 102 5.60% 16.33% 1.30 9.48 -46.58% 93.63% 68.59 [0.00]** No 
R, 102 6.87% 20.37% 0.72 3.69 -58.09% 99.61% 27.90 [0.00]** No 
RXD, 102 4.41% 17.28% 1.63 8.64 -49.58% 89.51% 38.90 [0.00]** No 
RX, 102 5.68% 20.92% 0.86 4.78 -59.88% 106.65% 36.03 [0.00)** No 
Panel B: CotTelation Matrix 
Vanoole w F, m GP, :0.! R-1 D!H RD RXD. R.\':, 
h£ 1.0000 
F, 
-0.83"1:3 1.COOO 
GD -OCI347 o.-1577 ·1.0000 
GP. -0.2414 0.2770 0.0009 1 0000 
:0./ p,_l 
-0 .CG73 onoe 0.201 t;; 0.532i:i 1 0000 
D.l p, 
-O.CI312 0.::::.506 0.24B7 -fi.269C: 0.5946 t.oom 
RD -O.Cfl60 0.1719 I) -~~~~7 4 0.0400 0.271E; 0.2:381 1 0000 
R., 
-0.2357 o.::::B16 01)127 0.99C:C: 0.5743 -0.225~3 0.0547 ·10000 
R.\D 0.2494 -0.2325 0.!32'13 ~) 07•19 0.175:3 0.9·1 i32 0.~3-132 -0 1)015 1.0000 
R.X 0.0:372 ~:t.04E;t; ~) 0404 0.9456 0.5194 ~:t.DJ4 -fi 0Ct15 0.9453 0.1)174 1.0000 
91 
3.2.5 STATIONARITY TESTS 
Stationarity, in so much as the relevant valuation ratios having a constant 
mean is a central issue for our dividend growth model, as outlined in Section 3.1. 
These models rely upon the ratio of the dividends to price having a constant mean in 
order for dividend growth to give accurate estimates of the capital gain of the share 
index. If the relevant valuation ratios tend to be characterized as random walk 
processes then estimates of dividend growth calculated using the Fama-French 
methodology could give poor approximations of actual share price growth, unless this 
non-stationarity is caused by rational price adjustment. This controversial issue of 
rational price adjustment versus systematic mis-pricing can be avoided if the valuation 
ratios are found to be stationary. 
More generally, stationarity is an important issue since it is a pre-requisite for 
OLS regression analysis to be reliably conducted. If the stationarity conditionsi3 are 
violated then econometric analysis runs a considerable risk of yielding spurious 
results as illustrated by Granger and Newbold (1974). With the consequences of a 
non-stationary data series being so dire and potentially disastrous for regression 
analysis there has been a preference in the literature for diagnostic statistics which test 
the null hypothesis that the data follows a random walk. This stems from the 
statistical rejection of the random-walk hypothesis giving a much stronger indication 
that the data is stationary than an acceptance of a null hypothesis of stationarity. 
Stationarity tests based upon the null hypothesis of a random walk were 
pioneered by Dickey and Fuller (1979). The Dickey-Fuller and Augmented Dickey-
13 There are 3 conditions of (weak) stationarity, a) constant mean over time, b) constant variance over 
time and c) constant co variances over time. 
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Fuller test assesses if the series Y1 follows the null hypothesis of a random walk or the 
alternative hypothesis that it has a constant mean. The Dickey Fuller test is based 
upon the following equations: 
~ = 1-lJ. + P~-' +c, c, ~ l/D(O,a2 ) 
~- ~-1 = f.lz + (p-1)~-1 + £, (11) 
~~ = f.lz + (p -1)~_, + £, 
The null hypothesis of the Dickey Fuller test is: ho: p=l. In this case the 
change in Y1 is determined purely by the white noise error term £, . This means that 
the time series follows a random walk and thus the series is non-stationary. The 
alternative hypothesis of stationarity is: ho: p<l. If p<l then the series will have a 
constant mean. The test statistic follows the tau distribution. The decision rule is if 
ltest statistic! < !critical value! then we fail to reject ho and we infer that the series is a 
random walk and thus is non-stationary. We reject ho if ltest statistic!> !critical value!, 
which indicates that the series is stationary and does have a constant mean. 
If Y1 follows an AR model of order greater than 1 then this would induce serial 
correlation into the error term of the regression equation causing the error term to no 
longer be white noise. In order to correct the error term for autocorrelation the 
augmented dickey fuller (ADF) test can be used, which includes higher order lags into 
the regression equation. 
p 
~~ = f.1 + m·~-1 +I mP~~-p + £, 
p=! 
(12) 
The order of the ADF test is given by the number of lags (P). So, if for 
example we believed Y1 to follow an AR(3) process we would examine a 3rd order 
ADF test in which P is set equal to 3. For stationarity we need to examine the term in 
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this equation m*Y,_, . If the coefficient m* = 0 then Yt follows a random walk process 
and will be non-stationary. However, if m* < 0 then Yt it will be a stationary mean-
reverting series. 
Since we have an annual data series we have no clear theoretical reason to 
expect any particular lag length for autocorrelation14. Consequently, the exact number 
of lags included is determined according to the minimum AIC model selection 
criteria, which allows the data to indicate the most appropriate lag length to correct for 
autocorrelation. Using the ADF test statistics for the appropriate model, we then 
assess if the series is stationary or not by comparing the test statistic with the critical 
value drawn from the tau distribution. Table 3.2 reports the results of the ADF tests. 
We find that all the variables are stationary including those required for econometric 
analysis in Chapter 3.4 and thus they can be reliably used. 
TABLE 3.2: UNIT ROOT TESTS (1901-2002) 
Variable Lags selected Test Test Statistic Critical Value Decision Inference 
by AIC 
D1/P1 0 DF -6.27 -2.89 Reject ho Series is stationary 
DPDUM 0 DF -4.46 -3.45 Reject ho Series is stationary 
GD1 0 DF -11.30 -2.89 Reject ho Series is stationary 
GD21 0 DF -6.93 -2.89 Reject ho Series is stationary 
GD51 0 DF -3.96 -2.89 Reject ho Series is stationary 
GP1 ADF(l) -8.09 -2.89 Reject ho Series is stationary 
R, ADF(l) -10.10 -2.89 Reject ho Series is stationary 
14 Maximal lag length in such tests is commonly set to 12 for monthly data or 4 for quarterly data so 
that any seasonality in the data can be accounted for. In annual data there is no obvious lag length. 
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FIGURE 3.1: The UK and the US Dividend-price ratio: 1900-2002 
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Notes: UK data is from Barclays equity-gilt study, US data is from Robert Shiller's website. 
The finding of stationarity in the case of the dividend-price ratio is especially 
crucial since this suggests that dividends and prices are in a stable long-term 
relationship. Thus dividend growth is an appropriate proxy for the capital gains of 
share prices, providing evidence that the use of the Fama-French dividend growth 
model (given by (3)) to estimate returns is supported by the data. 
Whilst, the dividend-price ratio is stationary for our full sample, this does 
cover a period of more than 100 years during which there has been substantial 
changes to the economic environment within which firms operate it. Thus it would be 
expedient to examine the stationarity of the dividend-price ratio within sub-periods of 
our overall sample. In order to achieve this, we utilise a rolling unit root procedure as 
first suggested by Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock (1992). Their approach involves 
running a stationarity test regression over a set sample window and then moving the 
sample window forward by one period and re-running the stationarity test. We chose 
the standard Dickey-Fuller test (see equation 11), which for the full sample period 
was deemed the most suitable specification by the AIC criterion. A 40-year sample 
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window is used which provides enough observations to conduct a stationarity test. 
Thus our first sample window sets t = 1901-1940 and conducts the Dickey Fuller test 
over this 40 year period. The sample window then moves forward to cover t = 1902-
1941 and so on running 63 separate unit root tests culminating with the 1963-2002 
period. 
FIGURE 3.2: DICKEY FULLER TEST STATISTICS 
Figure 3.2A: Rolling 40 year Dickey Fuller Tests on the UK Dividend-Price Ratio 
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Figure 3.2B: Rolling 40 year Dickey Fuller Tests on Series DPDUM, the UK Dividend-Price Ratio 
adjusted by use of dummy variables to account for outlying observations in the series 
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The unit root test statistic values and critical values are plotted through time in 
figure 3.2. In general we find that the series still exhibits stationarity during almost all 
sample periods. For any 40 year sample period, except that ending in 1974, the 
Dickey Fuller test always rejects the null hypothesis of a random walk at the 5% 
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significance level. The rolling unit-root tests provide broad support for the dividend-
price ratio being stationary, as indicated by the test of the whole sample. 
A difficulty with unit root tests, particularly the Dickey-Fuller test is that if 
there are outlying observations that quickly mean-revert then this can inflate the test 
statistic leading to impression that there is stationarity, when for much of the sample 
there is little mean reversion. To establish the robustness of the tests to outliers, we 
remove the impact of the mean reversion caused by these outliers. 
In the early part of the sample the dividend-price ratio appears to be 
exceptionally low in 1915 and 1919 and extremely high during 1921, this period 
corresponds to World War 1 and its immediate aftermath. In the 1970s there is a large 
outlying observation in 1974, due to the 1st OPEC oil crisis and the subsequent UK 
market crash. We therefore include dummy variables for the years 1915, 1919, 1921 
and 1974 during which exceptional dividend-price ratios were recorded. We run the 
regression in equation 13 of the dividend-price ratio on a constant, four dummy 
variables (where 1915D 1919D, 1921D and 1975D are dummy variables) and a 
random error term. For example 1915D corresponds to a dummy variable that is 1 in 
1915 and 0 in all other years. 
D, I~ =a+ /J1.(1915D)+ /J2 .(1919D)+ /J3.(1921D)+ fJ4 .(1974D)+£, 
DPDUM = D, I~- /J1.(1915D)- /J2 .(1919D)-fJ3 .(1921D)- fJ4 .(1974D) (13) 
We then calculated the dividend-price ratio series allowing for dummies 
(DPDUM), which adjusts the values for the outlying years. Using the DPDUM series 
with the effects of the outlying observations removed we proceeded to undertake the 
rolling unit root tests in the same manner as previously described and illustrated in 
figure 3.2B. With the outlying observations controlled for there doesn't appear to be 
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much of an impact upon the rolling Dickey-Fuller test, except for at the end of the 
sample. The pre-1990 data provides support for the data being non-stationarity in all 
sub-periods. 
However, the main difference in the stationarity test results are for periods 
ending after 1997. Before controlling for the 1974 dividend-price observation we 
found the data clearly rejected the null at the 5% significance level. However, when 
the effects of this outlier is controlled for we find evidence that samples ending in 
1998 or later are deemed to be non-stationary at both the 5% or the 10% significance 
level. Thus, the very end of the sample appears to exhibit some behaviour consistent 
with a random walk. This has perhaps been brought about by the gradual transition of 
the dividend-price ratio to a new mean in the late 1990s, an issue investigated in 
Chapter 3.4.4. 
Overall, apart from perhaps the post-1997 data, we find strong evidence that 
the dividend-price ratio is stationary as implied by theory. Given dividends and prices 
appear to be in a stable long-term relationship, this implies that dividend growth will 
be a good approximation for capital gains and provides confirmation that the Fama-
French dividend growth model derived in (3) can be justifiably applied to our dataset. 
3.3 ANNUAL EQUITY RETURNS 
3.3.1 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE UK MARKET 
Perhaps the most striking feature of our results is that the UK Equity Premium 
from the overall UK market 1951-2002 based on average realised returns was 7.79%, 
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which is more than 65% larger than the estimate of 4.60% from the Dividend Growth 
model. Over the period 1901-1950, the dividend growth model estimate of the annual 
UK equity premium of 4.22%, was similar to the 3.49% premium given by the 
average returns model. Thus both fundamentals and historical returns indicate that the 
expected equity premium from the turn of the twentieth century to 1950 was about 4% 
per annum. 
TABLE 3.3: UK and US ESTIMATES OF EQUITY PREMIA 
Panel A: UK Market Estimates of Equity Premia and Related Statistics 
UK Data Variable lnf1 F, D1 /P1•1 GD1 GP1 RD1 R, RXD, RX, 
1901-2002 Mean 4.21 1.18 4.62 0.98 2.25 5.60 6.87 4.41 5.68 
St. Dev 6.96 6.54 1.21 16.12 19.80 16.41 20.47 17.37 21.02 
1901-1950 Mean 2.20 0.82 4.48 0.56 -0.17 5.03 4.31 4.22 3.49 
St. Dev 8.07 8.49 0.98 22.00 14.43 22.34 14.93 23.70 15.27 
1951-2002 Mean 6.14 1.53 4.75 1.39 4.57 6.14 9.33 4.60 7.79 
St. Dev 5.06 3.89 1.39 7.04 23.77 7.28 24.56 7.59 25.34 
1966-2002 Mean 6.97 2.09 4.60 0.49 4.28 5.09 8.88 3.00 6.79 
St. Dev 5.44 3.95 1.54 6.82 24.69 7.04 25.57 7.20 26.56 
Panel B: US Market Estimates of Equity Premia and Related Statistics 
US Data Variable lnf, F, D1/P1•1 GD1 GP1 RD1 R, RXD, RX, 
1872-2000 Mean 2.16 3.24 4.70 2.08 4.11 6.78 8.81 3.54 5.57 
St. Dev 7.51 8.48 1.39 12.37 17.83 12.56 18.03 13.00 18.51 
1872-1950 Mean 0.99 3.90 5.34 2.74 2.96 8.07 8.30 4.17 4.40 
St. Dev 9.11 10.63 1.12 15.28 18.48 15.41 18.72 16.02 19.57 
1951-2000 Mean 4.00 2.19 3.70 1.05 5.92 4.74 9.62 2.55 7.43 
St. Dev 3.11 2.46 1.17 5.09 16.77 5.21 17.03 5.62 16.73 
Notes: 
All values reported are annual percentages. Panel A covers UK Data from the Barclays Equity-Gilt Study. Panel 
B covers US Data reported in Fama & French (2002). lnf1 is the rate of inflation for year t, (CPI1 I CPI1_1)- I. F1 
is the real return on Treasury Bills. d1 and p1 are nominal dividends and prices at time t. D1 I P1_1 is the real 
dividend yield, defined as: (d, I p1. 1)*(CPI,_ 1 I CPI,). GD, is the real growth of dividends fort, (d1 I d1_1)*(CPI,_ 1 I 
CPI,)- 1. GP, is the real capital gain fort, (p1 I p1• 1)*(CPI,_ 1 I CPI1). RD1 is the dividend growth model estimate of 
equity returns for t, (D1 I P1• 1) + GD,. RXD1 is the dividend growth model estimate of the equity premium for t, 
RD, -F1• R1 is the realised return at time t, (D1 I P,_1) + GP1• RX1 is the realised equity premium at time t, R1 -F1• 
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Our results indicate that the dividend growth estimate of the equity premium 
has been relatively stable, being 4.22% p.a. in the first half of the 20th Century 
compared with 4.60% p.a. since 1951. While, in contrast, the equity premium from 
average returns has increased substantial! y from 3.49% pre-1950 to 7. 79% post -1950. 
Thus, the gap between the dividend growth model estimate and the average return 
estimate has widened substantially. 
These two main findings that a) both models yield similar estimates of the 
equity premium for the pre-1950 era and b) the equity premium from average returns 
increased substantially in the second half of the 201h Century are entirely consistent 
with the Fama and French (2002) study of S&P 500 firms. Fama and French found the 
equity premium estimates for 1872-1950 are almost identical being 4.40% for the 
average return model and 4.17% dividend growth model. These figures are both 
around the 4% p.a. level found in this study. They also found the average return 
model estimate rose dramatically to 7.43% for the post 1951 sample from 4.40% for 
the earlier period, which mirror our results. 
However, in one aspect our results are different to Fama and French's. In the 
US the dividend growth model of the equity premium declined substantially in the 
second half of the 20th century to 2.55% from 4.17% for their earlier sample. In 
contrast, we find that this figure remains almost unchanged in the UK being 4.22% for 
1901-1950 increasing modestly to 4.60% during 1951-2002. Why are there these 
differences? Perhaps, this is due to changes in American corporations' payout policy 
which has not been fully mirrored in the UK. Fama and French (2001) demonstrate 
that the proportion of US firms that pay dividends at all declined substantially in the 
1980s and 1990s, whilst Grullon and Michaely (2002) provided evidence that share 
repurchases have become an important means of distributing funds to shareholders 
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besides dividends. Both these factors could cause US dividend model estimates to be 
biased downwards. However, in the UK there is little evidence to suggest changes in 
payout policy have occurred on the same scale as witnessed in the US. Ap Gwilym, 
Seaton and Thomas (2004) provide evidence that the UK payout ratio was 52.1% in 
December 2001, their sample end date, which was actually marginally above the 
average payout ratio of 51.4% for their full sample 1962-2001. Furthermore, share 
repurchases by British firms have been a far less popular and important mechanism 
for distributing resources to stockholders in comparison to the US; firstly share 
repurchases were illegal until the mid-1980s and even since then Rau and Vermaelen 
(2002) found share repurchase activity in the UK comprised only a very small 
proportion of total payout until the late 1990s. Dimson and Marsh (2001, p23) 
comment, "Until the late 1990s (UK) share buybacks were negligible." However, the 
trends which began in the US during the 1970s appear to become apparent in the UK 
from the late 1990s onwards. Young and Oswald (2004) find that UK share 
repurchases become a substantive part of total dividend payout during the late 1990s 
and Benito and Young (2001) provide evidence that dividend omissions rose in the 
UK during the late 1990s. Nevertheless there appears to have been little change in the 
payout policy of British firms until the very end of the sample period. Thus, we 
suggest that any change in payout policy there may have been will have anything 
other than a slight influence upon our UK dividend growth model results, which are 
based on long-run averages. 
An important advantage of the UK dividend growth model is that it does 
provide a more precise estimate of the equity premium since the variance of the 
dividend model is considerably smaller than that generated by average returns 
especially since 1950. Furthermore fundamentals are less affected by structural shifts 
in the economic environment than asset prices themselves. Hence, we contend that the 
implied equity premia derived from these models provide us with better estimates of 
expected returns than average historical returns. If this is the case then our results 
suggest that the equity premium puzzle is considerably smaller than generally cited in 
financial literature. Average historical returns indicate equities have delivered a 
premium over treasury bills of approaching 8% p.a. since World War 2, however, the 
dividend growth model intimates the true expected equity premium is closer to 4.5% 
p.a. 
Could investors in 1950 really have anticipated that stocks would outperform 
treasury bills by 8% p.a. for the rest of the century? Would they then decide that the 
risks involved with stocks were too great? If not, then a good deal of stock returns are 
simply due to good luck, that is they were unexpected. This is an issue we explore in 
more detail in Chapter 3.4. 
We will now examine the equity premium estimates by breaking our model 
into their constituent parts. The average real Treasury-bill rate rose considerably from 
0.82% during 1901-1950 to 1.53% for the post 1950 period. The rising return on the 
risk-free rate is informative because it has interesting implication for the overall real 
return on equity given by our models during the different sample periods. The 
dividend growth model estimate of the average return on equity (RD1) is remarkably 
steady being around 5 or 6% in all sub-sample periods. In contrast, the average return 
model gives very different equity return estimates (R1). For 1901-1950 it is 4.31 %, 
similar to that given by the dividend growth model, however since 1951 it rose 
spectacularly to 9.33%. 
The very high average returns received since 1951 has been due to a dramatic 
rise in the rate of capital gain (GPt). The average annual rate of capital gain increased 
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from -0.17% between 1901 and 1950 to 4.57% for the post 1951 period. Dividend 
Growth (GD1) rates also increased from 0.56% to 1.39% for 1951-2002. These results 
suggest that either price growth (GP1) was very low pre-1950 or has been extremely 
rapid since 1951 or a combination of the two. 
The key question is could investors in 1950 have rationally anticipated such · 
high average equity returns of approaching 9% or expected capital gains to be more 
than 4% p.a.? We suggest that the primary force behind the divergence between our 
models equity premia estimates seen since 1950 is an unexpectedly high rate of 
capital gains. This issue is examined in more detail in Chapter 3.4. 
3.3.2 UK EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM 10 YEAR SUB-SAMPLES 
TABLE 3.4: UK EQUITY PREMIA BY DECADE 
Sample lnf1 F, GD1 GP1 D1 /P1•1 RD, R, RXD, RXt 
Period 
1901-2002 4.21% 1.18% 0.98% 2.25% 4.62% 5.60% 6.87% 4.41% 5.68% 
1901-1910 1.00% 1.63% -2.68% -0.28% 4.50% 1.82% 4.22% 0.19% 2.59% 
1911-1920 10.58% -4.25% -0.77% -10.71% 3.62% 2.84% -7.09% 7.09% -2.84% 
1921-1930 -5.00% 7.67% 6.85% 8.37% 5.38% 12.22% 13.75% 4.55% 6.07% 
1931-1940 2.47% 0.91% -0.33% -0.61% 4.45% 4.12% 3.84% 3.22% 2.93% 
1941-1950 1.94% -1.87% -0.27% 2.38% 4.43% 4.16% 6.81% 6.03% 8.68% 
1951-1960 4.06% -0.67% 5.78% 9.01% 5.42% 11.20% 14.42% 11.87% 15.09% 
1961-1970 4.28% 2.15% -1.29% 0.17% 4.48% 3.18% 4.65% 1.03% 2.50% 
1971-1980 13.92% -2.37% -1.88% 2.71% 5.58% 3.70% 8.29% 6.06% 10.66% 
1981-1990 6.43% 4.71% 5.70% 7.51% 5.03% 10.73% 12.53% 6.01% 7.82% 
1991-2002 2.68% 3.46% -0.92% 3.65% 3.51% 2.60% 7.16% -0.86% 3.70% 
Table 3.4 provides a breakdown of each variable over a 10 year period. 
Interestingly there seem to be 3 decades of exceptional growth in UK fundamentals: 
the 1920s, 1950s and 1980s. During each of these decades real dividend growth was 
above 5% p.a., which is huge considering in other 10-year periods the growth rate 
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tended to hover close to zero or was even slightly negative in real terms. Since 
dividend growth was high in the 20s, 50s and 80s and dividend yields were fairly 
stable the dividend model equity return (the sum of these two variables) was also at its 
peak in the 20s, 50s and 80s. We also find that UK capital gains hit historical highs 
during the 20s, 50s and 80s as did UK average equity returns (the sum of average 
capital gain and average dividend yield) at the same times as fundamentals were 
growing strongly. 
A seemingly compelling explanation is that during these periods dividends 
grew strongly and were expected to continue to grow at above average rates, thus 
investors raised their valuations of the average stock stimulating high capital gains. 
However, the causality from fundamental performance to stock return cannot be 
established unequivocally at least initially. It is plausible that some other factor 
perhaps economic news caused stock prices to rise, forcing corporate mangers 
wishing to appease investors demanding a reasonable yield to increase dividend 
payments. This second hypothesis, however, appears not to be supported by the data 
in table 3.4. Both the dividend-price ratio and dividend yield were well above their 
means during the 20s, 50s and 80s, rather than struggling to keep pace with the 
historical average as would be expected if the causality flowed from prices to 
dividends. It seems more likely thus that the high level of dividend growth stimulated 
the rapid capital gains during these periods. 
As mentioned above the dividend yield and dividend-price ratio tended to only 
fluctuate within quite narrow bounds with highpoints during the 1920s, 50s, 70s and 
80s. However, the high levels during the 1970s appear to have been driven by the 
outlier in 197 4, which occurred at the time of the stock market crash following the 1st 
OPEC oil crisis. The ratios were exceptionally low during the 1910's, mainly due to 
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two outliers during World War 1, and the 1990s especially from the mid-1990s 
onwards during which the ratios fell and remained considerably below there long run 
average. In Chapter 3.4.4 we examine if in fact this fall constitutes a structural change 
in the dividend-price process. 
Our inflation indicator fluctuates quite widely across the different decades. It 
was extremely high during the 1910's and during the 1970s. The high inflation of the 
1970s in large part stimulated by the OPEC oil crises and the inflationary effects upon 
the economy have been well documented in the economic literature. Outside of these 
two spurts of rapid inflation there has been a much more steady appreciation of the 
price index, often around 3-4% p.a., the one notable exception being the 1920s when 
our data suggests there was deflation. 
Our results suggest there is a negative relationship between the inflation rate 
and the real risk-free rate. When inflation was high during the 1910's and 1970s the 
real risk-free rate was negative, but when there was deflation in the 1920s the real 
risk-free rate was at its highest level for the entire 20th century. Furthermore, the real 
risk-free rate appears exhibit some modest volatility over time, when it is usually 
surmised to be relatively constant. This appears to support the view that unanticipated 
inflation does impact upon the risk-free rate and thus the equity premium. 
While we have noted in this section that equity returns were at their highest 
when dividend growth was also high during the 1950s and 1980s, this doesn't provide 
a satisfactory answer to why since 1951 has historical returns exceeded the dividend 
growth model return by so much. For example, during the 1970s and 1990s real 
dividend growth was negative but real capital gains were still around 3% p.a. In 
Chapter 3.4 we tackle the question of what has caused our two estimates of equity 
returns to differ by so much during the second half of the 20th Century. 
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3.4 EXPLAINING UK EQUITY RETURNS 
3.4.1 WHA 'f HAS CAUSED THE REALISED RETURN TO EXCEED 
THE RETURN IMPLIED BY FUNDAMENTALS BY SO MUCH? 
If the models hold then the divergence in actual returns away from their 
fundamentals must be due to capital gains that were unanticipated at the beginning of 
the sample period. 
Valuation theory, states that this can be caused by either: 
A) the expected future growth of fundamentals being unusually high. 
B) faster growth of fundamentals than expected during the sample period. 
C) a decline in expected unconditional stock returns during the sample period. 
3.4.2 ARE POST 2000 EXPECTED DIVIDEND GROWTH RATES 
UNUSUALLY IDGH? 
It has been argued that we have entered a new economic era, which has 
enabled higher rates of economic growth to be attained. One claim is that the ever 
increasing pace of technological developments has facilitated more rapid productivity 
growth (Jagannathan et al, 2001). An alternative argument is that increasing 
globalisation as witnessed by growing moves towards a truly globally integrated 
economic system in which resources can be allocated more efficiently due to previous 
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barriers being removed and in which compames are able to locate production 
internationally in order to minimise costs. A final assertion is that substantial declines 
in inflation during the latter part of the 201h Century in many developed economies has 
set the footing for higher economic growth in the future, 15 economic policymakers 
have argued. Policymakers assert that lower and less volatile inflation rates (witnessed 
in recent years) provide businesses and entrepreneurs with a more stable economic 
environment in which long term investments can be undertaken with more confidence 
providing a basis for continuing rapid growth in GDP underpinned by higher earnings 
growth rates which would feed dividend increases. These three factors: a) 
technological improvements, b) globalisation and c) declining inflation - have lead to 
hopes that higher levels of economic growth can be achieved and sustained long into 
the future. 
However, if these higher future expected growth rates had not been anticipated 
at the beginning of our sample period then this would lead to unexpected capital gains 
being realised by investors as the potential for extended periods of high economic 
growth became known to investors and incorporated into their expectations. A critic 
of this view would point out that dividend growth has been fairly low since the 1960s 
and especially since 1991 (see table 3.4). Thus, it would be difficult to believe that 
investors would expect dividend growth to be unusually high in the future. 
This is however an issue which we can test empirically. We can examine the 
in-sample predictability of dividend growth. Using the results from these regressions 
we can then examine if there is a robust relationship between the predictor variables 
and dividend growth. From these regressions future dividend growth can be forecast. 
15 However, Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argue that inflation causes money illusion amongst investors 
who discount cashflows using too low a discount rate during periods of high inflation and vice-versa; if 
this is true investors act irrationally. Ritter and Warr (2002) provide some empirical support for this 
hypothesis. 
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3.4.2.1 IN-SAMPLE PREDICTABILITY OF DIVIDEND GROWTH 
USING ALL POSSIBLE CANDIDATE VARIABLES 
We examine the predictability of the dividend growth rate from variables 
known in advance in a similar manner to Fama-French (2002). We analyse the 
predictability of fundamental growth rates using 2 methods. Firstly, we select 
variables that have been documented to predict returns and examine if they have any 
explanatory power over dividend growth. Secondly, we identify variables that appear 
to have predictive ability such as the dividend-price ratio and model these 
relationships parsimoniously. 
The candidate variables which are available for our whole sample are: i) the 
lagged dividend-price ratio (D,_J ~-1 ), ii) prior dividend growth rates (GD,_1), 2) 
prior returns (R,_1) and iv) the short-term interest rate (F,_1). These have all been 
documented in the literature to have explanatory power over future returns. Here we 
assess if they are able to predict future growth rates of dividends. The estimated 
regression is given by equation 14. Other variables used in this study could also have 
been included such as inflation, however we exclude inflation since the correlation 
matrix (Table 3.1 Panel A) demonstrates it is highly correlated with the short-term 
interest rate. Including inflation could thus amplify the effects of any multicollinearity 
in the regression. Since the real risk-free rate has been used in prior studies (such as 
Ang (2002)) we adopt it here. 
GD, =a+ A.(D,_1j ~-1 ) + P2 .GD,_1 + P3.GD,_2 
+P4.GD,_3 + P5.Rt-1 + p6.Rr-2 + p?.Rt-3 + Ps.F,-1 +t:, 
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(14) 
TABLE 3.5: IN-SAMPLE PREDICTABILITY OF REAL DIVIDEND GROWTH 
Panel A: Predi: ting D:i!.r idend. Growth with all Potential Predictor Variables 
Sample Period: Pre-195 0 
Y Sunple Varia.b:ie Constant !A-1 i Pt..J GJ:\I Gllw GDw R.y ~2 R....1 F,_, R2 
GD, 1904-1950 CoeiTlcient 1114 -5.22 ~117 -(1.12 -0.31 017 0.24 O.CI7 1).1)3 0.28 
t-'··~:!l.l.E< 0.72 -1.17 -D.91 ~J.63 -1.95 076 101 0.32 1.61 
GD2, 1904-19 50 Coet1ic ient 0.04 -1.07 ~117 -(124 
-0.16 026 0.19 [I 05 -0.08 Cl26 
t-,,~:J.lF. 027 -0.33 -1.29 -1 74 -131 1.69 087 1]:?6 
-0.20 
(}[)5t 1904-19 50 Goemc iertt ~J [11 
-0.42 ~J .IJ5 
-DD7 -003 012 O.Dl -DD4 O.Dl [116 
t-'.•hlll:< -1] J 5 
-0.29 -D.82 
-1 D3 -0.52 1.74 0.17 -D52 1.56 
Sample Period: Post-1951 
y Sun:ple Varia.bJe Constant !?z 3 I Pt 1 GJ!l GJ!.;~ GJ!a R.J R.2 R.a Ft J R2 GD, 19 51-:ll 02 Coefiic ient 
-DD4 097 0.19 0.04 -0.10 013 007 0.01 000 0.28 
t-V.:!l.lJ:< 
-D.73 0.99 1.15 n ·-.~ _,L!Q 
-0.74 245 127 O.:ll -0.78 
GD2, 19 51-20 01 CoeiTIC ient -I]JJ8 1.92 1109 
-D JJ9 1104 014 om o.m 0.00 0.25 
t-'.·hlll:< -1 .7 0 2.08 0.60 -(168 0.35 2.84 1.41 06S -0.81 
GD5, 19 51-19 98 Coet1ic ient ~J .14 2.88 O.Dl 0.10 0.05 012 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.33 
t-'.•hlll:< -3.53 3.81 0.11 0.90 0.58 324 1.84 0.76 -0.04 Nc~es 
Tie regression in te ICe pt is constant aru:l. t-Y'd ue is the regressiort co-eiTlcien t ck.ided byi ts staru:hrd error. 
Tie rorni:m.l value c,fthe equity price irrlex and tre rorninal dividend paid at the end ofy:ar tare d,a:ndp,. The price le'.el at the end of year tis CPI, 
Tie real ore vear drvidend grot,r,thrate furvear tis GD,= (dld,.J)*(CPI.1/CP~-1. 
Tie real !t.~·D-w au::.o~;:ra,."';e dividend grotJ.th tate is Gm, = K d.ii /d,.1f' (C Pit-rlCPir!i ::~ 1] .0 
Tie real the-v~ ar a::.o~;:rage d:iv:idend growth tate is GD5, = ~·d.+; id,.1:rt' (C Pin/CPI,.;. ::~ 1] /5 
F 
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[0 105] 
1.64 
[0.147] 
ogg 
[O 539] 
F 
2.13 
[0.053] 
1.77 
[0.111] 
.-1 .-, .::-
..::. _j_.J 
[11036]* 
TABLE 3.5: IN-SAMPLE PREDICTABILITY OF REAL DIVIDEND 
GROWTH (CONTINUED) 
Sanp le Period: Pre-1950 Simple Period: Post-1951 
y SanpJe Vuiable Conrian:t D-1IR-1 R~ y Sanple VadabJe (~ D-l!P .. 1 R·z 
GD. t:;cl!l-19::n Coeffi:ieul 0.36 -7.95 0.15 G[\ 19 51-JJJ2 Coefficient 0.04 -0.66 om 
t-\'&1ue 2.93 -2.~~ t-\'alue 115 -081 
GD4 1904-19.::(1 Cc.;,ffu:i.eul 0.25 -5.12 0.14 GD2.. 19 51-JJJ 1 Coefflcient 0.01 0.16 000 
t-wdue .-, . .,.., ..:...JJ -2.74 t-value 0.24 023 
(J.D2\, 1904-19.::0 Coefficieut I} Of -0.97 om GD:\ 19 51-1998 Ccefficient -O.CG 101 0.06 
t-wdue 1.07 -Lcr7 t-\'alue -110 1.78 
Panel C: Prndi:tinrg Dn<ilend Growthwnh lamed DWilend C1ro\vfu 
Sanp le Period: Pre-1950 SanpJe Period: Post-1951 
y SanpJe VuiabJe Co:mtmt Gl).-l R·z y SanpJe Variable C-<lrlriant GD-1 R·z 
GD, 1904-1950 C oefflcieiii O.CQ -0.18 o.m G[\ 19 51-:J"JJ2 (,::.;,fflcient O.Dl 035 0.13 
t-'·"lue 0.43 -1.23 t-\'alue 09J.;l 2ill 
GD2. 1S04-19Y-I Cceffiae11i 0.01 -0.14 O.C~ GD2 19 51-::m 1 Ccefficient O.Dl 022 om 
t-v~lue 0.51 -1.43 t-value 1.43 1.87 
GD:, 1~:;.)4-19.:{1 c;,::.;,ffiaelli O.OJ -0.04 om (:;!):\ 19 51-19..:;.8 Ccefficient 0.01 0.12 om 
t-\..lue 0.17 -0.8.5 t-',o;Jue 2.22 12.4 
PaneiD: Prndi:tinrg Dn<ilend Growth with &!turns 
Sanp le Period: Pre-1950 SanpJe Period: Post-1951 
y SanpJe VuiabJe Co:mtmt R..l R·z y SanpJe Variable Cmmmt R..l R·z 
().[)l 1904-19.::1) Cc.;,ffiaelli o.m OD4 om GI:I 19 51-))1)2 (,::.;,ffJ.cient 000 Oll 0.13 
t-\..lue 1})6 017 t-\~e 0.12 2.78 
GD2. 19=~-19.::1:1 c: ce fficio;nli o.m 0.15 o.cc (;f):.?.. 19 51-))) 1 Ccefflcient O.Dl 0.08 0.12 
t-v:.b1e 1}15 1.01 t-\alu.e 0.73 2.52 
GD:~s. 19=~-19:(1 C.:~.ffici.el"d: o.m 0.08 om GD:\ 19 51-19..:;.8 Coofficient om o.m 0.02 
t-' . ..lue ~)21 123 t-\~e 2.03 1.06 
We split our dataset into the pre-1950 and post-1951 sub-samples. The 
rationale behind this is that we are trying to uncover the difference in the behaviour of 
the equity premium over the first half of the 201h century when dividend growth and 
average returns provided similar equity premium estimates and the second half of the 
201h century when these methods provided divergent estimates of stock returns. 
Panel A of Table 3.5 demonstrates that equation 14 can account for 
approximately 28% of the variation in one-year dividend growth during both sub-
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samples. However, the individual coefficients for all variables (except the 1 year 
lagged return for post 1950) are deemed to be statistically insignificant by the t-test. 
Similar results with very few individually statistically significant variables are also 
reported for two-year average dividend growth 16• We also examine five-year average 
dividend growth 17• We find that for the pre-1950 period none of the variables are 
found to be statistically significant and R2 is only 16%. However, for the post 1950 
period the regression is able to explain 33% of the variation in dividend growth. 
Furthermore both the lagged dividend price ratio and one period lagged return are 
statistically significant from zero at the 1% significance level. However, the dividend-
price ratio has a positive sign contrary to our expectation that dividends should help 
move the dividend-price ratio towards its mean value. This is discussed in more detail 
in Section 3.4.2.2. 
Nevertheless, given that we generally find there are so few statistically 
significant independent variables, but R2 is not tiny we suspect that there is multi-
collinearity between some of the predictor variables, which has inflated the estimated 
standard errors of the multi-collinearous variables. The moderate R2 values obtained 
from the estimated regressions using equation 14 suggests there might be some 
modest in-sample predictability of the dividend growth rate. However, the pattern of 
the predictability is difficult to detect because the regressions estimated appear to 
suffer from multi-collinearity, which deflates the t-test statistics. The correlation 
matrix (Table 3.1 Panel B) highlights that there are indeed at least moderate 
correlations between many of the predictor variables. For instance, dividend-price 
(DtfPt) ratio is moderately correlated with both the real risk-free rate (Ft) and the real 
16 2 year average dividend growth GD2
1 
= [(Dt+l - ~-1 )/ 0 t-l] 
17 5 year average dividend growth GD5
1 
= [(Dt+4 - ~~-1 )/ D1_1] 
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return (R1). Consequently, in the next section we examine if more parsimonious 
models can identify which variables, if any, are actually able to predict future 
dividend growth. 
3.4.2.2 IN-SAMPLE PREDICTABILITY OF DIVIDEND GROWTH 
lUS:U:NG PARSIMONIOUS REGRESSIONS. 
In this section we consider the in-sample predictability of dividend growth by 
either the dividend-price ratio or prior dividend growth or prior returns. Our 
motivation for examining the predictive power of each variable individually is that 
our results from Chapter 3.4.2.1 aroused suspicion that there is some correlation 
between these predictor variables. The regression results reported in this section 
should give us a much clearer picture of the relationship between the relevant 
independent variable and dividend growth rates, since unlike the regressions estimated 
in Chapter 3.4.2.1 they will not be affected by multicollinearity. We first consider the 
dividend-price ratio. 
There is a burgeoning literature that has examined the ability of the dividend-
price ratio to predict future returns18, which has generally shown some evidence of 
return predictability, especially in data prior to the 1990s. In this section we focus on a 
two-variable regression model, using only the dividend-price ratio to predict 
dividends. The regressions we estimate is given by equation 15. 
18 Beginning with Fama and French (1987) 
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GDI =a+ fl.(Dr-!1 P,_,) + &t 
GD21 =a+ {J.(D1_ 1 / P,_,) + &1 
GD51 =a+ {J.(D1_J P,_,)+&t 
(15) 
In these regressions the coefficient of prime interest is B. We expect that fJ 
should be negative. When dividends are high relative to prices then one would expect 
dividend growth to be low, so that the dividend-price ratio will revert towards its 
mean; for this to occur fJ must be negative. 
In contrast with the results from Section 3.4.2.1 we do find some statistical 
evidence of predictability using the dividend price ratio. For 1904-1950 there is a 
statistically significant negative relationship between the lagged dividend-price ratio 
and dividend growth at both 1 year and 2 year horizons. What is more this 
parsimonious model can explain approximately 15% of the variation in dividend 
growth rates during this period. However, the predictive ability of the dividend-price 
ratio evaporates at longer horizons. For five-year future dividend growth, the 
dividend-price ratio becomes statistically insignificant is unable to explain any more 
than 2% of the subsequent variation in dividend growth between 1904-1950. 
Since 1951 the dividend-price ratio appears to have lost any predictive ability 
over dividend growth; the t-statistics become insignificant at all horizons and the 
coefficient of determination (R2) tends to zero. However, contrary to our expectations, 
at the two year and five year horizons the coefficient on the dividend-price ratio is 
positive, but is insignificant. 
In part, the results of this section conflict with those reported in Section 
3.4.2.1, where we examined the relationship between dividend growth and all 
potential predictor variables. Firstly, over the pre-1950 sample our more parsimonious 
specification of the relationship between the dividend-price ratio and dividend growth 
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(15) indicated a significantly negative relationship between these variables at the one 
and two year horizon. Whereas our results from the more general specification (14) 
failed to detect a statistically important connection. We suggest the failure of (14) to 
identify this relationship is due to multicollinearity, with the dividend-price ratio, 
lagged dividend growth and lagged returns capturing much of the same phenomena. If 
there is multicollinearity in (14) then the estimated standard errors of the coefficients 
will be overstated and consequently the t-test statistics will be deflated leading to this 
inference. 
A second instance of a disparity in results is that over the post-1951 period 
regressions of (14) indicated a significant positive relationship between the dividend-
price ratio and dividend growth at the two or five year horizon, whereas the more 
parsimonious specification (15) suggests these variables are insignificantly related. 
We suspect that this finding is also due to multicollinearity. If there is high correlation 
between independent variables then this can induce a bias into the OLS estimated 
coefficient on each independent variable. As in this case, this can lead to a counter-
intuitive and spurious results being found. 
Since, we find that over the past fifty years the dividend-price ratio and future 
dividend growth are essentially unrelated, this provides no evidence to suggest that 
long-term growth rates of fundamentals should be extraordinarily high in the future. 
Our findings are consistent with Campbell and Shiller's statement (200 1, p6), "It is 
the denominator of the dividend-price ratio that brings the ratio back to its mean, not 
the numerator." Similarly, we find the numerator of the UK dividend-price ratio has 
played no role in restoring the ratio to its long-run mean since 1951. 
114 
"'"'· .. 
Our results from Section 3.4.2.1 did indicate that perhaps lagged dividend 
growth might be able to predict dividend growth. We estimate a parsimonious model 
with just one lag of dividend growth included19• 
GD, =a+/).( GD,_,) + £, 
GD21 =a+ /).(GD1_ 1)+£, 
GD5, =a+/).( GD,_,) + £1 
(16) 
This specification provides an interesting insight. Table 3.5 Panel C reveals 
that over 1951-2002, this model performs well at both the 1 year and 2 year horizon. 
The p coefficient was significant and positive, indicating that there is some 
persistence in the dividend growth rate. This is consistent with the field research of 
Lintner (1956), who suggested that dividends partially adjust each year towards an 
optimal level. The model can account for a respectable portion of dividend growth 
variability for 1951-2002, especially at the one year horizon. Although the five year 
horizon results indicate that this element of predictability disappears at longer 
horizons. In contrast, we find no evidence of in-sample predictability over the earlier 
sample period, 1901-1950. The lagged dividend growth model performs extremely 
poorly with a tiny R2 and insignificant coefficients on the independent variable. 
Consequently, the pre-1950 data doesn't support there being any link between lagged 
dividend growth and future dividend growth. 
Another possible candidate for predicting dividend growth is lagged returns, 
the results from Section 3.4.2.1 indicate. We suggest that economic news about 
fundamentals received during time period t-1 will be rapidly impounded into the 
19 Higher order specifications were estimated but the coefficients on these Jags proved to be 
insignificant and provide little additional explanatory power, thus the results are not presented here. 
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return series but will only become visible in the dividend series during time t or 
possibly time t+ 1. This we would expect the coefficient on lagged returns to be 
positive. A high return in time t-1 might be linked with expectations of high dividend 
growth in the future. Again, a parsimonious model with just one lag of the variable 
included was utilised20. 
GD, =a+ p.(Rt-1) +c, 
GD2, =a+ p.(Rt-l)+c, 
GD5, =a+p.(R,_1)+c, 
(17) 
Similar to the dividend growth specification over 1951-2002 the lagged return 
performed well at explaining future dividend growth at both the 1-year and 2-year 
horizons. The f3 coefficient was significant and accounted for a reasonable portion of 
dividend growth variability at both horizons. However, at the five-year horizon we 
discover that returns are insignificantly linked with dividend growth. Over the earlier 
sample period, 1901-1950, we find that lagged returns are scarcely able to explain any 
variation in dividend growth and the f3 coefficient was not being significantly different 
from zero. 
3.4.2.3 IN-SAMPLE PREDICTABILITY: CONCLUSION 
Our results indicate that at longer horizons of five-years or more that dividend 
growth is essentially unpredictable. Individually, neither the lagged dividend-price 
20 Higher order specifications were estimated but the coefficients on these lags proved to be 
insignificant and provide little additional explanatory power, thus the results are not presented here. 
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ratio, nor lagged dividends, nor lagged returns are statistically significantly related to 
future dividend growth at the five-year horizon. In this case it would appear that the 
historical average rate of dividend growth is likely to be the best predictor of future 
dividend growth. Since 1951, we know this has averaged 1.39% p.a. which is not 
exceptionally high and we find no evidence to suggest that future long-term dividend 
growth is liable to be extraordinarily rapid. 
Even at shorter horizons, where we do detect a significant in-sample 
relationship between dividend growth and lagged dividend growth and lagged returns 
respectively, these models do not indicate that future dividend growth is anticipated to 
be high. Dividend growth was below its historical average during the sample end 
years of 2000, 2001 and 2002, consequently extrapolating into the future using the 
regression results from (16) would imply future dividend growth was anticipated to be 
below average. Returns were actually negative in 2000, 2001 and 2002, thus end-of-
sample forecasts of short-run future dividend growth from (17) at either the one or 
two year horizon proves to be negative. 
Consequently, our evidence indicates that the outlook for dividend growth in 
December 2002 can at best be expected to equal the historical average dividend 
growth rate. However, in the short-term rational agents might anticipate dividend 
growth to be even below the historical average. Consequently, we find no evidence 
whatsoever to support the hypothesis that future dividend growth is expected to be 
exceptionally high. Fama and French (2002 p651) reach a similar conclusion. "In 
short, we find no evidence to support a forecast of strong future dividend growth at 
the end of our sample period." Our contention is that since the historical average 
growth rate of dividends was not extraordinarily high around the turn of the 21st 
Century, nor were predictions from models based on in-sample predictability 
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unusually high, then lofty expectations of future dividend growth cannot be the cause 
of the unanticipated capital gains witnessed since 1951 in the UK. Consequently, we 
suggest that the deviation between expected returns implied by dividend growth and 
average returns must have been caused by a factor other than the anticipation of 
extraordinarily rapid dividend growth in the post 2002 period. 
3.4.3 IS DIVIDEND GROWTH (1951-2002) UNEXPECTEDLY HIGH? 
If dividend growth in the second half of the 20th Century had been above 
expectations formed in 1950 then this would lead to an unanticipated rise in equity 
prices. However, even if in-sample growth had been extraordinarily large then the 
expected return estimates from fundamentals would also have been large and prices 
would have responded to this. Had the dividend-price ratio or earnings-price ratio 
been the same in 2002 as in 1951 (or 1901) the estimates of all three models would 
have been equal. 
In the UK, we find that dividend growth showed an increase during the latter 
part of the 20th century. Real dividend growth was 0.56% over the period 1901-1950, 
increasing to an average rate of 1.39% from 1951-2002. However, the magnitude of 
the increase is sensitive to the inclusion of 1901 in the pre-1950 sample. Between 
1902-1950 the real dividend growth rate was 1.18%, just a modest 0.21% below the 
rate observed post-1950. 
Furthermore, part of the increase in dividend growth is likely to have been 
expected due to increased economic stability following the end of World War 2. In 
fact, dividend growth was at its peak in the 1950s and has averaged less than 0.5% 
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since 1960, which is even less than during the earlier sample period. The 1950s aside 
rather than being impressively high, dividend growth has shown few signs of 
extraordinary growth in the latter part of the 201h Century. 
Thus we find some support for the hypothesis that dividend growth has been 
high since the 1950s, although a good deal of this in all likelihood would have been 
expected. Since 1960, there is much less support for dividend growth having been 
very high. Even if dividend growth had been high it would not have been able to 
explain the divergence between the equity premium derived from fundamentals and 
that from realised returns, since such economic news is rapidly impounded into share 
prices. 
However, this hypothesis can be tested directly and in much more detail by 
examining the out-of sample forecasting power of variables discovered to be linked 
with dividend growth from our in-sample tests. 
3.4.3.1 OUT OF SAMPLE FORECASTING OF DIVIDEND GROWTH 
The results obtained in Section 3.4.2 relate to in-sample predictability of 
dividend growth. In-sample tests are useful for identifying historical relationships 
between variables. They use all the available data to estimate the coefficients. 
However, they are of limited use if we are concerned with investors' expectations at a 
particular point in time. For example, an investor in 1970 does not have access to data 
on dividend-price and dividend growth for the post 1970 period; this investor only has 
pre-1970 data at his disposal in which to forecast dividend or earnings growth for 
1971. Modifying the testing procedure to take account of this will give us a much 
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clearer indication of exactly what could be expected by an investor at any point in 
time. Hence out-of-sample tests are much more appropriate to examine forecasting 
relationships since they only allow forecasts to be made from information available to 
agents prior to the forecasting period. This will enable us to examine if and when 
dividend growth exceeded investor expectations during the period 1951-2002. 
Out of sample tests will also provide us with the opportunity to test the claims 
made by Fama and French (2002) that the historical average dividend growth rate is 
the best predictor of long term future dividend growth. "In sum, the behavior of 
dividends for 1951 to 2000 suggests that future growth is largely unpredictable, so the 
historical mean growth rate is a near optimal forecast of future growth." (Fama and 
French, 2002 p651) 
We test if these claims made by Fama and French hold for the UK market by 
investigating the out-of-sample forecasting power of the average historical dividend 
growth rate compared to variables which have demonstrated in-sample predictability. 
The predictor variables we include are the dividend-price ratio, dividend growth and 
returns, each of which we found to have some predictability over in-sample dividend 
growth. For completeness, we also compare the results of all these models with the 
random walk model that naively predicts that any change in the growth rate is 
unexpected. 
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3.4.3.2 OUTaOF-SAMPLE FORECASTING OF DIVIDEND GROWTH: 
METHODOLOGY 
The historical growth rate model is defined as: 
t = 1902, .... ,t (18) 
That is next periods expected dividend growth rate is equal to the mean of all 
previous dividend growth rates. Fama and French (2002) maintain this is the best 
available forecast. 
The naive or random-walk model is simply: 
(19) 
The expectation of the naive model is that next periods dividend growth rate is 
equal to the current dividend growth rate. Thus, any change in the growth rate is 
unexpected. 
The remaining three models rely upon a two-step process in which the time-
varying coefficients of the model are firstly estimated and then secondly a forecasting 
/ 
calculation is made. An identical process is followed for each predictor variable 
denoted by Xr in the derivation that follows, where Xr is either the dividend-price ratio 
(D1 I Pr), dividend growth rate (GDt) or return (R1 ). Throughout, our analysis is 
based purely on data available to the investor at time t. 
Firstly, the model is estimated up until the current time period. We make use 
of a rolling regression technique to estimate the coefficients21 . A rolling window 
21 A recursive estimation procedure was also conducted for the dividend-price ratio. In terms of 
forecasting, both the recursive and rolling dividend-price methods appear to predict some of the wide 
fluctuations in aggregate dividend growth rates over time. However, the forecast errors of both models 
tend to move closely together over time with very similar mean absolute errors and mean squared 
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approach is utilised so that the number of -observations used to estimate the 
coefficients is held constant. 
Co-efficient Estimation Equations: 
For One year real dividend growth GD1 
GDt=at+P,(Xt_1)+£t estimated for t=t-19, .... ,t 
where (Xt-1) is (Dt-I/P,_1),(GDt_1) or (Rt_1). 
For Two year average real dividend growth GD21 
GD2t-I =at+Pt(Xt_2 )+£t estimated for t=t-19, .... ,t 
where (Xt_2 ) is (Dt_2f J>,_2 ),(GDt_2 ) or (Rt_2 ). 
Forecasting Equations: 
For One year real dividend growth GD1 
GDt+l =at+P,(Xt) 
where (Xt) is (D,/P,),(GDt) or (Rt) 
For Two year average real dividend growth GD21 
GD2t+1 =at+Pt(Xt) 
where (Xt) is (Dt/P,),(GDt) or (Rt) 
(20) 
(21) 
We use a window length of twenty years since a sample of at least twenty 
observations is necessary to enable credible estimations of at & Pt to be derived. We 
estimate equation (20) is estimated over a 20 year period from t -19 to the current time 
period (t). Thus, at & Pt are updated through time and for each forecast. Our earliest 
coefficient estimation is for observations of the independent variable (Xt-I) from 1902-
1921 to estimate dividend growth over the period 1903-1922. Our estimates of the 
errors for the full sample period 1923-2002. Although the errors were slightly smaller for the rolling 
model indicating it provides slightly more accurate forecasts. 
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parameters at & fit are combined with the current value of Xt. in order to forecast the 
average future dividend growth rate over the next one or two years using (21). At the 
one year horizon, therefore the first forecast value for dividend growth is for 1923, 
while at the two year horizon its 1924. The process is repeated for all T from t= 1922 
to t=200 1, so that 80 forecasts are produced. 
3.4.3.3. OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECASTING OF DIVIDEND GROWTH: 
TIME-VARIA 'fiON IN B 
Since, we employ a rolling window technique to forecast dividend growth it is 
natural that the values of at & fit will vary over time. In this section we explore how 
much these parameters vary through time. Our estimation equation (20) reveals that 
there is in fact substantial time-variation in a & fi. In particular p is of special interest 
since this coefficient determines the response of dividend growth to a change in the 
independent variable. Figure 3.3 illustrates graphically that there is substantial time-
variation in the p coefficients from all three models estimated from (20). 
GDt =at +fit (DH / P,_J) + &t 
GD2t =at+ fit(Dt-1/P,-I)+ct 
(22) 
For the dividend-price ratio we expect that fi should be negative. If the 
dividend-price ratio is above its mean then future dividend growth should be below 
average to guide it back to equilibrium. At the one year horizon, we find that fi on 
the dividend-price ratio does tend to be negative as predicted by theory. In particular 
we find that it is most strongly negative during the early part of our sample up until 
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the mid-1950s22. However, p tends to move towards 0 as the sample period 
progresses, indicating that the relationship between the lagged dividend-price ratio 
and dividend growth weakens over the sample period. In fact, the rolling estimates for 
P turns positive in 1999 and remains so until 2002 at both the one year and two year 
horizon, contrary to theory. At the two-year horizon we also find that pis positive 
throughout the 1960s. 
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FIGURE 3.3: TIME-VARIATION IN REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS 
Figure 3A: Forecasting 1 Year Dividend Growth: Time-variation in Beta. 
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Figure 3B: Forecasting 2 Year Dividend Growth: Time-variation in Beta. 
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Figure 3A plots the Beta co-efficient from the regression: GD1 = ~ + /J,(X,_t); where (XH) is (Dt-1/ P,_1) or (GD1_t). 
Figure 3B plots the Beta co-efficient from the regression: Gm1 =a1 + /J,(X,_t); where (X,_t) is (D1_tf P,_1) or (GD,_1). 
22 Our in-sample results found B1 on D/P1 to be significantly negative for the 1902-1950 period. 
124 
The weak and sometimes perverse relationship between the dividend-price 
ratio and future dividend growth since the 1960s indicates that mean-reversion in the 
dividend-price ratio cannot be expected to be driven by adjustments in dividend 
payments, in breach of theory23. It appears that since the 1960s dividends have had 
little impact in driving the dividend-price ratio back to equilibrium. This is exactly the 
pattern we detected in our in-sample tests of 3.4.2.2 that post 1950 there was no 
statistically significant relationship between the dividend-price ratio. 
At the two-year horizon we do find that the P coefficients are negative and 
often of substantive magnitude throughout the pre 1950 sample period, supporting the 
pattern found at the one year horizon. This is in-line with the in-sample findings for 
the pre-1950 period that there was a statistically significant negative relationship 
between the dividend-price ratio and future dividend growth. 
GDt =at+ fi1(GDt_1)+ct 
GD2t =at+ fit(GDt-!)+ct 
(23) 
For previous dividend growth we expect that p should be positive. Dividends 
tend to adjust only slowly over time and managers only tend to increase dividends at a 
rate they believe to be sustainable (Lintner, 1956). Figure 3.3A indicates that at the 
one year horizon p on dividend growth was positive in each sample ending period 
since 1940. From the 1940's to the 1980s the P coefficient tended to fluctuate around 
0.2. However, during the 1990s the p coefficients rise and are always above 0.35. 
This indicates that at the end of the sample period dividend growth has become 
increasingly persistent, strengthening the relationship between prior and current 
23 See Section 3.4.2.2 for a more detailed description of this. 
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dividend. However, before 1940, f3 on dividend growth was negative contrary to our 
expectations at both the one year and the two-year horizon. Although the in-sample 
tests of 3.4.2 found past dividend growth to have little explanatory power over current 
dividend growth during the first half of the 20th Century. 
At the two-year horizon we do find that f3 tends to be small and hover around 
zero during the period 1940-1980, indicating the relationship during this period is 
weaker than at the one year horizon. However, since the mid-1980s there does appear 
to be much greater persistence in f3 predicting dividend growth at the two-year 
horizon, with the coefficient estimate being above 0.2 throughout this period. 
GDt =at+ f3t (Rt-I) + ct 
GD2t =at+ PrCRr-I)+cr 
(24) 
The relationship between returns and dividend growth is a little less direct than 
that between the previous variables. If the current return is high then this could be due 
to an upward revision in expectations of the future performance of fundamentals, 
particularly earnings growth, which could feed higher future dividends. Thus, our 
expectation· is that there is a positive relationship between the two variables. The in-
sample results reported in Section 3.4.2 found no significant relationship between 
returns and dividend growth during the first half of the 20th Century, thus the 
relatively small coefficients found in figure 3 over this period are unsurprising. 
Nevertheless, the negative coefficients found in the early part of the sample do 
contradict our expectations. 
Perhaps, most interestingly figure 3.3A suggests a strong link between the 
lagged return and one-year dividend growth from the 1940's to the 1970s as 
evidenced by a highly positive f3 on returns, during this period. However, since 1980 
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the link between returns and dividend growth appears to have diminished, with the 
return p being close to 0. It did remain positive but was small during the 1980s 
before turning negative, but of a negligible magnitude, during the mid-1990s. 
Consequently, it appears there is little, if any, relationship between returns and 
dividend growth from the mid-1990s onwards. 
For two year average dividend growth, p on returns is positive throughout the 
sample period of 1922-2000. This supports our hypothesis that current returns do 
contain useful information about future dividend growth and there is a positive 
relationship between the variables. As at the one year horizon the relationship appears 
strongest for sample periods ending between 1940 and 1979. 
3.4.3.4 OUT -OF-SAMPLE FORECASTING: PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
To compare the forecasts from our various models we can generate statistics 
that examine the magnitude of the forecasting errors. The first measure is simply the 
mean error, which simply tells us the average difference between the forecasted value 
and the actual value. This measure is not particularly informative about the accuracy 
of model forecasts since it allows forecast over-estimates and under-estimates to 
cancel out. Therefore a better measure is the mean absolute error, which takes into 
account the absolute deviation of each forecast error from the actual value and then 
takes the average. An alternative method which has similar benefits is the mean of 
squared errors. This takes into account both the absolute distance of any forecast error 
but also penalises larger forecast errors more heavily than smaller errors. To enable a 
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degree of comparability of this measure with the mean absolute error then the root of 
the mean squared error can be used. 
Mean Error = L GD, - L GD, 
n 
Ijcv,-cv,j 
Mean Absolute Error = ---'------'-
n 
~)<CD; -GD,)2 ] 
Mean Squared error: = =-----'-----'--
n 
Root Mean Squared error: = 
A crucial remaining issue is identifying if the forecasting accuracy of a 
particular model is statistically distinguishable from that of any other? This can be 
tested now by the Diebold-Mariano test (1995) developed under the null hypothesis 
that forecast a and forecast b are equally accurate forecasts. Our two sets of forecast 
errors eat and ebt provide the same quality of forecasts if El dt I = 0, where dt = eat2 -
ebt2 under the mean-squared error criterion. The test statistic is S1 =[V(~i)r112d, which 
follows a standard normal distribution. 
Harvey, Leybourne and Newbold (1997) advocate modifying the Diebold-
Mariano test to improve its finite sample performance. Their modification improves 
the estimation of the variance of d , proposing the new test statistic: 
n+ 1-2h+ n-1h(h-1) · ah s1* = S1 , where h ts the number of steps ead that are forecast. 
n 
This new statistic, which follows the t-distribution, is confirmed by monte-carlo 
simulations to perform better than the original Diebold-Mariano statistic. 
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3.4.3.5. OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECASTING 1 YEAR DIVIDEND 
GROWTH: RESULTS 
For the whole sample period 1923-2002, we find that the mean error (see 
3.4.3.4 for definition) for all models was positive. This demonstrates that these 
forecasting tools suggest that average annual dividend growth could have been 
expected to be up to 0.57% p.a. higher than it actually was! Considering that average 
dividend growth only averaged 0.98% p.a. for 1901-2002, this is quite a substantial 
amount. This suggests that rather than being phenomenally high, dividend growth was 
actually lower than expected during 1923-2002. 
In terms of actual forecasting accuracy at the one year horizon, we find that 
the historical average model proposed by Fama and French is superior over the full 
sample period of 1923-2002. It has the lowest mean-squared error and the lowest 
mean absolute error (see 3.4.3.4 for definition) of 55.60% and 5.92% respectively. 
The three regression based forecasting models had very similar performance in terms 
of overall accuracy. In terms of mean-squared error the dividend-price model fared 
best with 61.47% followed by the dividend model with 63.99% and then the return 
model with 66.20%, whilst in terms of mean absolute error all three were almost 
identical being between 6.27% and 6.37%. The nai"ve random walk model performed 
very poorly having the largest statistics of 80.80% for mean-squared error and 6.89% 
for mean absolute error. 
However, when we split the sample into two sub-periods a slightly different 
picture emerges. For 1923-1950, the dividend-price model provides the most accurate 
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one step ahead dividend growth forecasts. Its mean squared error of 53.82% is much 
smaller than that of the other models and its mean absolute error of 6.20% is also the 
lowest. The historical average model is second best whilst the dividend model and 
return model produce poor forecasts which are only surpassed by the na"ive model. 
Over 1951-2002, the historical average model provides the lowest forecast errors in 
terms of mean squared error with 49.37%, with the return model and dividend model 
closely following with 52.26% and 52.90%. However, the return model has the 
smallest mean absolute error of 5.45% followed by the historical average model with 
5.58% and then the dividend model with 5.86%. Somewhat surprisingly the random 
walk model had a reasonable degree of accuracy over the 1951-2002 period, 
outperforming the dividend-price model in terms of both mean squared error, 62.69% 
compared to 65.58%, and mean absolute error, 6.17% as opposed to 6.46%. 
The performance of the three regression models in the sub-samples are as one 
would expect given the results of the in-sample tests. The dividend-price model 
performs well over 1923-1950, the period when in-sample tests demonstrated it had 
some predictability over dividend growth, while it performed poorly over 1951-2002 
when in-sample tests indicated it was unable to predict dividend growth. The return 
and dividend models followed a similar pattern performing well when the in-sample 
tests had indicated they had forecasting power during 1951-2002 and performing 
poorly in the early sample period when in-sample tests had found no predictability. 
However, what is surprising is that the historical average model performs so well and 
is able to outperform the forecasts of the return and dividend model over the 1951-
2002 period. 
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TABLE 3.6: ONE YEAR DIVIDEND GROWTH FORECASTING 
PERFORMANCE 
1923-2002 Dividend-Price Dividend Return Naive Historical Av. 
Statistic Model Model Model Model Model 
Mean Squared Error 61.47% 63.99% 66.20% 80.80% 55.60% 
Mean Error 0.57% 0.46% 0.49% 0.02% 0.31% 
Mean Absolute Error 6.37% 6.27% 6.27% 6.89% 5.92% 
Root Mean Squared Error 7.84% 8.00% 8.14% 8.99% 7.46% 
1923-1950 Dividend-Price Dividend Return Naive Historical A v. 
Statistic Model Model Model Model Model 
Mean Squared Error 53.82% 82.41% 85.31% 114.44% 67.17% 
Mean Error 1.86% 1.63% 0.88% 0.02% 0.86% 
Mean Absolute Error 6.20% 6.86% 7.37% 8.23% 6.55% 
Root Mean Squared Error 7.34% 9.08% 9.24% 10.70% 8.20% 
1951-2002 Dividend-Price Dividend Return Naive Historical A v. 
Statistic Model Model Model Model Model 
Mean Squared Error 65.58% 52.90% 52.26% 62.69% 49.37% 
Mean Error -0.13% -0.14% 0.13% 0.03% 0.01% 
Mean Absolute Error 6.46% 5.86% 5.45% 6.17% 5.58% 
Root Mean Squared Error 8.10% 7.27% 7.23% 7.92% 7.03% 
Now we tum our attention to whether or not the forecast errors are statistically 
distinguishable from each other. For this we use the Harvey et al.'s modified Diebold-
Mariano test for which results are reported in Table 3.7. 
For the full sample, these tests indicate that the historical average model, 
which had the lowest mean-squared error, provides statistically significantly better 
forecasts than the dividend model and the naive model. However, all the other models 
are found to provide forecasts that are statistically equally accurate according the 
modified Diebold-Mariana test. Thus, we are unable to claim unambiguously that the 
historical average model provides the best forecasts because we are unable to reject 
the null that the historical average model produces superior forecasts to either the 
dividend-price model or the returns models over the full sample period. 
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TABLE 3.7: ONE YEAR DIVIDEND GROWTH- TESTS OF EQUAL 
FORECAST ACCURACY 
Sample Forecast I Forecast 2 Test-stat Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Historical Dividend -1.83 -1.67 Historical Forecast are more accurate 
1923-1950 Historical Dividend -1.70 -1.70 Historical Forecast are more accurate 
1951-2002 Historical Dividend -0.84 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Sample Forecast I Forecast 2 Test-stat Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Historical Returns -1.13 cJ.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Historical Returns -2.31 -1.70 Historical Forecast is more accurate 
1951-2002 Returns Historical -0.25 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Sample Forecast I Forecast 2 Test-stat Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Historical Dividend-Price -0.88 -1.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Historical Dividend-Price 1.02 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1951-2002 Historical Dividend-Price -2.25 -1.70 Historical Forecast are more accurate 
Sample Forecast 1 Forecast 2 Test-stat Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Dividend Dividend-Price 0.23 -1.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Dividend-Price Dividend -1.72 -1.70 Dividend-Price forecast is more accurate 
1951-2002 Dividend Dividend-Price -1.77 -1.70 Dividend Forecast is more accurate 
Sample Forecast I Forecast 2 Test-stat Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Returns Dividend-Price 0.43 -1.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Dividend-Price Returns -2.12 -1.70 Dividend-Price forecast is more accurate 
1951-2002 Returns Dividend-Price -0.95 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Sample Forecast I Forecast 2 Test-stat Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Returns Dividend 0.33 -1.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Returns Dividend 1.03 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1951-2002 Returns Dividend -0.01 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Sample Forecast I Forecast 2 Test-stat Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Returns Nai've -0.97 -1.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Returns Nai've -0.82 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1951-2002 Returns Nai've -0.57 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Sample Forecast I Forecast 2 Test-stat Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Dividend Nai've -1.35 -1.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Dividend Nai've -1.09 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1951-2002 Dividend Nai've -0.78 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Sample Forecast I Forecast 2 Test-stat Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Dividend-Price Nai've -1.33 -1.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Dividend-Price Nai've -2.38 -1.70 Dividend-Price forecasts are more accurate 
1951-2002 Dividend-Price Nai've 0.17 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Sample Forecast 1 Forecast 2 Test-stat Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Historical Nai've -1.87 -1.67 Historical forecasts are more accurate 
1923-1950 Historical Nai've -1.84 -1.70 Historical forecasts are more accurate 
1951-2002 Historical Nai've -0.86 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
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For the 1923-1950 period we find that the dividend-price forecast is 
statistically superior to the dividend, return and naive models, and that the historical 
average forecast is also superior to these three models. However, for the dividend-
price and the· historical average models we find we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that they produce equally accurate forecasts. The implication of these results is that 
rational investors in 1950 attempting to predict future dividend growth have sufficient 
information to know that the dividend-price model or the historical average model 
will provide them with the best short-term forecasts. 
Over 1951-2002 we find that the dividend-price forecasts are inferior to the 
historical average model and the dividend model. However, all other combinations of 
models are found to produce equally accurate predictions. Given that the historical 
average, dividend and returns model all had broadly similar mean-squared errors then 
perhaps investors in 2002 might consider the predictions of all three models when 
assessing the prospects of future dividend growth. However, it should have become 
clear by 2002 that the dividend-price ratio is no longer a useful forecaster of future 
dividend growth. 
3.4.3.6. OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECASTING 2 YEAR DIVIDEND 
GROWTH: RESULTS 
When considering average dividend growth over the next two years we find 
that the historical average model has the smallest mean-squared error both in the full 
sample and in the two sub-samples, and also has the lowest mean absolute error in all 
periods. In terms of the modified Diebold-Mariano tests for the full sample period, the 
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historical average model is found to be statistically superior to the dividend-price, 
dividend and naive models. Only, for the return model are we unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that both models provide equally good forecasts. 
Perhaps surprisingly the return model provides the second most accurate 
forecasts in all periods by both the mean-squared error and mean absolute error 
approach. This is surprising for the pre-1950 period because our in-sample tests 
indicated that there was little relationship current returns and subsequent two year 
dividend growth. Furthermore, the theoretical link between current returns and future 
dividend growth is less direct than between other variables. The explanation for the 
link between the two, in our opinion stems from current returns often being generated 
in response to changes in expectations of future earnings growth, which feeds into 
future growth in dividends. In terms of the modified Diebold-Mariana tests for the full 
sample period and all sub-periods, we find that the model provides equally accurate 
forecasts as the historical average, dividend-price and dividend models. Its forecasts 
are only found to be superior to the naive model. 
The dividend-price ratio performed disappointingly when predicting two year 
average future dividend growth. Even during the pre-1950 period when it exhibited 
in-sample predictability we find that in terms of forecasting it was outperformed by 
both the historical average model and the returns model according to the mean-
squared error and mean absolute error criterion. For the full sample period its 
forecasting performance was also worse than the dividend model, while for the post-
1950 sample it generated the worst forecasts, worse even than the naive random-walk 
model. Nevertheless, for the full sample period only the historical average model was 
deemed to provide statistically superior forecasting power, while the dividend-price 
model was found to give more accurate forecasts than the naive model. 
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TABLE 3.8: TWO YEAR DIVIDEND GROWTH FORECASTING 
PERFORMANCE 
1923-2001 
Statistic 
Mean Squared Error 
Mean Error 
Mean Absolute Error 
Root Mean Squared Error 
1923-1950 
Statistic 
Mean Squared Error 
Mean Error 
Mean Absolute Error 
Root Mean Squared Error 
1951-2001 
Statistic 
Mean Squared Error 
Mean Error 
Mean Absolute Error 
Root Mean Squared Error 
Dividend-Price 
Model 
63.49% 
0.46% 
6.31% 
7.97% 
Dividend-Price 
Model 
50.31% 
1.37% 
6.04% 
7.09% 
Dividend-Price 
Model 
70.73% 
-0.03% 
6.45% 
8.41% 
Dividend 
Model 
47.16% 
0.52% 
5.46% 
6.87% 
Dividend 
Model 
54.50% 
1.44% 
5.59% 
7.38% 
Dividend 
Model 
43.12% 
0.01% 
5.39% 
6.57% 
Return 
Model 
42.53% 
0.55% 
5.30% 
6.52% 
Return 
Model 
44.23% 
1.30% 
5.23% 
6.65% 
Return 
Model 
41.59% 
0.14% 
5.34% 
6.45% 
Naive 
Model 
79.03% 
-0.04% 
7.00% 
8.89% 
Naive 
Model 
108.13% 
-0.02% 
8.19% 
10.40% 
Nai"ve 
Model 
63.06% 
-0.05% 
6.35% 
7.94% 
3.4.3.7 OUT-OF-SAMPLE FORECASTING CONCLUSION: 
Historical Av. 
Model 
37.35% 
0.22% 
5.02% 
6.11% 
Historical Av. 
Model 
39.62% 
0.82% 
5.06% 
6.29% 
Historical Av. 
Model 
36.10% 
-0.11% 
5.00% 
6.01% 
Our results support the hypothesis that there is no better forecaster of future 
dividend growth than its historical average. For forecasts of dividend growth at both 
the 1 year and 2 year horizon over the full sample the historical average model had the 
lowest mean-squared error and mean absolute error. Even during sub-periods, such as 
for 1923-1950 forecasts of 1 year dividend growth when the dividend-price model 
provided the lowest performance statistics, the statistical test of equal performance 
failed to reject the null that both the dividend-price and the historical average model 
provided forecasts of equal quality. 
The historical average dividend growth rate stood at 1.2% p.a. in 1951, it was 
almost unchanged in 2002 nudging marginally higher to 1.3%p.a. The growth rate for 
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1951-2002 was 1.4% p.a. Thus, although the actual dividend growth rate might have 
been above investors' expectations, it was only by a negligible amount. 
TABLE 3.9 TWO YEAR DIVIDEND GROWTH - TESTS OF EQUAl. 
FORECAST ACCURACY 
Modell Model2 Test Statistic Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Historical Dividend -2.37 -1.67 Historical Forecast are more accurate 
1923-1950 Historical Dividend -1.45 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1951-2001 Historical Dividend -2.29 -1.70 Historical Forecast are more accurate 
Modell Model2 Test Statistic Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Historical Return -1.29 -1.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Historical Return -0.84 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1951-2001 Historical Return -1.00 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Modell Model2 Test Statistic Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Historical Valuation -2.13 -1.67 Historical Forecast are more accurate 
1923-1950 Historical Valuation 0.43 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1951-2001 Historical Valuation -2.82 -1.70 Historical Forecast are more accurate 
Modell Model2 Test Statistic Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Dividend Valuation -0.40 -1.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Valuation Dividend -1.63 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1951-2001 Dividend Valuation -1.81 -1.70 Dividend Forecasts are more accurate 
Modell Model2 Test Statistic Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Return Valuation -1.04 -1.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Valuation Return -0.96 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1951-2001 Return Valuation -1.65 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Model 1 Model2 Test Statistic Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Return Dividend -1.02 -1.67 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1923-1950 Return Dividend -1.47 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
1951-2001 Return Dividend -0.26 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Modell Model2 Test Statistic Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Return Naive -3.05 -1.67 Return Forecasts are more accurate 
1923-1950 Return Naive -2.60 -1.70 Return Forecasts are more accurate 
1951-2001 Return Naive -1.72 -1.70 Return Forecasts are more accurate 
Modell Model2 Test Statistic Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Dividend Naive -2.57 -1.67 Dividend Forecasts are more accurate 
1923-1950 Dividend Nai've -1.98 -1.70 Dividend Forecasts are more accurate 
1951-2001 Dividend Naive -1.65 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Modell Model2 Test Statistic Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Valuation Naive -2.08 -1.67 Valuation forecasts are more accurate 
1923-1950 Valuation Nai've -2.82 -1.70 Valuation forecasts are more accurate 
1951-2001 Valuation Naive -0.35 -1.70 Forecasts have equal accuracy 
Modell Model2 Test Statistic Critical Value Conclusion 
1923-2002 Historical Naive -3.61 -1.67 Historical forecasts are more accurate 
1923-1950 Historical Nai've -3.13 -1.70 Historical forecasts are more accurate 
1951-2001 Historical Naive -2.08 -1.70 Historical forecasts are more accurate 
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3.4.4 DO EXPECTED STOCK RETURNS FALL DURING THE 1951-
2002 PERIOD? 
If we examine in more detail the relationship between a change in expected 
returns and share prices indices; we note that a change in expected returns will trigger 
an unanticipated capital gain or loss in a well-functioning capital market. For example 
if a share is simply valued according to the discounted value of all its future payoffs, 
now suppose there is a fall in expected returns then future payoffs are discounted at a 
lower rate meaning that the price of the asset must rise. This rise in the price of the 
asset is unexpected and unanticipated; it is simply good fortune caused by the decline 
in expected returns. 
However, studies of the equity premium tend to analyse the premium using 
about 100 years of data. Over such long sample periods one would expect these 
unexpected gains and losses to cancel out, thus rendering realised returns as an 
appropriate proxy for expected returns over extended time periods. 
Although, if expected returns have declined on average over time this would 
not be the case. A stream of unexpected capital gains may have been triggered causing 
realised historical returns to be substantially above investors expectations. In these 
circumstances estimations of the equity premium implied by fundamentals, which are 
essentially unaffected by changes in expected returns, will give us estimates of the 
true ex ante risk premium that are not contaminated by unanticipated share price 
appreciation. As outlined below there are a number of reasons to suggest that the cost 
of equity capital has fallen over recent decades causing unexpected rises in rationally 
valued shares. 
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There have been a number structural changes to the economies of the World's 
leading nations over the last century. For example, the threat of another World War 
has subsided considerably over the past 50 years. Alternatively perhaps increasing 
globalisation, openness and integration of markets around the world has enabled 
investors to seriously consider investing in countries they would've been reluctant to 
supply funds to 30 or 40 years ago (Stulz, 1999). In addition, greater opportunities for 
portfolio diversification which now exist (Merton, 1987). Bansal and Lundblad (2002) 
provide evidence that the international ex ante risk premium on the global market 
portfolio has dropped considerably; they show this is lirtked to a decline in the 
conditional variance of global real cashflow growth rates. The level of currency risk 
in some countries may also have declined. Sentana (2002) suggests that the 
introduction of the EMS and the consequent reduction in currency risk has lead to a 
moderate drop in the cost of capital for 10 European countries, which supports the 
findings of Antoniou et al (1998) for the UK market. Furthermore transaction costs 
have declined as pointed out by Aiyagari and Gertler (1993) and Jones (2000), which 
have effectively lowered the rate of return demanded by investors. 
If factors such as these have occurred, then it is quite plausible that the cost of 
equity capital has fallen. If this has occurred during the latter part of the 20th Century, 
then this would stimulate rises in the equity price index unforeseen by rational 
investors. Thus, the true ex-ante equity premia might be considerably below the 6-8% 
estimates based upon historical investment returns. If this is the case then the 
magnitude of the equity premium puzzle will have been overstated by studies which 
have employed historical returns. Thus, the equity premium puzzle is likely to be 
smaller than previously thought. 
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We examine the dividend-price ratio to assess if there has been any permanent 
change in the level of expected returns. Figure 3.1 shows that there does appear to 
have been a declining trend in the UK Dividend-price ratio since the 1980s. In every 
year since 1992 the UK dividend-price ratio has been below its historical average of 
4.42%, reaching a post-war low of 2.06% in 1999. However, the decline in the UK 
dividend-price ratio does not appear to be as clearly prevalent or severe as the decline 
of the US dividend-price ratio. For example, Fama and French's sample finished in 
2000, at which point the S&P 500 dividend-price ratio was at an all-time minima of 
1.1% and even by the end of 2002 it had remained below 1.5%. Our conjecture is that 
part of the decline in the US dividend-price ratio can be assigned to a change in the 
payout policy of American firms that has not been paralleled by their British 
counterparts27 . Nevertheless, it appears that since the early 1990s both the UK and the 
US dividend-price ratio have been fluctuating around a lower mean value. This is 
indicative that, in fact, the discount rate has fallen. 
As alluded to in Chapter 3.2.5 there are several outlying observations in the 
Barclays dividend-price ratio. These correspond to World War 1 and its immediate 
aftermath for the years 1915, 1919 1921. There is also a large outlying observation in 
1974, due to the 151 OPEC oil crisis and subsequent UKmarket crash. Since outliers 
can seriously damage the ability of structural break tests to correctly detect the true 
date of the change we therefore insert dummy variables for these years to neutralise 
the effects of these extreme observations. The approach employed is given by 
equation 25.28 
27 This issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.3.1 . 
28 For a more detailed description of the formation of the DPDUM series we refer the reader to Chapter 
3.5. 
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D1 I~= a+ /J1.(1915D)+ /J2 .(1919D)+ /J3 .(1921D)+ /J4 .(1974D)+e1 
DPDUM = D1 I~- /J1.(1915D)- /J2 .(1919D)- /J3.(1921D)- fJ4 .(1914D) (25) 
The resultant series, DPDUM is stationary (as reported in Section 3.5) and 
thus can be appropriately used to test for breaks. We utilise the Andrews-Quandt 
structural stability tests which searches for the break date which maximises the F-
value of the Chow test. 
Under the Chow test the null hypothesis is that there is no structural break, 
which for our application we are testing if there is any change in the mean of the 
dividend-price ratio. In order to test if there is a structural break we suppose there is a 
break in time period nt. A dummy variable D1 is then included in the regression with 
takes the value of 0 prior to the structural break i.e. for t= 1902,1903 ... n t; the dummy 
variable is 1 fort= nt+ 1, nt+2 ... 2002. This specification we refer to as the New 
regression, which can be compared with the Old specification which has no structural 
break. 
Old) DP4DUM =a+t:1 
New) DP4DUM =a+ fJDr +t:t 
We then use an adjusted F-test to assess if the inclusion of the dummy variable 
has reduced the residual sum of squares by a statistically significant amount. The F-
Test statistic is given by: 
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F: _ (RSSold- RSSnew)l k 
k,T-Zk- RSS IT- 2k 
new 
k = number of parameters 
T = number of observations 
RSS =residual sum of squares 
(26) 
The Andrews-Quandt test assumes the break date is unknown, and calculates 
the Chow test for every possible break date29 , it chooses the break date which 
maximises the F-test statistic. This test-statistic can then be compared with the critical 
value from the F-distribution with k,T -2k degrees of freedom to infer if the break date 
selected is statistically significant. If the test statistic > critical value then we reject the 
null hypothesis and conclude that there has been a statistically significant structural 
break. We should then employ the New regression specification. 
More sophisticated structural break tests than Andrews-Quandt have recently 
been developed. For instance there are now structural stability tests that allow for 
multiple breaks (Bai and Perron (1998, 2004). These tests have been employed in 
Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, however, we can report that these more sophisticated 
tests fail to detect more than a single break in the dividend-price series examined in 
Chapter 3. Thus, the key inferences made in Chapter 3 using the Andrews-Quandt test 
are the same as those had the Bai and Perron (1998, 2004) methodology been adopted 
in the current Chapter. 
29 The first and last 15% of observations are excluded in order that erroneous breaks are not found. 
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TABLE 3.10: ANDREWS-QUANDT TESTS 
Dependent Variable Sample Break Break Andrews-Quandt Test Inference 
Period Date Parameter Test statistic p-value 
Barclays DPDUM 1902-1951 1919 Constant 1.94 0.80 Break is statistically insignificant 
Barclays DPDUM 1952-2002 1992 Constant 20.45 0.00 Break is statistically significant 
Our equity premium results from Chapter 3.3.1 indicated equity premia results 
diverged for the post-1950 period but were approximately the same for the pre-1950 
period. Since we are concerned with uncovering what could have caused this disparity 
in the second half of the 20th Century, we split our sample in half and run the 
structural break test on each sub-sample. 30 
The Andrews-Quandt test fails to detect a significant break in the mean of the 
dividend-price ratio during the period 1902-1951. However, over the period 1952-
2002, 1992 is selected as the break date with a p-value of 0.0002. 
Dr/Pr =a+ P1993D+£1 
Dividend-price ratio with 1993 break =a+ P1993D 
(27) 
Equation 27 gives our new line of best fit for the dividend-price ratio. The 
dummy variable 1993D takes the value of 0 fort ~ 1992 and 1 fort ;::: 1993. 
When we use a post-1992 break in the mean of the dividend-price senes, 
visual inspection of figure 3.4 demonstrates the shift appears to fit the data extremely 
well. Therefore it appears as if a break in the dividend-price ratio ratio did occur in the 
early 1990s. 
30 When we run the test on the full sample (1902-2002) we discover a statistically significant break is 
detected in 1985 with a 0.000 p-value. However, this break appears to provide a poor fit to the data 
probably since the break tests exclude the first and final 15% of observations and hence can't detect a 
break in the series any later than 1985. Therefore the results reported in the text appear most 
appropriate and appear to date the break most accurately. 
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FIGURE 3.4: UK DIVIDEND-PRICE RATIO WITH 1993 BREAK. 
UK Dividend-price ratio with structural break in 1993 
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Our evidence lends support to the hypothesis that expected returns have fallen. 
The break tests indicate a downward shift in the mean of the dividend-price ratio by 
the value of B, of approximately 1.5%, which is economically substantial particularly 
given the previous mean of the dividend-price ratio was about 4.5%. This evidence 
supports the notion that future cashflows are being discounted by investors at a lower 
rate. If this is the case rationally valued equities would witness a run-up in prices 
during the late 20th Century, due to factors not anticipated by investors. This appears 
to match exactly the empirical observations of rising stock market indices during the 
1990s and can be attributed to investor's revising downwards their expectations of 
future returns. 
Our break-point test findings are entirely consistent with the US study of 
Carlson, Pelz and Wohar (2002) who document that valuation ratios have shifted to 
permanently lower values. They examined the quarterly dividend-price ratio finding 
support for a single break in the data. The timing of their break date in the early 1990s 
appears to coincide almost exactly with our contention that the UK dividend-price 
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ratio suffered a downward shift in mean in 1992. This is suggestive that perhaps there 
were common factors at work in both markets that might have lead to such a shift. 
However, whilst we do not examine precisely what has caused the fall in 
discount rates; we do propose that there are several factors which potentially these 
findings could be attributed to: increased international political stability, increasing 
globalisation of economic production, greater openness of international financial 
markets and increased opportunities for portfolio diversification or declining 
transaction and information costs. We leave the avenue open for further research to 
attempt to pinpoint the exact cause of the decline in expected returns. Our main 
conclusion is purely that there is good reason to believe that expected stock returns 
have declined towards the end of the 20th Century. Such a decline in expected returns 
could rationally explain why stock prices rose so rapidly during the 1990s and why 
realised returns over the period 1951-2000 have exceeded investors' expected returns 
as proxied for by the dividend model. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The empirical research presented in this Chapter suggests that the UK equity 
premium since 1951 has been much higher than could be expected. We suggest that 
annual expected market equity premium was most likely to be in the region of 4.6%, 
our estimate of the dividend growth model rather than the 7.79% investors' actually 
received. We document for the overall market that the pace of capital gains has been 
dramatically higher since 1951 than the period prior preceding 1950. This is thought 
to have been largely unanticipated by economic agents and certainly it cannot be 
justified by in-sample growth of dividends since 1951. 
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We argue that the average stock return since 1951 was above investors' 
expectations and investigate if this was due to either a) expectations of higher growth 
rates of fundamentals post-2002 or b) a decline in the discount rate. 
We find some evidence of in-sample dividend growth predictability at one or 
two year horizons during each sub-period. Since 1951, lagged returns and lagged 
dividend growth are found to be significantly and positively related to dividend 
growth. However since 2000, both returns and dividend growth have been below 
long-run average thus these models suggest investors should expect lower than 
average dividend growth in the future. Out-of-sample the historical dividend growth 
rate is the best forecaster of future dividend growth especially since 1951 and 
especially for horizons longer than one year. This provides evidence to refute the 
hypothesis that dividend growth should be especially high in the future. Since the 
historical dividend growth is the best forecaster then investors should expect dividend 
growth rates to be approximately the same as in the past. In short we find no evidence 
whatsoever to support the view that future dividend growth should be any higher than 
its historical average. 
We find support for the hypothesis that expected returns have fallen. There 
appears to be a permanent decline in the dividend-price ratio as identified by the 
structural break test, which would indicate that the expected unconditional equity 
return has fallen. We propose that this is the primary cause of the high level of capital 
growth witnessed since 1951, which we believe to have been largely unanticipated by 
potential investors in 1950. These findings of course feed through to the expected 
equity premium. If expected returns have fallen then the equity premium, the return in 
excess of the risk-free rate will, ceteris paribus, also be lower. This has important 
consequences for many economic agents. For financial directors of corporations it 
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means they should be able to raise equity capital more cheaply than implied by the 
historical equity premium. However, for members of private pension schemes it 
suggests that projections based upon the historical equity premium will have to be 
revised downwards. Therefore, pension members will either will have to save more to 
provide the same benefits or settle for a lower pension during retirement. Hence, the 
key implication of this Chapter is that unless UK investors believe that valuation 
ratios will halve again, they should expect a lower equity premium in the future. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EQUITY PREMIUM - UK 
INDUSTRY EVIDENCE. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Recent US research has suggested that the aggregate equity premium and 
aggregate expected returns have fallen (see Fama and French (2002), Arnott and 
Bernstein (2002) amongst others). Chapter 3 of this thesis provides evidence from the 
UK consistent with the view that the historical equity premium over the latter part of 
the 201h Century was above the expected equity premium implied by fundamentals; 
subsequent analysis suggests that expected returns and hence the expected equity 
premium had fallen in the UK consistent with the conclusions of Fama and French 
(2002). Other recent studies also suggest a fall in expected returns occurred during the 
early 1990s in the US (Lettau, Ludvigson and Wachter (2006)) and globally (Bansal 
and Lundblad (2002)). 
Our most important innovation and extension of the prior literature and our 
study in Chapter 3 of this thesis is to present an industry analysis of the equity 
premium. The key issue we address in this Chapter is whether the historical equity 
premium earnt by individual industries is consistent with the expected equity premium 
for that industry. The equity premium eamt by individual industries has implications 
for various stakeholders. Corporate treasurers use the firm's cost of equity capital' for 
investment appraisal and financing purposes. However, estimates of the firm cost of 
equity capital are usually based upon estimates of the equity premium for their 
industry. If there has been a fall in expected returns and the expected equity premium 
then this should benefit all industries via a lowering of the cost of equity capital. A 
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fall in the cost of equity capital enables corporate treasurers to raise funds for new 
investment more cheaply. This thesis chapter enables us to assess the extent to which 
the cost of equity capital has fallen across UK industries. 
To private investors looking to invest long-term whether the historical 
performance of particular industries is commensurate with what could be expected is 
also of practical interest. An anecdotal example of the dangers of investing based 
upon purely upon prior historical return performance can be seen from technology 
investment funds marketed around the tum of the Millenium in 2000. High 
technology firms eamt extremely high returns during the 1990s. Perhaps, many 
investors thought this recent performance would continue and would look favourably 
upon investing in technology funds. However, these high returns were not supported 
by fundamentals; many tech stocks have never paid a dividend nor reported a profit. 
Hence, it was unlikely that these stocks could be expected to continue to generate high 
returns into the future. With the benefit of hindsight we can see that these stocks have 
eamt very low returns since the late 1990s. While our study examines a much longer 
timeframe than this example, it does serve to highlight the importance, necessity even, 
of estimating the expected equity premium as well as the historical average equity 
premium in order for more informed asset management decisions to be made. 
We use a cross-section of 16 narrowly defined industry groupings enabling a 
rich and comprehensive analysis. Special effort is devoted to data collection to ensure 
both live and dead firms are included in the analysis, in order to avoid much of the 
survivorship bias inherent in the Datastream compiled industry indices which only 
include firms currently trading. 
The empirical analysis questions whether findings made using aggregate 
market indices are apparent in the cross-section of UK industries. Iri particular, our 
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results question assertions from the prior literature that a) over recent decades there 
has been a general or overall fall in expected returns and b) there was a decline in 
expected returns during the 1990s. Specifically, our findings on the question of an 
overall fall in equity premium over 1966-2002 depends upon the measure of 
fundamentals used. For the majority of UK industries the earnings growth model 
suggests that for most industries the equity premium earnt over 1966-2002 was 
expected. In contrast the dividend growth model suggests that there could have been a 
fall in expected equity premia consistent with prior aggregate market findings. On the 
second issue of whether a fall in expected equity premium occurred during the 1990s 
this Chapter's analysis suggests if a fall occurred it occurred prior to the 1990s. Both 
dividend and earnings based results provide little support for a fall in equity premium 
during the 1990s. 
The literature on the US equity premium has expanded considerably over 
recent years. Contemporary studies tend to focus one of two issues either a) what 
equity premium (if any) can be expected in the future or b) whether the historical 
equity premium could have been expected to be as high as was observed in the 20th 
Century. In relation to the first literature studies by Gebhardt et al. (2001), Claus and 
Thomas (2001) and Amott and Bernstein (2002) broadly support the notion that at the 
start of the new millennium the equity premium should be lower than its historical 
average. The second question addressed by Jagannathan et al. (2001) and in more 
depth by Fama and French (2002) suggest that historical equity premia were higher 
than expected in the late 201h Century since stock price appreciation has not been 
supported by growth in economic fundamentals such as dividends or earnings. 
This thesis chapter focuses upon this second issue of whether the historical 
equity premium observed in the latter 20th Century could have been expected to be as 
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high as it was. In contrast, to almost all prior studies we examine the UK market 
rather than the US enabling us to examine how well Fama and French's results 
translate to countries outside of North America. We follow the approach of Fama and 
French (2002) and use both dividend and earnings growth to estimate expectations of 
capital gains. There are benefits and drawbacks relating to each measure of 
fundamentals. Nevertheless, the use of earnings growth as a proxy for expected 
capital gains is to our knowledge a new approach to estimating the UK equity 
premium. Earnings growth, we propose, also has some advantages over dividends as a 
measure of fundamentals. Firstly, dividends are arbitrary payments unlike earnings 
which are based on independently audited figures, secondly earnings are unaffected 
by changes in payout policy (such as the recent growth of share repurchases) and 
thirdly they are less susceptible to 'management' or 'smoothing' by boards of 
directors. Nevertheless despite these apparent benefits of earnings vis-a-vis dividends; 
dividends also have some advantages. Firstly, dividends are cash payments to 
investors whereas earnings are don't guarantee any actual payout to investors will 
occur. Secondly, earnings can be manipulated and the instances of such management 
appear to increase during the latter part of our sample (Berenson, 2004 ). Therefore, 
we report and interpret the results for both dividend and earnings based measures of 
the equity premium. 
Have historical returns in most UK industries been considerably higher than 
those expected by investors over 1966-2002? Are these industry equity premium 
results consistent with those from prior aggregate market studies (for US, Fama and 
French (2002) and Jagannathan et al. (2001) and for UK Chapter 3 of this thesis)? If 
these market results were caused by a common risk factor then they should be 
generalisable across industry (or other portfolio) groupings. 
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Does a disparity exist between equity premium estimates from fundamentals 
and historical data over the period 1966-2002 across industries? Over the last 40 years 
there have been industries that have grown from being relatively small and 
unimportant31 on the LSE to becoming of major importance. For example, the 
pharmaceutical, media and leisure industries have grown rapidly over recent decades 
becoming some of the largest sectors by market capitalisation by the tum of the 21st 
century. Whilst others have suffered major decline, for instance the mining and 
automotive industries. How pervasive are the market results? Is it just in industries 
experiencing major structural change that realised returns diverge from those implied 
by the earnings growth model? Or has this phenomenon been pervasive across the 
majority of industries? If the market results are pervasive across industries this would 
suggest they have been caused by a common economic risk factor if not they could be 
due to idiosyncratic industry effects. 
Our analysis then seeks to prescribe the cause of any disparities found between 
historical returns and those implied by fundamentals. Firstly, we examine if 
fundamental growth is expected to be especially high in the future. We provide 
evidence that earnings growth is highly predictable in-sample. Moreover, forecasts 
from these models suggest that in some industries where the discrepancy between 
premia estimates was large (and positive), fundamental growth is expected to be high. 
Part of the high capital gains witnessed over recent years appears due to expectations 
of high future fundamental growth. 
Secondly, we attempt to uncover if a change in expected returns has occurred. 
A related literature examines if there has been structural breaks in valuation ratios 
(earnings-price or dividend-price). Such a structural change is indicative of a change 
31 Some were virtually non-existent forty years ago such as IT. 
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in expected returns. We provide evidence of multiple regimes in valuation ratios of 
both the aggregate market and almost all industries over 1966-2002. Similarly to 
studies of the market (Carlson, Pelz and Wohar, (2002) and chapter 3 of this thesis, 
we find a common downward break in the market indices in the early 1990s. 
However, the majority of industries don't have a break in the 1990s, questioning if the 
market break is related to a common risk factor. Furthermore, although in almost all 
industries we do find structural breaks prior to the 1990s, overall there is little 
evidence of a fall in earnings-price over 1966-2002. This is indicative that overall 
expected returns haven't fallen during this period contrary to prior US aggregate 
studies. 
4.2 DATA DESCRIPTION AND METHODOLODY 
4.2.1 DATA DESCRIPTION 
Our data was collected from Datastream. However we don't use the 
Datastream compiled industry indices which have been used in many previous studies 
(including Fletcher and Kihanda (2005) and Hong et al. (2006)). This is because of 
the survivorship bias inherent in these indices due to them only including live firms 
(i.e. those which are still currently trading). This 'survivorship bias' is compounded 
since they are only based on the 550 largest companies which are then split into 
industry groupings. In order to mitigate concerns of such a survivorship bias in our 
sample we compile industry portfolios ourselves. Firstly, we list all UK firms (in their 
database) trading on the LSE at any time between 1966-2002. Therefore our sample 
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includes companies still trading as well as those that delisted. Financial firms are 
discarded32, in line with similar studies, due to them having much greater scope for 
earnings management than 'real' economy firms. Thus, a total of 2,925 firms are 
included in the sample, of which 1 ,920 had de listed and 1 ,005 were still trading in the 
market. For each of these firms, we collected price, dividend-price, price-earnings and 
market capitalisation data from the Datastream database. Importantly, our dataset is 
free from the survivor bias inherent in the Datastream quoted industry indices. 
Firms were then split into industries based upon the Financial Times Industry 
Groupings.33 We include individually the 14 industries, which had at least 8 active 
companies at the sample start date35• The exception to this is the Pharmaceutical 
industry which initially had only 5 firms, however given the tendency for this industry 
to be relatively large in terms of market capitalisation and important economically we 
include it in its own right. Remaining industries were grouped according to whether 
they were services or goods I resources and are referred to as 'other services' and 
'other goods' making a total of 16 portfolio groupings listed in Table 4.1. 
Panel A of Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics on the numbers of firms 
within an industry during the sample period. There is considerable variation in the 
average number of firms within each industry. Pharmaceuticals, Aerospace and 
Beverages all have fewer than 20 firms on average, whereas Construction and 
Engineering have around 100 firms or even more. There is also substantial time-
variation in the number of firms within an industry; typically the maximum number of 
firms is several times larger than the minimum. Sub-sample averages also reflect this 
32 As is common in similar studies see e.g. Fama and French (1993). 
33 Datastream Level 4 industry classifications were identical to the Financial Times when data 
collected. 
35 Of these only Aerospace & Defence, Oil & Gas and Pharmaceuticals & Biotech had fewer than 12 
firms at any point during the sample. 
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with the average number of firms for most industries being much lower over 1966-
1978 than subsequent years. This reflects the relatively limited coverage of smaller 
firms by Datastream prior to the early 1970s. Actually, for almost all industries the 
minimum number of firms occurred during 1966-1978. 
TABLE 4.1: INDUSTRY DATA DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Panel/'·,: Finn Coml! Byindusby 
Full Sat!'f-'le Sub-satnple hremges 
hu:lustry J.~ .... ~'emge Min Max 19&5-1978 1979-1990 1991-2002 
El:lgineeri!-g & Ivhdure1y 12!19 Xl 162 120.33 14800 9833 
Chemicals 39.19 16 53 3938 45.92 31.25 
SupfOlt 74.57 23 134 41.77 75.92 11lU5 
Electrical Eq. 62.86 :..\4 120 4415 9:1.03 55.92 
Auto &Parts 36D3 16 4_) 3292 42.58 32.83 
(~neral Retailers 71.54 34 93 5723 80.17 78.42 
Construction & Building 9946 33 134 7923 11408 105.75 
Bewrages 1651 11 JJ 1723 1792 1433 
Iv:ecfu & Entertffimte.nt 7200 2l 110 42.25 73.67 96.92 
.~..erosp1ce & [eferce 14.81 8 21 1177 16.58 16.33 
Fcod Pmdu~ ers 5441 17 72 48.77 {6.25 43.67 
Leisllle & llitels 6824 18 109 41.85 71.67 9342 
Other Goods 61[18 9 162 2046 43.92 11725 
Oil&Gas 23.62 8 37 1138 2933 31.17 
01her S er...ices 5324 14 110 26.69 42.17 9308 
Planreceuticals& Biotech 11.65 5 ~,, 
-.! 577 8.75 Jl92 
Panel B: Ivluket Capitalisation of'Nhole Induo;hy 
Full Sample Sub-sarrq:Ue hremges 
Indu .. 'try A'~mge Min Max 19&5-1978 1979-1990 1991-2002 
El~ginet:Tirg Sc Nhchirery 17,416 3,943 42,009 10,L9 16,454 26,272 
Ch.enlicals 27,9l'i 10,849 51,190 29,629 27,653 26,332 
S'JPfOlt 15,822 1,688 51,715 4,169 10,433 33,736 
Electrical Eq. 10,561 2,812 21,739 6,171 15,298 10,579 
Auto &Pat1s 7,947 2,091 15,591 7,270 7,7?7 8,850 
C~neral Retailen: 30,7ilJ 6,370 70,629 16,301 25,1)40 52,176 
Cbnstmction &. Building 23,5:-4 3,917 53,851 10, 1(12 25,874 35,3)7 
Eev~tages 15,943 3,672 39,691 8,425 9,56J 30,~5 ~·ibdli &Ente1iffinnerd 28,758 2,156 124,397 5,626 15,&50 66,716 
.U..erospice & Ceterce 6,553 414 22,920 1,278 4,542 14,280 
Fcod Pmd~ t-.rs 25,64) 5,116 49,666 12,lg7 23,&53 42,190 
leis me & llitels W71J3 2~597 40,047 6,014 15,154 29,833 
Othe1 ChJods 54,44) 9,434 162,176 17,602 30,671 118,115 Clil~~ctas 66,1 :7{: 1(~ 182 21)4,('63 29,891 47,063 124,541 ()thel Se1vices 76,95) 3,907 422,511 8,230 48,142 180,234 
PlanraceuticalsS:. Biotech 45,3)';1 3,462 195,478 8,167 22,ffi2 108,988 
Note: .~Jl '.{uues in pmel B atB in fs nrilliJns 
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Panel B of Table 4.1 shows descriptive statistics for the real market 
capitalisation of industries in 2002 £'s millions. There is also substantive variation 
both across industry and across time in market capitalisation. The inclusion of the 
'other services' and 'other goods' industries appears warranted given that the full-
sample average market capitalisation for these industries are the highest of all 
industries and combined is a substantial proportion of the entire market. Furthermore 
the inclusion of Pharmaceuticals as a separate industry also appears warranted given 
that it is far from the smallest industry by average market capitalisation, or by any 
other indicator in Panel B. In fact even during the 1966-1978 period when there were 
very few Pharmaceuticals companies the market capitalisation of these was higher 
than 5 other industries suggesting an economically important role for this industry 
despite the low number of listed firms. 
Annually rebalanced value-weighted price, earnings-price, dividend-price, 
earnings and dividends were then calculated for all industries. Each firm must have 
been trading for at least four quarters to be included in the sample for the next year. 
For each industry we set the price index equal to 100 in 1965, movements in the index 
are then calculated according to the value-weighted capital gain for that industry in 
each subsequent year. The weight attributed to each firm is based on the previous year 
end market capitalisation as a proportion of the relevant industry total capitalisation. 
~ = ~-1 (1 + LV;) 
LV; = t b.P;,r·MV;,r-l I M~-l (28) 
(29) 
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UK data on the consumer price index and three-month treasury bill rate were 
gathered from the IMF' s International Financial Statistics database. Consumption data 
on individual series for non-durables and for services were taken from the UK Office 
for National Statistics (ONS) and these series were combined to form our measure of 
consumer expenditure. We examine the data in real terms throughout since we believe 
economic agents are primarily concerned about the purchasing power of their income, 
although our methodology is equally applicable to nominal values. 
4.2.2 RETURN AND EQUITY PREMIA ESTIMATING EQUATIONS 
We follow the approach of Fama and French (2002) to derive estimates of 
average stock returns and expected returns implied by fundamentals36. The historical 
average model states the average stock return (Rt) is simply equal to the average 
dividend yield (Dt I Pt_1) plus the average growth of prices (GPt). 
A(~)= A(D,j f;_1) + A(GJ;) (30) 
Equation 4.3 shows the average return model, where A ( ) is the arithmetic 
average, Dr is real dividend payments during the current time period t, Pr-J is the 
price index at the previous time period t-1 and Dr I Pr-J is the dividend yield. GPF is 
the proportional capital gain between time t-1 and t. 
If the earnings-price ratio (Y1 I P1) has a constant mean then over extended 
periods of time the proportional change in prices must be matched by an almost 
36 See Chapter 3.2 for a fuller description of the Fama-French (2002) approach. 
37 GP, = (P,- P,_t )/ pt-1 
156 
equivalent proportional change in earnings. Since a constant mean is one condition 
that stationary variables must satisfy, it follows that if we have a stationary earnings-
price series then earnings growth will give us an estimate of the expected growth of 
the share price. Consequently, the Fama-French Earnings Growth Model (31) obtains 
estimates from fundamentals of expected capital gains. It is defined as the return of 
earnings growth model (RYr) equals by the average dividend yield (Dr 1Pr.1) plus the 
average earnings growth rate (Gfr)38. 
A (RY,) = A (D1 I ~_1 ) + A (GY,) (31) 
Similar intuition applies to any other variable that is in a long-term stable 
relationship with prices. Another suitable candidate variable is dividends, which has 
the attraction of having been linked to firm valuation since at least Gordon's (1962) 
seminal dividend growth model. In this case the proportional capital gain of (30) can 
simply be replaced by average dividend growth rate. Therefore, and as outlined in 
more detail in Chapter 3.2.1 of this thesis, the Fama-French dividend growth model 
can be written as: 
A (RD1 ) = A (D, I P,_1) +A (GD,) (32) 
As alluded to in the introduction of this chapter there are reasons to suppose 
that dividend growth may well understate the actual level of expected returns. Firstly, 
dividend payments are paid at the discretion of corporate executives and thus can be 
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smoothed and managed as desired. In contrast earnings are based on figures that are 
independently audited. (Longstaff and Piazzesi, (2004)) 
Secondly, dividend payments can be affected by changes in corporate payout 
policy. US corporate payout policy has changed considerably over recent years. 
There has been a sharp decline in the proportion of firms that pay dividends at all 
(Fama and French, 2001), which has been coupled with a sharp increase in the 
popularity of share repurchases as an alternative and more tax-efficient means of 
distributing funds to equityholders (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Firms outside the 
US have been slower to adopt share repurchases as an alternative means of 
distributing funds to shareholders. In the UK share repurchases were illegal until the 
1980s, however, since 1995 share repurchases have grown in importance in the UK 
(Oswald and Young, (2004a, 2004b)) reaching £8bn by 2000, more than 20% of 
aggregate dividends. 
Consequently, using dividends to estimate equity premia would understate the 
expected value in the UK, but the impact would be substantially greater in the US. 
This could be overcome if reliable share repurchase information were readily 
available, unfortunately they are not. Some of these difficulties can be avoided if 
earnings are instead used to estimate fundamental growth since these are unaffected 
by changes in corporate payout policy. Therefore earnings growth estimates provide a 
useful alternative indicator of the expected premium. 
Nevertheless there are a also drawbacks with using earnings. Firstly, earnings 
don't by themselves guarantee any future payment to investors. Secondly, earnings 
can be manipulated and managed by managers without any direct relationship to 
operating performance (see e.g. Healy and Wahlen, 1999 for a review.) A particular 
concern is incidences of earnings management appear to have increased over time, 
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especially during the latter part of our sample (Berenson, 2004). This could 
potentially lead to recent earnings growth being inflated and thus somewhat overstate 
true operating performance. In this chapter, we therefore report both dividend and 
earnings measures of the equity premium. 
The Fama-French (2002) approach benefits from its generality and its 
simplicity. It relies upon very few underlying assumptions. The main assumption 
made is that the ratio of earnings to price is stationary. In fact, these fundamentals 
should provide us with a more precise estimate of the expected equity return due to 
earnings fluctuating less erratically than stock price indices. Furthermore since prices 
are affected by changes in expected returns whereas fundamentals should be relatively 
impervious to such a change the case can be made that fundamentals offer a better 
approximation than historical returns. Nevertheless, if the valuation ratios are the 
same at the sample beginning and end then the average equity premium yielded by 
each method will be almost identical. 
4.2.3 PANEL REGRESSION METHOD 
In our panel data regressions we focus upon the use of fixed effects within 
groups estimation, which since we have a balanced panel provide identical estimates 
to those provided by the least squares dummy variable method (LSDV). Individual 
industries have very different mean values of our predictor variables, especially the 
payout ratio. For example, one would expect the valuation and payout ratios to be 
high in mature industries such as food retailers, but lower in growing industries such 
as pharmaceuticals. However, we are not concerned about uncovering cross-sectional 
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variation m mean earnings growth or returns across industries. Rather, we are 
concerned about time-series predictability of earnings growth or returns, but since 
there is substantial cross-sectional variation in industry payouts and fundamental 
valuations then it would be extremely restrictive to model the data on the basis that all 
industries tend to revert to the same payout ratio. Hence it is natural to use within 
groups estimators which de-mean the predictor variables and so consider the payout 
ratio for industry i at time t relative to the sample mean payout ratio for industry i. 
An important issue with regards to the standard error estimation is the 
likelihood that errors are correlated across industries, for instance due to a common 
macroeconomic shock impacting upon all industries at the same time. In order to 
correct for such spatial correlation we use the method proposed by Driscoll and Kraay 
(1998), which corrects not only for spatial correlation but also for heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation. Driscoll and Kraay corrected standard errors have good power 
properties for panels in which T > N. This is appropriate for our purposes since we 
have a time dimension (T) of 32 or more observations and a cross-sectional dimension 
of 16 industries (N). 
4.2.4 STRUCTURAL BREAK TESTS 
If there is a change in mean of a valuation ratio then this could imply that there 
has been a shift in expected return. Recent US empirical evidence supports such shifts 
(Carlson et al. (2002), Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2006)). Carlson et al. (2002) 
use quarterly data to identify mean breaks in US aggregate price-earnings and 
dividend-price ratios. We follow their approach and report results from quarterly data. 
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We use structural break tests to identify if such regime shifts are apparent in the mean 
of the UK dividend-price and earnings-price ratios. In the simplest case of a single 
break illustrated by (33) then the mean of the earnings-price ratio equals l51 prior to 
the breakpoint (at time m) and equals l52 from period m+l onwards. 
~~~ = 811 +e1 ; t = 1, ... ,m, 
YJ~ =821 +el' t=m+l, ... ,T, 
(33) 
In Chapter 3 we used the Andrews-Quandt method to test for the presence of a 
single break. In Chapter 4 and 5 we use state-of-the-art methods that allow for the 
possibility of multiple breaks39. In Chapters 4 and 5 we test for structural breaks using 
the recently developed procedure of Bai and Perron ((1998), (2003)). Firstly, the Bai-
Perron test assumes that the break date is unknown, selecting the breakpoint(s) that 
minimises the sum of squared residuals for the whole period. This test has the 
particularly attractive feature however is that it allows for the more complex cases 
where there are multiple regimes as given by (34 ). 
(34) 
for j= 1, ... ,m+ 1, where l5 1 is the regression coefficient for the jth regime. The 
m-partition (T1, ••• ,Tm), represents the breakpoints for the different regimes (by 
convention, T 1 = 0 and T m+I = T). Estimates of the regression coefficients are 
produced in order that the sum of squared residuals is minimised. Therefore for 
39 As noted in Chapter 3 even tests that allow for multiple structural breaks failed to detect more than a 
single break in the data series examined there. Hence we simply reported results from the Andrews-
Quandt tests in Chapter 3. 
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however number of breaks is specified the position of the breaks is determined 
according to the minimum sum of squares. However, since the sum of squares will 
always fall or at the very least remain the same if the number of breaks is increased 
then separate tests were developed by Bai and Perron in order to distinguish the 
appropriate number of breaks for the series. 
Bai and Perron (1998) develop a SupFT testing procedure which tests the null 
hypothesis of no structural breaks against the alternative of m structural breaks. A 
maximum F-test is produced which can they be used to assess if the null hypothesis of 
no structural break can be rejected. Bai and Perron (1998) also develop what they 
refer to as the SupFT(l+ lll) statistic to test the null hypothesis of 1 breaks against the 
alternative hypothesis of 1 +1 breaks. It begins with the global minimized sum of 
squared residuals for a model with 1 breaks. Each of the intervals defined by the 1 
breaks is then analyzed for an additional structural break. From all of the intervals, the 
partition allowing for an additional break that results in the largest reduction in the 
sum of squared residuals is treated as the model with 1 +1 breaks. The statistic is used 
to test whether the additional break leads to a significant reduction in the sum of 
squared residuals. 
However, there is an alternative approach to distinguish the appropriate 
number of structural breaks. This uses the information criteria approach of the various 
models to determine how many breaks. It has been suggested in the literature that the 
Scharwz Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) could be the most appropriate to be 
used since it penalises the inclusion of additional variables most heavily relative to 
other established measures such as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). In this 
chapter we also use a modified Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) developed by 
Liu et al. (1997), which Perron (1997) simulations indicate perform better in 
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distinguishing the number of structural breaks when there is autocorrelation in the 
error terms than the standard BIC. Consequently, we also report the number of breaks 
implied by the Liu et al. modified BIC as means of a check that the number of breaks 
selected by the SupFT tests show a large degree of consistency40. 
4.2.5 UN1T ROOT TESTS 
Stationarity, in so much as the relevant valuation ratios having a constant 
mean is a central issue for our dividend growth and earnings growth models, as 
outlined in Chapter 4.2.5. These models are based upon the assumption that the ratio 
of fundamental to price having a constant mean in order for dividend growth or 
earnings growth to give accurate estimates of the capital gain of the share index. 
Although, Fama and French (2002) forcefully assert that their method is robust to 
reasonable forms of non-stationarity. More generally, stationarity is an important 
issue since it is a pre-requisite for OLS regression analysis to be reliably conducted. 
These points are further elaborated on in Chapter 3.2.5. 
For our industry compiled data, we find in Panel A of Table 4.2 that the 
dividend-price ratios of all industries are stationary for the full sample period, 
indicating that dividend growth will provide us with suitable estimates of capital 
gains. This picture is maintained when we look at industry earnings-price ratios. Table 
4.2 Panel B illustrates that all industry earnings-price ratios are also stationary. 
40 
** BIC overstates number of breaks in series with high autocorrelation need to do SupF tests. 
Results reported for Minspan=30 (20% of data), Maxbreaks=4. 1965:4-2002:4 
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TABLE 4.2: UK INDUSTRY UNIT ROOT TESTS ON ANNUAL DATA (1966-2002) 
Panel A: Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests on Dividend-price ratio and Constant 
p 
!!( D,/ P,) = f.1 +a/ ( D,_J P,_1 ) + L wP!!( D,~p/ P.~p) +£, 
p=l 
Industry Test Test Stat Critical Value Decision Inference 
Oil&Gas ADF(O) -3.40 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Chemicals ADF(O) -4.50 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Construction & Building ADF(O) -4.64 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Aerospace & Defence ADF(O) -3.53 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Electrical Eq. ADF(O) -3.25 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Engineering & Machinery ADF(O) -3.58 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Beverages ADF(O) -2.98 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Food Producers ADF(O) -3.92 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Phanmceuticals & Biotech ADF(O) -3.20 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
General Retailers ADF(O) -4.42 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Leisure & Hotels ADF(O) -3.88 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Media & Fntertainrrent ADF(O) -3.02 -2.% Rejectho Stationary 
Support ADF(O) -3.12 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Auto &Parts ADF(O) -3.64 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Other Goods ADF(O) -3.35 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Other Services ADF(O) -3.38 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Panel B: Augmented Dickey Fuller Tests on Earnings-price ratio and Constant 
p 
!!(Y,/ P,) = f.1 + w' (Y,~J P.~]) + L wp!!(Y,~p/ P.~p) + £, 
p=l 
Industry Test Test Stat Critical Value Decision Inference 
Oil&Gas ADF(O) -4.87 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Chemicals ADF(O) -4.19 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Construction & Building ADF(O) -3.86 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Aerospace & Defence ADF(O) -3.47 -2.%· Reject ho Stationary 
Electrical Equiprrent ADF(O) -3.87 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Engineering & Machinery ADF(O) -3.56 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Beverages ADF(O) -4.56 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Food Producers ADF(O) -4.02 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Phanmceuticals & Biotech ADF(O) -3.71 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
General Retailers ADF(O) -4.24 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Leisure & Hotels ADF(O) -3.73 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Media & Fntertainrrent ADF(O) -3.44 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Support ADF(O) -3.40 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Auto & Parts ADF(O) -3.51 -2.% Reject ho Stationary 
Other Goods ADF(O) -3.28 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Other Services ADF(O) -2.98 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
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4.3 INDUSTRY EQUITY PREMIA ESTIMATES 
Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 provide annualised sample averages of pertinent 
variables to this study. Firstly, Table 4.3 reports that inflation with an average of 
7.03% was relatively high over 1966-2002, whereas, the real risk-free rate averaged a 
more modest 1.97%. Further, Table 4.3 shows there is substantial variation across 
industries in dividend yield and earnings-price ratios. Industries that have developed 
and grown over the sample period such as Pharmaceuticals and Other Services (which 
includes IT) have the lowest earnings-price ratios and dividend yields, whereas more 
mature industries such as Engineering & Machinery and Chemicals are amongst those 
with the highest earnings-price ratios and dividend yields. There is also variation in 
the payout ratio (the ratio of dividends to earnings) across industries ranging from 
50.97% for the Automobile industry to 71.06% for Chemicals. However, there 
appears no obvious trend underlying the cross-sectional patterns in payout ratios. This 
is somewhat surprising growing industries might also be expected to have low payout 
ratios since they will tend to use earnings more for investment than paying dividends. 
Table 4.4 reports estimates of the key metrics of the study especially the 
average return, earnings growth and dividend growth model estimates of equity 
returns (calculated using (30), (31) and (32)) and equity premia. Figure 4.1 illustrates 
graphically the substantial variation apparent in the equity premium across the 16 UK 
industries we examine over our sample period 1966-2002. Equity premia from 
average historical returns (RXt) vary greatly across industries from around 5% p.a. in 
the Chemicals and Engineering and Machinery industries to more than 13% p.a. in the 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotech industry. We interpret this as simply being 
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compensation for the higher level of risk borne by those investing in sectors that yield 
higher expected returns; Gebhardt et al. (2001) provide some empirical support for US 
industries that this is the case for the prospective equity premium. 
We also find similar variation in equity premia estimates from our earnings 
growth and dividend growth estimates models. The fundamental equity premia 
estimates (RXYt and RXDt) have a clear and reasonably strong, positive relationship 
with those from average returns. Hence there is a considerable degree of agreement 
across models over which industries have relatively low actual and expected equity 
premia and those which have relatively higher equity premia. Since, dividend yield is 
a common component to all three models, this suggests that the high capital gains 
generated by the ph~rmaceutical and food retailing industries relative to other 
industries is to a large due to strong earnings growth and strong dividend growth in 
these industries during the sample period. This indicates that in industries where there 
was strong in-sample growth of earnings and dividends investors in those industries 
tended to receive relatively high levels of capital appreciation. 
There are however differences between the different model estimates of equity 
premia for individual industries. In general, both the earnings growth and dividend 
growth models imply that the expected equity premium was below realised historical 
average equity premium. Figure 4.2A, illustrates that in 13 industries out of 16 
average returns exceeded those implied by the earnings growth model. However, the 
magnitude of the difference varies across industries. In 4 of these 13 industries the 
estimates were within 1% p.a. of each other. The remaining 9 industries, a majority of 
the total, have earnings growth that was substantially in economic terms below capital 
gains. Nevertheless there were 3 industries- Chemicals, Automotive and Oil and Gas 
-where the expected equity premia was above the historical premia. 
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TABLE 4.3: ESTIMATES OF FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH AND VALUATION RATIOS 
Inf, F, D,/P~, D,/ P, 
P~ru 1 A Mm<rt D t.a 
Y,/P, D,/Y, ®, GY, GP, 
lfV.lMm<rt 1%6-2002 7D3% 1.97% 4.82% 433% 7.61% 5991% 2.89% 4.57% 6.55% 
EW:r~.~rm-rt 1%6-2002 7D3% 1.97% 4.15% 439% 7.j3% 59.68% 2.45% 4.49% 5.15% 
P~ru 1 B: hdustry Dat~ 
Ehgir.eermg & l•.ohdrll-,;,r:r· 1%6-2002 7D3% 1.97% .5.86% 5..59% 8 . .58% 67.19% ·1.53% -0.11% 1.12% 
Chwio:ak 1%6-:1002 7.03% 1.97% 5.41% 522% 8.05% 1lD6% -1.61% 4.03% 1.68% 
Sqlpott 1%6-2002 7D3% 1.97% 4.88% 4..52% 7.65% 5922% -0.19% 1.26% 2.85% ~dricalJ!4 1%6-2002 7D3% 1.97% 4.04% 3.78% 1.41% 52.16% 028% 1.81% 3.14% 
Aulo&Pms 1%6-2002 1.o3% 1.97% 4.11% 4..51% 7.34% .50.97% .5D1% 8.15% 3.51% 
G&u!"al RI!Wl.er,: 1%6-:lOO:l 1D3% 1.97% 4.16% 3.84% 6.M% 6:lD3% 2D8% 3.51% 4.45% 
Comructi.m & Blilding 1%6-2002 1D3% 1.97% 5.21% 493% 8Jl3% .59.89% 0.85% 3.35% 3.61% Bo!1:.~~ 1966-:JOO:J 1D3% 1.97% .5.14% 4.14% 1.11% 6629% 1.14% 3.40% 4.31% Med.if!.&~t. 1966-:lOO:l 7D3% 1.97% 4.54% 4.18% 7.28% 51..51% -0.13% 1.65% 5.41% 
Ae:ro!pac e & D@fence 1%6-2002 1D3% 1.97% 4.91% 4.63% 8.07% 58.40% 1.40% 4.49% 5.09% 
Food Prodw:EH 1%6-2002 1D3% 1.97% 4.15% 433% 1.93% 5531% 1..53% 3.39% .5.60% 
Lcislm & l:bt.ek 1%6-2002 1D3% 1.97% 4.73% 421% 1.22% 62.10% 13.15% 6.18% 6.15% 
other Geoeod> 1%6-2002 1D3% 1.97% 5.53% 499% 9.04% 56.65% 401% 3.j3% 6.29% 
Oil& !As 1966-2002 7D3% 1.97% .S.::lS% 4.14% 9.11% 65..54% 2.60% 13.61% 7.04% Other S eJTJi: e,: 1966-JOO:l 'lD3% 1.97% 3.4::l'J<, 3.03% 6.19% 51.6.5% 333% 5.07% 8.92% 
Plo:nncel1.icals & Bitteclt 1%6-2002 "7.03% 1.97% 3.42% 296% 5.23% .58.81% l25% 1.('/i)% 11.83% 
TABLE 4.4: ESTIMATES OF EQUITY RETURNS AND EQUITY PREMIA 
RD, 
Piite 1A: Mm-et D~ 
RY, R, R:xD, RXY, RX, ~-!;- RXD, RX,- RXY, 
WlMm<rt 1966-2002 }:71% 939% 1136% 5:75% l.42% 9.40% 3.65% 198% E\VMm-et 1966-2002 l20% 924% 9 9crro 524% "728% }94% 2:70% 0.66% 
Piite 1B : Indlstt)· D~ 
Ehgineering& Madrlrlliy 1966-2002 433% 51.5% 698% 236% 3.18% 5D1% 2.65% 123% C:hmicili 1966-2002 3.86% 9..50% 7.15% 1.89% 1..54% .5.18% 3.29% -235% S\n•Oit. 1966-2002 4.69% 6.13% l.73% 2.72% 4.11% 5.16% 3.04% 1..59% ~ctric<d J!4. 1966-2002 43::l% .591% 1}8% ::l36% 395% .5.8::!% 3.46% 1.8"7% kio&Pms 1966-2002 9:7::l% 13.47% 8289(. l.lS% 11..50% 632% 
-1.44% 
-5.19% Gelural Rl!taoo 1966-2002 624% 1.66% 8.60% 421% 5}0% 6.64% 2.36% 094% Co:1sttuctiln & Building 1966-2002 6.12% 8.62% 894% 4.15% 6.65% 698% ::1.83% 032% BeV!!I'-~ge5 1966-2002 629% 8..5.5% 9..52% 432% 6..58% 1..55% 3.23% 091% Med.if!. & Ettertairtn(!J:t. 1966-:lOO:l 4.41% 6.19% 995% 2.45% 422% "799% .5.54% 3.16% Aero !pace & DE! (!J:·.::e 1966-2002 631% 9.40% lODO% 435% 1.44% 8D3% 3.68% 0.60% Food Profuc EH 1966-2002 628% 8.14% 1035% 431% 6.113% 1338% 4.01% 220% Lcislm & Hotek 1966-2002 17.81% 1090% 11.48% 15.91% 894% 9..51% 
-6.39% 0..51% 01her Goods 1966-2002 9..54% 9.11% 11.82% 1.51% "7.1.5% 9.85% 2.28% 2.11'Jio Oil&~ 1966-2002 "7.84% 1892% 1228% .5.88% 169.5% 10.32% 4.44% 
-6.64% 01!ter Sonoi:e 5 1966-2002 6.16% 8.49% 1234% 4:79% 6..53% 10.38% .5.59% 3.85% Plurm.: el1.icili & Bi:•ted·, 1966-::!002 10.6"1% 11.11% 1.52.5% 8.10% 9.15% 13.28% 4..58% 4.14% 
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Figure 4.2A: Deviation of Actual Return from that implied by Earnings Growth 
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Figure 4.2B: Deviation of Actual Return from that implied by Dividend Growth 
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The results from the dividend growth model suggest that the expected equity 
premium tended to be even further below the historical premia than suggested by the 
earnings growth method. In 14 of 16 industries dividend growth implied premia were 
below the historical average; in all 14 of these industries the discrepancy between the 
estimates was at least 2% p.a. and in 5 it was in excess of 4% p.a. Only in the cases of 
the Automotive and Leisure and Hotels industries did earnings implied equity premia 
surpass the historic premia. Therefore, overall there seems to be consistent evidence 
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in favour of the hypothesis that historical returns exceeded those implied by 
fundamentals from these initial results. 
An issue with using the arithmetic average is that its value can be inflated by 
an outlying value. This is important for our capital gain estimates since there was a 
stock market crash in 1974 which reversed over the next year41 • Simply averaging the 
individual values for 1974 and 1975 leads to a severely distorted estimated of the net 
price change between 1973-1975. We adjust the outlying values in 1974 and 1975 for 
capital gains and earnings growth by taking the net change from 1973-1975 and 
attributing half of this to each of 1974 and 1975 as shown by (35).42 
GP. _ GP. _ ~975/ ~973 -1 
1974 - 1975 - 2 
GY. = GY. = ~975/~973 -1 
1974 1975 2 (35) 
GD = GD = D1975/ D1973 -1 
1974 1975 2 
As demonstrated by table 4.5, the discrepancy between these different 
methods of calculating average capital gains for just the two years of 1974-1975 are 
extremely large. In all industries the arithmetic average is much larger than the 
adjusted average and the difference is at least 20% in 13 of the 16 industries. This 
translates into the outlying event of the stock market crash of 1974 being able to 
account for more than 1%, and in some substantially more than 1%, of the annualised 
average capital gain over the entire sample period for these 13 industries. Even for the 
41 Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2002) note the UK stock market crash of 1974 was one of the most 
severe market crashes of the 20th Century. 
42 Naturally, adjustment using the geometric average for 1973-1975 yields qualitatively identical results 
to those using the adjustment proposed here. 
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industry which seems least affected by the shock, Other Goods, it still causes an over-
estimation of the annual capital gain of 0.8%. 
However, both adjusted and unadjusted methods yield broadly similar 
estimates for earnings growth and dividend growth over 1973-1975. Particularly any 
divergence between the two methods becomes rather miniscule once it is averaged 
over the entire sample period. There is just one exception to this general point, the 
earnings growth estimate of the Oil and Gas industry is sensitive to the market crash 
of 1974. This doesn't seem unusual since the Oil and Gas industry operations would 
be most affected by the OPEC Oil Crisis, which is suggested was largely responsible 
for the market turbulence of 1974-1975. 
Does this bias in the estimate of the capital gain account for most of the 
divergence between equity premium estimates? 
Figure 4.3A demonstrates that after accounting for the impact of the 1974 
stock market crash in 9 of the 16 industries average return and earnings growth equity 
premium estimates are similar. However, there are 4 industries in which average 
return estimates still substantially exceed the earnings growth estimates, namely, 
Other Goods, Other Services, Pharmaceuticals and Biotech and Media and 
Entertainment. Conversely 3 industries have average return estimates substantially 
below those implied by earnings growth: Automobiles, Oil and Gas and Chemicals. 
However, it is important to note that once the 1974 outlier is corrected for then there 
is no systematic pattern in the divergences between earnings growth and historical 
return estimates, specifically there is no recurring tendency for the historical average 
return to exceed the earnings growth estimate. This is important since it is contrary to 
the US aggregate results of Fama and French (2002) who interpreted there finding of 
a substantial difference in historical and expected equity premia as an overall decline 
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in expected returns. Our results question that there was in fact a systematic decline in 
expected returns since no systematic tendency for historical returns to exceed the 
earnings growth return is apparent in our sample. Are these findings mirrored for the 
dividend growth method? 
The dividend growth model results conflict with those for the earnings growth 
model. Figure 4.3B illustrates that the dividend method still generally produces equity 
premia estimates that are below those of historical average even after the 1974 stock 
market crash is adjusted for. Although the scale of the disparities between the 
dividend growth and historical premia is smaller when the 1974 outlier is removed, a 
sizeable discrepancy still remains for almost all industries. A positive difference 
between the equity premia estimates remains in 14 of the 16 industries, and of these 
14 the smallest divergence is 0.96% and in fact for 11 of the 14 industries the 
discrepancy exceeds 1.50%. A margin of greater than 1.50% is large and will be 
analysed carefully in the proceeding sections of this chapter in order for an 
appropriate explanation for this discrepancy to be found. 
Our results stimulate vital questions as to the driving forces behind these 
findings. What is it about Pharmaceutical or Entertainment industry that has caused 
their capital gains to exceed their fundamental growth and why has Automotive 
industry fundamental growth been greater than their capital gains? Perhaps, most 
important of all, why do we not find that historical returns have exceeded the earnings 
model across the board? Fama and French (2002) concluded low future expected 
returns seemed to be the main factor causing realised returns to be above that implied 
by fundamentals at the market level. Our analysis of UK industries according to the 
dividend growth estimates of equity premia suggests that these have been below the 
historical average, as for the US aggregate market. 
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TABLE 4.5 ADJUSTING FOR THE 1974 STOCK MARKET CRASH 
Panel A: Capital Gains Adjustm:nt 
1974 1975 AvofGPt Net Change Difference Difference 
Market GPt GPt 1974& 1975 1973-1975 1974-1975 1966-2002 
EW Market -59.07% 86.30% 13.62% -11.87% -25.49% -1.38% 
VW Market -58.80% 94.36% 17.78% -9.97% -27.74% -1.50% 
Industry 
Engineering & Machinery -56.00% 86.70% 15.35% -8.93% -24.28% -1.31% 
Chemicals -55.56% 96.56% 20.50% -6.32% -26.82% -1.45% 
Support -58.20% 81.82% 11.81% -12.00% -23.81% -1.29% 
Electrical Eq. -63.85% 77.41% 6.78% -17.93% -24.71% -1.34% 
Auto & Parts -62.96% 101.92% 19.48% -12.60% -32.08% -1.73% 
Construction & Building -61.72% 111.49% 24.88% -9.52% -34.40% -1.86% 
G:neral Retailers -62.94% 75.69% 6.37% -17.45% -23.82% -1.29% 
Aerospace & Defence -60.32% 117.14% 28.41% -6.92% -35.33% -1.91% 
Beverages -60.08% 60.93% 0.43% -17.88% -18.30% -0.99% 
Media & Fntertainm:nt -66.27% 78.46% 6.10% -19.90o/o -26.00% -1.41% 
Food Producers -58.89% 100.23% 25.17% -7.00% -32.16% -1.74% 
Leisure & Hotels -64.63% 56.35% -4.14% -22.35% -18.21% -0.98% 
Other Goods -47.69% 62.36% 7.34% -7.53% -14.87% -0.80% 
Oii&Gas -60.67% 126.45% 32.89% -5.46% -38.36% -2.07% 
Other Services -64.14% 99.62% 17.74% -14.21% -31.95% -1.73% 
Phanmceuticals & Biotech -59.27% 105.23% 22.98% -8.20% -31.18% -1.69% 
Pane!B: Frunings Growth Adjustm:nt 
1974 1975 Av ofGYt Av Net Change Difference Difference 
Market GYt GYt 1974& 1975 1974-1975 1974-1975 1966-2002 
EW Market 5.23% -24.61% -9.69% -10.33% -0.64% -0.03% 
VWMarket 23.20% -38.29% -7.55% -11.99% -4.44% -0.24% 
Industry 
Engineering & Machinery 11.81% -12.75% -0.47% -1.22% -0.75% -0.04% 
Chemicals 19.29% -39.20% -9.95% -13.73% -3.78% -0.20% 
Support -0.61% -25.25% -12.93% -12.86% 0.08% 0.00% 
Electrical Eq. 9.93% -25.24% -7.65% -8.91% -1.25% -0.07% 
Auto & Parts -33.43% -16.35% -24.89% -22.16% 2.73% 0.15% 
Construction & Building -22.30% -25.87% -24.00% -21.20% 2.88% 0.16% 
G:neral Retailers -20.58% -16.20% -18.39% -16.72% 1.67% 0.00% 
Aerospace & Defence -4.23% -22.12% -13.17% -12.70% 0.47% 0.03% 
Beverages -10.52% -30.72% -20.62% -19.00% 1.62% 0.00% 
Media & Entertainm:nt -4.25% -34.64% -19.44% -18.71% 0.74% 0.04% 
Food Producers -7.27% -27.39% -17.33% -16.33% 1.00% 0.05% 
Leisure & Hotels -25.69% -21.57% -23.63% -20.86% 2.77% 0.15% 
Other Goods 24.13% -19.92% 2.11% -0.29% -2.40% -0.13% 
Oii&Gas 136.49% -68.06% 34.21% -12.23% -46.44% -2.51% 
Other Services -18.20% 10.33% -3.93% -4.87% -0.94% -0.05% 
Phanmceuticals & Biotech 6.92% -9.87% -1.47% -1.81% -0.34% -0.02% 
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Panel C: Dividend Growth Adjusurent 
1974 1975 Av of GOt Av Net Change Difference Difference 
Market GDt GDt 1974& 1975 1974-1975 1974-1975 1966-2002 
EWMaiket -4.99% -10.53% -7.76% -7.50% 0.26% 0.01% 
VWMarket -2.13% -13.57% -7.85% -7.71% 0.14% 0.01% 
Industry 
Engineering & Machinery -1.77% -10.00% -5.88% -5.80% 0.09% 0.00% 
Chemicals 12.17% -28.20% -8.01% -9.73% -1.72% -0.09% 
Support 5.91% -13.67% -3.88% -4.28% -0.40% -0.02% 
Electrical Eq. -7.73% 4.76% -1.48% -1.67% -0.18% -0.01% 
Auto &Parts -23.93% -27.76% -25.84% -22.52% 3.32% 0.18% 
Construction & Building -12.00% -2.72% -7.36% -7.20% 0.16% 0.01% 
General Retailers -6.48% -6.95% -6.71% -6.49% 0.23% 0.01% 
Aerospace & Defence -3.56% -16.68% -10.12% -9.82% 0.30% 0.02% 
Beverages -6.92% -10.75% -8.83% -8.46% 0.37% 0.02% 
Media & Fntertainrrent -5.46% -11.05% -8.26% -7.95% 0.30% 0.02% 
Food Producers -1.19% -I 1.78% -6.48% -6.41% 0.07% 0.00% 
Leisure & Hotels -6.48% -15.99% -11.23% -10.72% 0.52% 0.03% 
OtherG>ods 5.73% -17.10% -5.68% -6.18% -0.49% -0.03% 
Oil&Gas -5.84% -10.75% -8.30% -7.98% 0.31% 0.02% 
Other Services -12.51% -2.21 o/o -7.36% -7.22% 0.14% 0.01% 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotech -8.58% -4.32% -6.45% -6.26% 0.19% 0.01% 
Panel D: Overall1mpact 
Unadj. Adj Unadj. Adj 
Market RXt-RXYt RXt-RXYt RXt-RXDt RXt-RXDt 
EW Maiket 0.69% -0.65% 3.65% 1.52% 
VW Maiket 2.00% 0.72% 2.70% 2.15% 
Industry 
Engineering & Machinery 1.23% -0.04% 2.65% 1.33% 
Chemicals -2.35% -3.60% 3.29% 1.94% 
Support 1.59% 0.30% 3.04% 1.78% 
Flectrical Eq. 1.87% 0.60% 3.46% 2.13% 
Auto & Parts -5.19% -7.07% -1.44% -3.35% 
Construction & Building 0.32% -1.69% 2.36% 0.%% 
General Retailers 0.94% -0.44% 2.83% 1.06% 
Aerospace & Defence 0.60o/o -1.34% 3.23% 1.76% 
Beverages 0.97% -0.11 o/o 5.54% 2.22% 
Media & Fntertainrrent 3.76% 232% 3.68% 4.12% 
Food Producers 2.20% 0.41% 4.07% 2.32% 
Leisure & Hotels -7.30% -0.56% -6.39% -7.41% 
OtherG>ods 2.71% 2.03% 2.28% 1.50% 
Oil&Gas -6.64% -6.20o/o 4.44% 2.35% 
Other Services 3.85% 2.17% 5.59% 3.85% 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotech 4.14% 2.47% 4.58% 2.89% 
Notes: Panel A illustrates the impact of the 1974 stock market crash on our average estimate of capital gains. Such 
a crash and rebound can result in a large upward bias in the estimate growth rate over the period. The first two 
columns show the capital gains for 1974 and 1975 respectively. Unadj. GP1 simply takes the average of these two 
figures (GP1974+ GP 1975)/2. Adj. GP1 uses the correction suggested in Section 4.3 and given by equation (35), 
CP..m/P..
973 
-1)/2 this takes the overall change in the price level from 1973-1975 and attributes half of the gain to 
1974 and the other half to 1975. Difference 1974-1975 is Adj. GP1 - Unadj. GP1 and shows the extent to which 
taking the simple average for 1974-1975 is distorted. Difference 1966-2002 is 2/37*Difference 1974-1975 and 
gives the extent to which the overall sample average is distorted by the 1974 stock market crash. Panel B illustrates 
the impact of the 1974 stock market upon estimates of earnings growth. Unadj. RX1-RXY1 is simply the same 
figure as given for RX1-RXY1 in Table 2 interpreted as the difference between equity premia estimates. The final 
column is Unadj. RX1-RXY1 - GP1 Difference 1966-2002 + GY1 Difference 1966-2002 and gives the difference 
between equity premia estimates after the 1974 stock market crash has been neutralised. 
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Figure 4.3A: Deviation of Actual Return from that implied by Earnings Growth 
corrected for 1974 spike in earnings-price ratios 
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Figure4.3B: Deviation of Actual Return from that implied by Dividend Growth 
corrected for 1974 spike in dividend-price ratios 
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Nevertheless, we find in several specific industries there was a divergence 
between equity premia estimates. It is of interest to examine the source of the 
inconsistencies between the dividend and earnings models. Furthermore, where there 
is any discrepancy between the results at the industry level then we are able to 
investigate the likely cause. From this perspective, the remaining industries provide a 
useful control group since there are no substantial discrepancies between their premia 
estimates. The obvious framework to examine this within is the present value model 
of Campbell and Shiller (1988). Campbell's (1991) return decomposition 
demonstrates if actual returns were above (below) expectations this can be caused by 
either: a) the expected future growth of fundamentals being unusually high (low) or b) 
a decline (rise) in expected unconditional stock returns during the sample period. 
Chapter 4.4 addresses these issues. 
4.4 EXPLAINING UK EQUITY RETURNS 
4.4.1 ARE POST 2000 EXPECTED DIVIDEND AND EARNINGS 
GROWTH RATES IDGH? 
It has been argued we have entered a new economic era, which has enabled 
higher rates of economic growth to be attained. One claim is that the ever increasing 
pace of technological developments has facilitated more rapid productivity growth 
(Jagannathan et al, 2001). An alternative argument is that increasing globalisation as 
witnessed by growing moves towards a truly globally integrated economic system in 
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which resources can be allocated more efficiently due to previous barriers being 
removed and in which companies are able to locate production internationally in order 
to minimise costs. A final assertion is that substantial declines in inflation during the 
latter part of the 20th Century in many developed economies has set the footing for 
more stable and higher economic growth in the future,43 economic policymakers have 
argued. These three factors have lead to hopes that higher levels of economic growth 
can be achieved and sustained long into the future. 
However, if this higher future expected growth rate had not been anticipated at 
the beginning of our sample period then this would lead to unexpected capital gains 
being realised by investors as the potential for extended periods of high economic 
growth became known to investors and incorporated into their expectations. 
In this chapter we focus on the predictability of fundamental growth. This is 
because the predictability of market fundamental growth is covered in depth in 
Chapter 3.4.2. Given that the market equity premium results reported in this chapter 
and similar to those reported in Chapter 3 then a re-assessment of market fundamental 
growth appears unwarranted. However, we haven't previously examined the 
predictability of industry fundamental growth and hence we concentrate on this area 
in the following section. 
We examine all the variables available at industry level, which we believe 
could plausibly predict future fundamental growth rates. We use: i) the fundamental-
price ratio, ii) the dividend-payout ratio, iii) prior growth of fundamentals and iv) the 
consumption-fundamental ratio. These variables have been found to predict 
fundamentals at the market level. Campbell and Shiller (1998) find the ratio of 
43 However, Modigliani and Cohn (1979) argue that inflation causes money illusion amongst investors 
who discount cashflows using too low a discount rate during periods of high inflation and vice-versa; if 
this is true (Ritter and Warr, 2002 provide some empirical support for this hypothesis) investors are 
irrational. 
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fundamental-price predicts fundamental growth albeit with the wrong sign and there is 
an extensive literature documenting the predictive power of the dividend-price ratio 
over returns dating back to Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Fama and French (1988). 
The dividend-payout ratio has been found to predict earnings growth by Amott and 
Asness (2003) for the US and to also predict dividend growth by Ap Gwilym et al. 
(2006) in their study of 7 developed countries including the UK. Amott and Asness 
(2003) and Ap Gwilym et al. (2006) also find a role for lagged fundamental growth 
for predicting future fundamental growth. Menzly, Santos and Veronesi (2004) 
provide a theoretical model and empirical results supporting a relationship between 
consumption-fundamental ratio and future fundamental growth. They specify 
dividends as their measure of fundamentals. We additionally use earnings as a 
measure of fundamentals and investigate if consumption-earnings ratio can predict 
future earnings growth, as well as if consumption-dividend ratio can predict future 
dividend growth. 
However, to our knowledge, our study is the first to consider this issue for 
such a large number of industries data specifically using a panel data specification. As 
discussed in Chapter 4.2.3 we focus upon the use of fixed effects within groups 
estimation, which since we have a balanced panel provide identical estimates to those 
provided by the least squares dummy variable method (LSDV). This specification 
enables us to focus upon time-series predictability of earnings growth by modelling 
the regressand the payout ratio for industry i at time t relative to the sample mean 
payout ratio for industry i rather than relative to average mean payout ratio of all 
industries. Imposing the later assumption would be very restrictive since it implies all 
industries have the same mean payout ratio, whilst our data indicates in many cases 
that individual industries have very different mean values of our predictor variables. 
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Consequently, we use within groups estimators which de-mean the predictor variables 
and so consider the payout ratio for industry i at time t relative to the sample mean 
payout ratio for industry i. We use the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator for the 
covariance matrix which is consistent for spatial dependence, serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. 
Table 4.5 reports the results of regression (36). Although, we are primarily 
concerned with medium to long term growth prospects of the industries, rather than 
the short-term, we report results for the one-year horizon as well as a five-year 
prediction window. We expect the coefficient on the valuation ratio should be 
negative. When earnings (or dividends) are high relative to prices then one would 
expect earnings growth to be low, so that the earning-price ratio will revert towards its 
mean; for this to occur fJ must be negative. Similarly one would expect mean 
reversion in the relationship between consumption and earnings and hence the sign on 
this coefficient should be positive. 
The theoretical supposition is that both dividend and earnings growth should 
be negatively related to the payout ratio. Firms with low payout ratios retain a large 
portion of their earnings. Since retained earnings for most companies are the primary 
source of investment funds this suggests firms with low dividend payouts should be 
investing heavily feeding higher future earnings and higher dividend payments also. 
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TABLE 4.6: FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH PREDICTABILITY 
Panel A: One-year Earnings Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel R-bar 
Variable Period Industries (N) Observations Dt-JIYt-1 Yt-IIPt-1 GYt-1 CYDTt-1 squared 
PanelGYt 1967-2002 16 576 0.42 0.0742 
(3.07) 
Panel GYt 1967-2002 16 576 -2.35 0.1327 
(4.05) 
Panel GYt 1967-2002 16 576 ..0.04 0.0016 
(0.47) 
PaneiGYt 1967-2002 16 576 0.21 -1.95 0.1472 
(1.37) (3.76) 
PanelGYt 1967-2002 16 576 0.50 0.11 0.0822 
(3.51) (1.29) 
PanelGYt 1967-2002 16 576 0.29 -1.93 0.10 0.1537 
(1.80) (3.89) (1.20) 
PaneiGYt 1967-2002 16 576 0.04 0.1183 
(5.75) 
PanelGYt 1967-2002 16 576 0.01 -1.98 0.08 0.04 0.2045 
(0.10) (4.27) (0.95) (3.96) 
PanelGYt 1967-2002 16 576 -1.93 0.04 0.2020 
(4.29) (4.99) 
Panel B: Five-year Earnings Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel R-bar 
Variable Period Indus tries (N) Observations Dt-1/Yt-l Yt-IIPt-1 GY5t-5 CYDTt-1 squared 
PaneiGY5t 1967-1998 16 512 0.38 0.2523 
(4.84) 
Panel GY5t 1967-1998 16 512 -1.02 0.0904 
(2.20) 
PanelGY5t 1971-1998 16 448 ..0.40 0.1266 
(2.78) 
Panel GY5t 1967-1998 16 512 0.34 -0.40 0.2656 
(4.11) (1.40) 
PaneiGY5t 1971-1998 16 448 0.36 ..0.16 0.3041 
(4.06) (1.28) 
Pane1GY5t 1971-1998 16 448 0.32 -0.37 ..0.16 0.3163 
(3.33) (1.12) (1.30) 
PanelGY5t 1967-1998 16 512 0.04 0.5156 
(8.98) 
PaneiGY5t 1971-1998 16 448 0.04 -0.42 ..0.09 0.04 0.5697 
(0.37) (1.58) (0.89) (5.23) 
Panel GY5t 1971-1998 16 448 -0.50 0.04 0.5469 
(2.03) (8.09) 
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Panel C: One-year Dividend Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel R-bar 
Variable Period Industries (N) Observations Dt-1/Yt-l Dt-IIPt-1 GDt-1 CDDTt-1 squared 
Panel GOt 1%7-2002 16 576 -0.42 0.0857 
(2.71) 
Panel GOt 1967-2002 16 576 -3.81 0.0596 
(3.15) 
Panel GOt 1967-2002 16 576 -0.11 0.0113 
(0.76) c 
Panel GOt 1967-2002 16 576 -0.41 -3.61 0.1376 
(2.82) (4.46) 
Panel GOt 1967-2002 16 576 -0.44 -0.13 0.1019 
(2.70) (0.91) 
Panel GOt 1967-2002 16 576 -0.43 -3.62 -0.13 0.1542 
(2.83) (4.60) (0.94) 
Panel GOt 1967-2002 16 576 0.04 0.1568 
(2.27) 
Panel GOt 1967-2002 16 576 -0.37 -2.87 -0.06 0.04 0.2520 
(3.21) (5.56) (0.61) (2.34) 
Panel GOt 1967-2002 16 576 -0.36 -2.83 0.04 0.24% 
(3.43) (5.91) (2.21) 
Panel D: Five-year Dividend Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample Panel Panel Panel Panel Panel R-bar 
Variable Period Industries (N) Observations Dt-1/Yt-l Dt-IIPt-1 GD5t-5 CDDTt-1 squared 
PanelGD5t 1967-1998 16 512 -0.11 0.0381 
(1.57) 
PanelGD5t 1967-1998 16 512 -1.19 0.0388 
(1.51) 
PanelGD5t 1971-1998 16 448 -0.12 0.0204 
(1.95) 
PanelGD5t 1967-1998 16 512 -0.11 -1.16 0.0737 
(1.54) (1.81) 
PanelGD5t 1971-1998 16 448 -0.06 -0.12 0.0317 
(1.18) (1.76) 
PanelGD5t 1971-1998 16 448 -0.05 -1.06 -0.12 0.0735 
(1.22) (1.63) (1.93) 
PanelGD5t 1967-1998 16 512 O.o3 0.5136 
(6.43) 
PanelGD5t 1971-1998 16 448 -0.05 -0.51 0.11 0.03 0.5792 
(2.47) (1.49) (2.02) (17.03) 
PanelGD5t 1971-1998 16 448 -0.05 0.11 0.03 0.5703 
(2.54) (1.99) (15.45) 
Notes to Table 4.6: 0 1_1/ Y1_1 is the payout ratio for t-l,Y1_1 I Pt-l is the earnings price ratio also for t-1. GY1 is 
real earnings growth for period t, defined as: (Y1 I Y1_1)-l. GY51 is real five-year average earnings growth, 
defined as: ((Y1+4 I Y1_1)-l)l5. CYDT1_1 is the industry time detrended ratio of non-durable and service 
consumption-industry earnings. The regressions are estimated using fixed effects, therefore each observation 
is de-meaned relative to the industry average. Industry subscripts for each variable have been dropped to aid 
clarity. Values in parentheses are absolute t-values calculated using the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) correction 
for spatial dependence, serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. 
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The persistence of earnings is likely to be dependent upon the horizon looked 
at. For short-term earnings it is likely there will be positive correlation between 
observations. However, over longer time horizons it is likely there will be a negative 
relationship since earnings tend to mean-revert over longer horizons. Dividend growth 
would be expected to be positively correlated, especially at short horizons since 
managers tend to adjust gradually towards a target payout ratio (Lintner (1956)). 
Panel A of Table 4.6 demonstrates that in bivariate regressions consumption-
earnings ratio explains more of the variation in one-year earnings growth than the 
other variables individually. The multivariate regressions indicate that consumption-
earnings dominates the payout ratio which becomes insignificant if both are included 
in the predictive regression. Current earnings growth appears of limited usefulness for 
predicting future earnings growth since it is statistically insignificant in all regression 
specifications. However, the earnings-price ratio and consumption-earnings ratio 
appear to contain information incremental to each other. In a regression including 
both variables they are both significant and the adjusted goodness-of-fit, of 20.20% is 
only fractionally below that including all four variables. 
Table 4.6 Panel B indicates that as much as 56.97% of five-year average 
earnings growth can be captured by (36). Consumption-earnings is positively related 
to future earnings growth as expected. The earnings-price and lagged earnings growth 
ratio are negatively related to future earnings growth as expected. The payout ratio is 
statistically significantly and positively related with earnings growth, which is 
contrary to conventional wisdom but consistent with prior studies conducted at the 
market level. All variables are statistically significant in bivariate regressions, 
however the consumption-earnings ratio appears to be the most important, explaining 
more than half (50%) five-year earnings growth variability alone. Again the 
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consumption-earnings ratio appears to dominate the payout ratio. As at the one-year 
horizon, once consumption-earnings is included in the regression payout ratio 
becomes insignificant. Our preferred model includes just the earnings-price ratio and 
consumption-earnings. Parameter estimates of these coefficients appear quite stable 
across different regression specifications. The more parsimonious specification finds 
both variables are statistically significant and has only a marginal reduction in 
adjusted R-squared to 54.69% from 56.97%44• 
Panel C of Table 4.6 demonstrates that in bivariate regressions consumption-
dividend ratio explains more of the variation in one-year dividend growth than the 
other variables individually. The regressions also indicate that lagged dividend growth 
is not significantly related to future dividend growth in either the bivariate or 
multivariate regressions. However, the multivariate regressions indicate that the 
consumption-dividend ratio, payout ratio and dividend-price ratio are all of 
importance and incremental value for the predictive regression. In a regression 
including these three variables they are both significant and the adjusted goodness-of-
fit, of 24.96%, only fractionally below the 25.20% if all four variables are included. 
Table 4.6 Panel D indicates that as much as 57.03% of five-year average 
dividend growth can be captured by (36). Consumption-dividend is positively related 
to future dividend growth as expected. The dividend-price and lagged dividend 
growth ratio are negatively related to future dividend growth as expected. The payout 
ratio is also negatively related to future dividend growth, as suggested by 
conventional wisdom. Only the consumption-dividend ratio is statistically significant 
at the 5% level in bivariate regressions, which can explain more than half (50%) five-
year dividend growth variability alone. However, lagged dividend growth is 
44 Use of the differing specifications for forecasting produces qualitatively identical results. 
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significant at the 10% level. Nevertheless, the payout ratio and lagged dividend 
growth become important conditional on the inclusion of the consumption-dividend 
ratio in the regression. The model including all variables has an adjusted R-squared of 
57.92% which is only marginally more than the 57.03% of the model which includes 
just the consumption-dividend ratio, payout ratio and lagged dividend growth. Our 
preferred model is therefore the more parsimonious specification which includes just 
the payout ratio, dividend-price ratio and consumption-dividend ratio45• 
Therefore for forecasts at both horizons we use a model including earnings-
price, lagged earnings and consumption-earnings in order to produce forecasts. 
G:t:,l+l = ~ +fl. .(Y;,J ~,1) + flz· Di,l /:t:,l + fJ3.GY;,I + fJ4.CYDI;,I + ei,t+i 
GY 5i,l+i = ~ +fl. .(f;,l I ~,1) + flz. Di,l /Y;,I + fJ3 .GY 5i,l--4 + fJ4 .CYDI;,I + ei,t+i (37) 
We combine our regression coefficient estimates from (36) with values of the 
relevant variables for the last year of our sample in order to derive forecasts of future 
expectations of fundamental growth as shown by (37). Table 4.7 reports the predicted 
growth rates relative to the historical mean. We also report the average of the last 3 
year growth rates from 2000-2002 to examine the consistency of these predictions. 
Table 4.7 Panel A suggests that a change in expected future fundamental 
growth could help explain the equity premia discrepancies we found. For instance in 
industries where capital gains were lower than earnings growth substantially below 
mean future growth is predicted in the Automotive industry. Furthermore in the 
Aerospace and Construction industries where there was a more modest difference, 
below average growth is also forecast. In industries where capital gains exceeded 
earnings growth, substantially above mean growth is forecast for .the media and 
45 Use of the differing specifications for forecasting produces qualitatively identical results. 
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pharmaceutical industries, two of the four where there was a substantial difference. 
However, for the oil and gas industry results are not consistent with their equity 
premia results being explained through changes in expected fundamental growth; one 
would expect substantially below mean future growth but in fact considerably above 
mean future growth is forecast. 
For five-year earnings growth forecasts the results tend to be fairly similar to 
those reported for one-year earnings growth. Of the 7 industries where there was a 
substantial discrepancy in equity premia estimates only for the automotive, other 
services and media industries is long-term growth forecast to be consistent with a 
change in expected growth explanation of this result. For the other services and media 
(automotive) industry above (below) mean growth in earnings in forecast which 
would help explain why historical returns were higher (lower) than those implied by 
the earnings model. The results for the chemical and pharmaceutical industry suggest 
medium term growth is likely to be about average, perhaps slightly leaning towards a 
forecast which suggests fundamentals were responsible for a modest part of the equity 
premium results. Furthermore, several sectors where earnings growth and capital 
gains were approximately equal over 1966-2002 are forecast to have exceedingly high 
future earnings growth, specifically, the electricals, engineering, and support service 
industries. Therefore, we find mixed evidence that changes in expected future 
fundamental growth can explain the discrepancies arising from our equity premia 
results.46 
46 Alternative specifications of the forecasting model yielded qualitatively identical results. 
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TABLE 4.7: FORECASTS OF FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH 
Panel A: 1-year Earnings Growth Forecasts excluding Payout and Earnings growth 
2002 A v. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 A v. 2000-2002 
Other Goods 2.68% 4.39% Neutral Neutral 
Oil&Gas 12.40% 6.13% Optimistic Optimistic 
Chemicals -1.95% -0.35% Neutral Neutral 
Construction & Building -11.29% -7.27% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
Aerospace & Defence -12.98% -6.47% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
Electrical Eq. 2.31% -1.56% Neutral Neutral 
Engineering & Machinery 10.59% 2.71% Optimistic Neutral 
Beverages -1.73% 0.08% Neutral Neutral 
Food Producers 1.08% 3.07% Neutral Neutral 
Other Services 3.28% 8.96% Neutral Optimistic 
Phannaceuticals & Biotech 0.24% 1.84% Neutral Neutral 
G.meral Retailers -3.68% -2.34% Neutral Neutral 
Leisure & Hotels -2.06% -0.68% Neutral Neutral 
Media & Entertainment ll.ll% 9.46% Optimistic Optimistic 
Support 3.68% 4.69% Neutral Neutral 
Auto & Parts -30.47% -9.51% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
PaneiB: 5-yearEamings Growth Forecasts excluding Payout and Earnings Growth 
2002 A v. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 A v. 2000-2002 
OtherGJods 0.53% 1.22% Neutral Optimistic 
Oil& Gas 5.66% 0.08% Optimistic Neutral 
Chemicals -1.19% -0.87% Pessimistic Neutral 
Construction & Building -5.31% -2.81% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
Aerospace & Defence -6.76% -3.80% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
Electrical Eq. 8.16% 2.66% Optimistic Optimistic 
Engineering & Machinery 14.55% 5.79% Optimistic Optimistic 
Beverages -1.24% -0.10% Pessimistic Neutral 
Food Producers 0.05% 1.43% Neutral Optimistic 
Other Services 4.14% 6.13% Optimistic Optimistic 
Phannaceuticals & Biotech 0.76% 1.10% Neutral Optimistic 
General Retailers -0.30% 0.61% Neutral Neutral 
Leisure & Hotels -0.02% 0.11% Neutral Neutral 
Media & Entertainment 8.15% 5.24% Optimistic Optimistic 
Support 3.84% 3.32% Optimistic Optimistic 
Auto & Parts -26.54% -5.88% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
Notes: These forecasts are produced using the preferred regression model from Table 4.6, which uses the 
earnings-price ratio and the detrended consumption-industry earnings ratio to predict future earnings growth. 
In the table we report the value predicted at the end of our sample, 2002, and as a check of the consistency of 
this forecast we also report the average of the three forecasts from 2000-2002. A positive value indicates that 
the relevant fundamental growth rate is expected to be above average. A negative value indicates that the 
relevant fundamental growth rate is expected to be below average. An optimistic outlook is defined as if 
earnings growth is predicted to be more than 5% above average at one-year horizon or I% p.a. above 
average at five-year horizon. Similarly a pessimistic outlook defined as if earnings growth is predicted to be 
more than 5% below average at one-year horizon of l% p.a. below average at five-year horizon. Otherwise 
we refer to the forecast as being neutral. 
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TABLE 4.7: (CONTINUED) 
Panel C: 1-year Dividend Growth Forecasts excluding Dividend growth 
2002 A v. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 A v. 2000-2002 
OtherCbods -7.39% -1.52% Pessimistic Neutral 
Oil& Gas -8.81% -3.14% Pessimistic Neutral 
Chemicals 3.59% 4.03% Neutral Neutral 
Construction & Building 2.81% 7.32% Neutral Op timis tic 
Aerospace & Defence -7.fiYJ!o 2.27% Pessimistic Neutral 
Electrical Eq. 10.31% 4.07% Optimistic Neutral 
Engineering & Machinery 15.95% 5.03% Optimistic Optimistic 
Beverages 4.96% 7.63% Neutral Optimistic 
Food Producers 7.26% 7.29% Optimistic Optimistic 
Other Services 8.07% 6.71% Op timis tic Optimistic 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotech 1.17% 3.14% Neutral Neutral 
General Retailers 3.32% 6.96% Neutral Optimistic 
Leisure & Hotels -1.95% 0.93% Neutral Neutral 
Media & Entertain~rent 10.15% 11.93% Optimistic Optimistic 
Support 7.62% 13.30% Op timis tic Optimistic 
Auto & Parts -20.74% -2.42% Pessimistic Neutral 
Panel D: 5-year Dividend Growth Forecasts excluding Dividend-price 
2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 A v. 2000-2002 
OtherCbods -0.93% -0.59% Neutral Neutral 
Oil& Gas 0.14% -2.32% Neutral Pes s imis tic 
Chemicals -0.47% -0.53% Neutral Neutral 
Construction & Building -1.33% -0.21% Pes s imis tic Neutral 
A eros pace & Defence -2.32% -0.89% Pessimistic Neutral 
Electrical Eq. 6.16% 2.71% Optimistic Op timis tic 
Engineering & Machinery 10.27% 4.15% Optimistic Optimistic 
Beverages -0.31% 0.31% Neutral Neutral 
Food Producers -0.18% 0.50% Neutral Neutral 
Other Services 1.73% 1.94% Op timis tic Op timis tic 
Pharmaceuticals & Biotech 0.08% 0.06% Neutral Neutral 
General Retailers 0.51% 1.31% Neutral Optimistic 
Leisure & Hotels -1.11% -1.12% Pessimistic Pes s imis tic 
Media & Entertain~rent 4.26% 2.55% Optimistic Optimistic 
Support 2.76% 2.57% Optimistic Op timis tic 
Auto &Parts -16.58% -2.97% Pes s irnis tic Pessimistic 
Notes: These forecasts are produced using the preferred regression model from Table 4.6, which 
uses the earnings-price ratio and the detrended consumption-industry earnings ratio to predict future earnings 
growth. In the table we report the value predicted at the end of our sample, 2002, and as a check of the 
consistency of this forecast we also report the average of the three forecasts from 2000-2002. A positive 
value indicates that the relevant fundamental growth rate is expected to be above average. A negative value 
indicates that the relevant fundamental growth rate is expected to be below average. An optimistic outlook is 
defined as if earnings growth is predicted to be more than 5% above average at one-year horizon or 1% p.a. 
above average at five-year horizon. Similarly a pessimistic outlook defined as if earnings growth is predicted 
to be more than 5% below average at one-year horizon of 1% p.a. below average at five-year horizon. 
Otherwise we refer to the forecast as being neutral. 
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Table 4. 7 Panel C provides limited support for the notion that a change in 
expected future fundamental growth could help explain the equity premia 
discrepancies uncovered in Chapter 4.3. In the two industries where dividend growth 
model estimates exceeded the historical average, Automotive and Leisure and Hotels, 
the only pessimistic forecast is for the Automotive industry in 2002, but even this is 
ameliorated if the prior two years are also considered. In the two industries where the 
historical return exceeded dividend growth estimates the most, Media and 
Entertainment and Other Services, then extremely large forecasts of dividend growth 
are consistently made for future years. This suggests that for the Media and Other 
Services groups that a change in expected future fundamental growth might have 
contributed to the equity premium results. However, for the remaining industries, the 
forecasts are mixed. One would expect future fundamental growth to be forecasted to 
be high across these industries to explain the equity premium results. This is given the 
fact that these indicated historical returns exceeded those implied by dividend growth 
across all these remaining 12 industries. However, the results are split with 3 
pessimistic forecasts, 5 neutral forecasts and 4 optimistic forecasts for 2002. 
For five-year dividend growth forecasts the results tend to be fairly similar to 
those reported for one-year dividend growth. Results are marginally more supportive 
of the hypothesis that expectations of future fundamental growth played a role in our 
equity premia results. For the two industries where dividend growth exceeded capital 
gains, Automotive and Leisure, then poor future dividend growth was forecast. For 
the two industries where capital gains exceeded dividend growth the most, Media and 
Other Services medium-term dividend growth is forecast to be above average. This 
suggests for these industries with the extreme results then future expectations of 
dividend growth can play a role in explaining their equity premia results. However, 
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we would expect the remaining 12 industries to all have substantially above mean 
dividend growth to explain their equity premia results; this is the case for only 3 of 
them, while 2 others have very low dividend growth forecast. Overall there is limited 
evidence that high expected dividend growth can explain the equity premia results. 
Therefore we find some evidence that changes in expectations of fundamental 
growth are able to shed some light on our equity premium results in specific instances. 
However, what is abundantly clear, according to our analysis conducted in this 
chapter, is that changes in expected fundamental growth rates alone are unable to 
explain the discrepancies between historical equity premia and those implied by 
fundamentals. Hence we next tum our attention to an alternative explanation; that 
these deviations were caused by a change in expected retums.47 
4.4.2 WAS THERE ANY CHANGE IN UK EXPECTED STOCK 
RETURNS OVER 1966-2002? 
The prior literature, based almost exclusively on studies of the US suggests 
that there has been a fall in expected returns over recent decades. Studies which 
attempt to identify the underlying economic causes of such a change in expected 
return identify the 1990s as the time when this shift occurred (Lettau et al. (2006), 
Bansal and Lundblad (2002)). This literature can be connected to a related literature 
which has studied structural breaks in valuation ratios via the present value 
framework. H there is a shift in the dividend-price (or earnings-price) ratio then this 
suggests that there has been a change in expected returns. This is given the perceived 
47 Alternative specifications of the forecasting model yielded qualitatively identical results. 
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wisdom that the dividend-price ratio fails to predict long-term future dividend growth. 
Previous studies have found a downward break in ratios of fundamental-price for the 
aggregate US (Carlson et al. (2002)) and UK (Vivian (2005)) markets during the 
1990s. We investigate the nature and direction of any breaks in the earnings-price and 
dividend-price ratios for both the aggregate UK market and individual industry 
indices. 
If expected returns have declined (risen) on average over time then a stream of 
unexpected capital gains (losses) may have been triggered causing realised historical 
returns to be substantially above (below) investors expectations. In these 
circumstances estimations of the equity premium implied by fundamentals, which are 
essentially unaffected by changes in expected returns, will give us estimates of the 
true ex ante risk premium that are not contaminated by unanticipated share price 
appreciation (depreciation). 
We use the procedures developed by Bai and Perron ((1998), (2003)) to 
investigate the possibility of multiple regimes in UK earnings-price ratios. In order to 
determine the number of breaks in the series Bai and Perron (1998) advocate the use 
of the SupFT(l) test followed by sequential SupFT(l+ lll) tests to determine the 
appropriate number of breaks. However, they also acknowledge that Bayesian 
information criteria or modified Bayesian information criteria could be useful for 
determining the number of breaks. We report modified Bayesian information (LWZ) 
criterion of Liu et al. (1997), to help verify our results. However, we do note that as 
found by Perron (1997) that the LWZ criterion could over-estimate the number of 
breaks in the presence of autocorrelation, which regressions with our application to 
earnings-price ratios are highly prone to. 
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TABLE 4.8: BAI-PERRON TESTS OF MULTIPLE STRUCTURAL BREAKS 
Panel A: Bai-Perron Multiple Structural Break Tests of Industry Earnings-Price Ratios 
No. of Breaks Selected 
Sample 1965:4 2002:4 SupFf(l) SupFf(2) SupFf(3) SupF(2jl) SupF(3j2) Modified LWZ 
VW Index 3.02 
fN.I Index 0.45 
Engineering & Machinery 4.55 
Cbemicals 2.53 
Support 0.64 
Electrical Eq. 7.16 
Auto & Parts 0.38 
General Retailers 6.53 
Construction & Building 4.76 
Beverages 6.92 
Media & Entertainrrent 1.48 
Aerospace & Defence 1.06 
Food Producers 1.03 
Leisure & Hotels 3.06 
Other G>ods 1.30 
Oil & Gas 1.33 
Other Services 2.09 
Phannaceuticals & Biotech 1.85 
16.73 
25.15 
26.64 
8.49 
10.51 
8.44 
9.50 
9.79 
17.29 
41.14 
18.09 
4.31 
14.27 
25.20 
31.34 
8.40 
6.99 
14.02 
26.03 
26.52 
19.04 
13.16 
11.00 
6.06 
9.86 
6.83 
11.04 
64.07 
26.12 
2.90 
18.30 
17.85 
33.09 
7.18 
5.56 
14.45 
2.76 
9.19 
33.05 
6.15 
10.78 
23.73 
11.52 
9.27 
30.55 
67.19 
14.09 
8.02 
14.02 
6.57 
11.68 
14.62 
2.57 
3.86 
Sequentia:Sequential 
16.29 0 3 3 
14.34 
4.3I 
4.57 
6.07 
1.37 
3.72 
0.87 
0.14 
1.85 
17.12 
0.65 
I4.02 
4.02 
I8.02 
3.17 
2.88 
1.24 
0 
I 
0 
0 
2 
0 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
0 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
Panel B: Bai-Perron Multiple Structural Break Tests of Industry Dividend-Price Ratios 
No. of Breaks Selected 
Sample 1965:4 2002:4 SupFf(l) SupFf(2) SupFf(3) SupF(2jl) SupF(3j2) Modified LWZ 
VW Index 
fN.I Index 
9.45 
1.85 
Engineering & Machinery 1.31 
Cbemicals 1.84 
Support 3.20 
Electrical Eq. 1.92 
Auto & Parts 2.99 
General Retailers 2.62 
Construction & Building 8.44 
Beverages 3.88 
Media & Entertainrrent 17.42 
Aerospace & Defence 2.21 
Food Producers 3.51 
Leisure & Hotels 6.08 
Other G>ods 1.58 
Oil & Gas 6.68 
Other Services 1.80 
Phannaceuticals & Biotech 2.77 
23.72 
21.76 
29.96 
18.71 
6.47 
14.58 
11.48 
6.44 
19.66 
13.48 
8.68 
2.42 
23.94 
9.28 
21.86 
8.21 
1.33 
1.75 
18.45 
29.21 
20.56 
23.15 
19.75 
9.34 
11.02 
5.35 
14.39 
13.05 
27.86 
2.99 
23.92 
7.46 
28.55 
10.70 
1.16 
2.81 
3.56 
11.53 
28.99 
I8.03 
7.4I 
8.99 
16.09 
3.37 
12.09 
11.64 
1.67 
0.55 
9.83 
9.08 
7.64 
5.4I 
0.87 
2.07 
Sequentia:Sequential 
6.10 I I 3 
6.23 0 2 3 
2.59 
4.49 
6.81 
0.37 
2.59 
0.8I 
0.92 
1.98 
6.50 
0.3I 
5.40 
1.68 
2.85 
0.00 
1.05 
1.75 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
2 
2 
l 
0 
0 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
I 
0 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
2 
3 
3 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
Notes: The 10% critical values for SupFT(k) for k=l-3 are 4.37, 5.59, 6.72. The 10% critical values for 
SupFT(I+lll) for 1=1-2 are 6.72, 8.13. To choose the number of breaks the sequential procedure examines if 
SupFT(l) rejects the null of 0 breaks in favour of I and then proceeds to conduct SupFT(l+ Ill), until it fails to reject 
the null. Given the nature of the data we find in many cases the SupFT(l) test fails to reject the null but the 
SupFT(2) and SupFT(3) tests do suggesting there are multiple rather than no structural breaks. We therefore modify 
the sequential procedure to first test SupFT(2} to identify if there are multiple breaks and then use SupFT(312) to 
decide if there are 2 or 3 breaks. The final column reports the number of breaks implied Liu et al. (1997) modified 
Bayesian information criteria. 
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TABLE 4.9: STRUCTURAL BREAK MAGNITUDES AND TIMINGS 
Panel A: Industry Earnings-Price Ratios 
1 96 5Q4- 20 (I 2Q4 No. of BREP.X 1 BRE..c..K2 BREAK3 
Bnak DA1E +or- SIZE DA1E +or- SIZE DATE +or- SIZE 
VVvTJnd ] 1973QJ Up 7.31% 1981Q1 Down -5.50% 1992Q2 Dov.;n -2. 57~(~) 
EQ Ind 3 1973Q3 Up 7.51% 1980Q4 Down -5.57% 1992Q 1 Down -1.78% 
Engineering &Ivlachi.nery ~, 1973Q3 Up 9 .9o~~c. 1980Q4 Do'Y\n -7.52% .<. 
Cherri C3.l s 2 1973Q3 Up 775% 1980Q4 Down -ti .31 ~/c. 
Support ., 1973Q3 Up 8.45% 1980Q4 Dov.;n -8 21%) .<. 
El ed:ri. cal E q. ~, 
.<. 1973Q3 Up 7.73~·o 1980Q4 DoVi-n -7.01% 
Auto &Parts 2 1973Q2 Up 8.80% 1980Q4 Dov.;n -8.66% 
General Retailers ., 1973Q3 Up 4.88% 1980Q3 DoVi-n -327% .<. 
C onst:ruction & B ui.1 ding 2 1973Q3 Up 9.13% 1981Q1 Down .{i 83% 
B e~m:-ages 2 1973Q3 Up 5.42% 1983Q4 Down 4.33% 
Media & Entertain.m.er.Jt 3 1973Q3 TJp 8.82% 1981Q 1 Dowr -7.05'}:) 1991Q3 Down -116% 
Aerospace & Defence (I 
F oodProduo::rs 3 1973Q2 TJp 7.85% 1980Q4 Dov.;n -5.72~.10 1992Q3 Down -1.98% 
LEisure & Hotels ~, 1973Q3 Up 4.92% 1981Q4 Do~r -5.07~~~ .<. 
Otha- Goods 3 1973Q4 Up 7.67~···0 1982Q2 Down -5.7s~~o 1992Q2 Down -2. 60'~{, 
Oil &1:Jas 2 1973Q3 TJp 9.75% 1986Q2 Down -9.34% 
Otha- Sen,ices 2 1973Q2 Up 5.42~1(1 1980Q3 Down 4.57% 
Ph3rrraceuticals &Biotech 2 1973Q4 TJp 4.66°!~ 1~n1Q1 Down 4.51% 
TABLE 4.9 (CONTINUED) 
Panel B: Industry Dividend-Price Ratios 
1 96 5Q4- 20 0 21~~4 No. of BR.Ei\K 1 BREAK 2 
Break DA1E +or- SIZE D.e,.1E. +or- SIZE 
~.,l~ .. ~l Jnd 1 199~1 Dcrw'!1 -1.84% 
EQ Ind 2 197::Q4 Up 2.62% 1982Q4 Dov;;n -2.79~,~ 
Engineffing &Machine:ty .-, 197~3 Up 4.19% 1983Q1 Dov;;n -3.95% .t. 
CherriG3ls 2 197~4 Up 169% 1983Q1 DO"IMl -150% 
Support ..., 197~4 Up 297~-(. 1982Q4 Dov;;n 4.08% 
"' E1 ectri cal E q. ~, 197~3 TJp 2.67% 1980Q4 DoTwn -116% .. 
Auto &Parts .-, 197~3 Up 295'7(, 1982Q4 Dov;;n -3.45% .t. 
Ge:t1tral Retailers 2 1971~4 Up 2.1J7'Yo 1982Q2 Dov;;n -1.82% 
Construction & B ui1 ding 2 197~3 TJp 3.28% 1982Q3 Dov;;n -212% 
B Brerages ~, 197~4 Up 119% 1985Q1 Dov;;n -J.87Sr~l 4 
Iviedia & Entertainrrm 1 199LQ3 Dcmn -3.12% 
Aerospace &Defence 0 
F oodProduCffs ~, 197X~4 Up 2.59% 1983Q3 Dov;;n -2.91~0 .t. 
Lci sure & Hotels 2 197~4 Up 2.81% 1982Q4 Dov;;n -286% 
Othff Goods 2 197~4 Up 3.06% 1983Q3 Dov;;n -123% 
Chi &Gas 1 1993~1 Dovm -2.25~{. 
Other Sen.~ ces 0 
Pl:arrraceuticals & Biotech 0 
Table 1.8A reports results from SupFT, SupFT(l+ til) tests and LWZ criterion 
for the earnings-price ratio. What emerges particularly is that the SupFT(l) often 
indicates there are no structural breaks in the earnings-price ratios although the 
SupFT(2) and SupFT(3) tests indicate that there are 2 rather than 0 or 3 rather than 0 
breaks respectively. The failure of the SupFT(l) test to reject the null of 0 breaks in 
favour of the alternative of 1 could be due to the series we examine appearing to go 
through a period of consistently high earnings-price ratio during the 1970s and then 
reverting back towards its previous mean in the 1980s or 1990s. The alternative 
hypothesis would have to allow for two breaks in the series in order to capture such a 
phenomena. Therefore we modify the procedure advocated by Bai and Perron (1998) 
to select the appropriate number of breaks in the series by using the SupFT(2) test to 
identify if there were at least two breaks in the series and then use the SupFT(3i2) test 
to examine if there were three rather than two breaks. Our empirical analysis reported 
in Table 4.8 suggests that there were multiple regimes in both market and industry 
earnings-price ratios over the 1966-2002 period. In general the results from using this 
modified procedure are similar to those indicated by the L WZ criterion. Although for 
5 of the 16 industries the L WZ criteria suggests a higher number of breaks than those 
selected by the modified sequential procedure of SupFT tests, although this is to be 
expected since given Perron's (1997) findings that LWZ tends to find too many 
breaks for series which are serially correlated. 
Table 4.8B reports results from SupFT, SupFT(l+ til) tests and LWZ criterion 
for the dividend-price ratio. A similar pattern to the earnings-price ratio tests surfaces 
since the SupFT(l) again often indicates there are no structural breaks in the dividend-
price ratios although the SupFT(2) and SupFT(3) tests indicate that there are 2 rather 
than 0 or 3 rather than 0 breaks respectively. We suggest this is likely to be caused by 
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a similar mechanism to the earnings-price ratio results that there is at least one 
positive and one negative break in many of the series which have only a marginal net 
impact on the dividend price ratio. Our empirical analysis reported in Table 5 suggests 
that there were multiple regimes in both market and industry dividend-price ratios 
over the 1966-2002 period. In general the results from using this modified sequential 
procedure are closer to those indicated by the L WZ criterion than the standard 
sequential approach. However, still for half of the 16 industries the L WZ criteria 
suggests a higher number of breaks than those selected by the modified sequential 
procedure of SupFT tests. Although, part of this result is to be expected since given 
Perron's (1997) findings that LWZ tends to find too many breaks for series which are 
serially correlated. There is a suggestion that perhaps there are even more breaks in 
the dividend-price series than indicated by the modified sequential procedure. 
We find in Table 4.9A that industry earnings-price ratios tend to have similar 
break timings consistent with a response to a pervasive economic risk factor. In fact, 
for almost all industries two breaks are found using the modified sequential 
procedure. Firstly, an upward break in the earnings-price ratio of all industries is 
found during the 1970s just prior to the first OPEC oil crisis in 1974 and the ensuing 
period of high inflation and economic instability and uncertainty in the UK economy. 
This finding of an upward mean break implies a rise in expected returns which is 
interesting since pripr studies (such as Carlson et al. (2002) and Chapter 3 of this 
thesis) only find evidence of mean-breaks indicating a fall in expected returns. 
Secondly, in almost all industries there is a downward break in the earnings-
price ratio during the early 1980s. This break tends to be of approximately equal 
magnitude to the upward breaks of 1972-3. This also appears to be in response to a 
common economic factor since almost all industries were affected at approximately 
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the same time. It is purported that this break could simply have occurred due to the 
resolution the economic instability and uncertainty faced by the UK economy in the 
mid-to-late 1970s. These two breaks almost entirely counteract each other, thus the 
overall net impact of the breaks on industry valuation ratios tends to be marginal. 
Thirdly, however, only in three of the sixteen industries is there a significant 
downward mean break in the 1990s. Therefore, in stark contrast, to studies of the 
aggregate market we find little evidence of a common downward break in valuation 
ratios in the 1990s. For instance, Carlson, Pelz and Wohar (2002) report a downward 
structural break in the mean of fundamental-price ratios during the early 1990s in the 
US while Vivian (2005) finds a downward break in the UK dividend-price ratio at a 
similar time. Our aggregate market results do reveal a downward break in both 
equally-weighted and value-weighted earnings-price ratios during the early 1990s 
although the magnitude of the break is much more pronounced for the value-weighted 
index. The general interpretation of a shift in a valuation ratio is that it is indicative of 
a change in expected return, particularly since fundamental growth is difficult to 
predict. However, our industry results question whether this could have been the case 
for the break in the early 1990s in the UK. This is because if a change in expected 
returns had been caused by a pervasive economic risk factor then one would expect 
the valuation ratios of all industries to be affected. However, our results indicate that 
only three out of sixteen industries experienced a statistically significant shift in their 
earnings-price ratio during the 1990s. Since the overwhelming majority of industries' 
valuation ratios were relatively unaffected, it suggests that this result was not caused 
by a pervasive economic risk factor causing a change in expected returns. Perhaps, it 
is more likely this episode can be ascribed to a change in expectations of future 
fundamental growth in these particular industries. 
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Furthermore, the net change from the structural breaks of earnings-price ratios 
tend to be rather small, thus our results are not supportive that expected returns fell 
overall during the period 1966-2002. Whilst in almost all industries at least two 
statistically significant breaks are found, the net impact of the change in valuation 
ratio is generally rather small. Furthermore, the timing of the breaks in almost all 
cases are prior to the 1990s, contrary to previous studies. 
Consequently, these structural break results add further weight to our equity 
premia results that indicated the tendency for capital gains to be supported by earnings 
growth for 1966-2002. There is certainly little evidence to suggest that prices rose 
more rapidly than earnings over this period and hence paltry support for an overall fall 
in expected returns over 1966-2002. 
We find in Table 4.9B that the results from industry dividend-price ratio break 
tests share a number of similarities with the results for the earnings-price ratios. 
Firstly, the dividend-price ratio results indicate that the industries tend to have similar 
break timings consistent with a response to a pervasive economic risk factor. In fact, 
for a large majority of industries two breaks are found using the modified sequential 
procedure. Firstly, an upward break in the dividend-price ratio in 11 of 16 industries is 
found during the 1970s just prior to the first OPEC oil crisis in. Secondly, in these 
same 11 industries there is a downward break in the dividend-price ratio during the 
early 1980s. This break tends to be of approximately equal magnitude to the upward 
breaks of 1973 and the net impact tends to be relatively small, but naturally there is 
some variation in impact across industries. These industries appear to be responding 
to a common economic factor since almost all industries were affected at 
approximately the same time. The results for the equally-weighted market index 
conform to the pattern of this majority of industries, namely only two breaks are 
201 
found, at a timing in common with the industries and these offset each other almost 
exactly. 
Thirdly, however, only in two of the sixteen industries is there a significant 
downward mean break in the 1990s. Therefore, in stark contrast, to studies of the 
aggregate market we find little evidence of a common downward break in valuation 
ratios in the 1990s. For instance, Carlson, Pelz and Wohar (2002) report a downward 
structural break in the mean of fundamental-price ratios during the early 1990s in the 
US while Vivian (2005) finds a downward break in the UK dividend-price ratio at a 
similar time. Our aggregate market results do reveal a downward break in value-
weighted dividend-price ratios during the early 1990s. The general interpretation of a 
shift in a valuation ratio is that it is indicative of a change in expected return, 
particularly since fundamental growth is difficult to predict. However, our industry 
results question whether this could have been the case for the break in the early 1990s 
in the UK. This is because if a change in expected returns had been caused by a 
pervasive economic risk factor then one would expect the valuation ratios of all 
industries to be affected. Our results indicated that only two out of sixteen industries 
experienced a statistically significant shift in their dividend-price ratio during the 
1990s. Since the overwhelming majority of industries' valuation ratios had little net 
change overall during our sample period, it suggests that this result was not caused by 
a pervasive economic risk factor causing a change in expected returns. Perhaps, it is 
more likely this episode can be ascribed to a change in expectations of future 
fundamental growth in these particular industries or due to changes in the composition 
of industries within the market portfolio. In general though our main finding here is 
that there was not a pervasive break in industry dividend-price ratios during the early 
1990s. 
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In terms of the earnings growth model, consequently, these structural break 
results add further weight to our equity premia results that indicated the tendency for 
capital gains to be supported by earnings growth for 1966-2002. There is certainly 
little evidence to suggest that prices rose more rapidly than dividend over this period 
and hence paltry support for an overall fall in expected returns over 1966-2002. In 
terms of the dividend growth model, there appears little evidence either that there was 
a pervasive downward shift in expected returns, which would be necessary to explain 
to equity premia results. Consequently, for most industries the results relating to the 
dividend model are somewhat perplexing. This is in so far as there doesn't seem to 
have been a substantial downward shift in the dividend-price ratios of these industries 
but there tend to be large divergences between equity premium estimates from the 
dividend and the historical average models. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter's analysis suggests that whether investor's expectations of UK 
equity premia were approximately equal to the historical average depends upon the 
method used to calculate expected returns. We find the dividend growth model 
suggests UK equity premia since 1966 have been systematically lower than the 
historical average equity premia across the majority of UK industries. The dividend 
growth model results are consistent with the extant literature based on aggregate 
market studies of the US (Fama and French (2002) and J agannathan et al. (2001)) and 
of the UK (Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
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However, when earnings growth is used to estimate expected equity premia 
then across most industry sub-sectors these estimates are much closer to the historical 
average, especially once the 1974 spike in stock prices is adjusted for. Thus, in 
general, the appreciation in stock prices over 1966-2002 appears to have been largely 
supported by earnings growth across industry portfolios. Further, when we aggregate 
the 16 'real' economy industries to form a market portfolio both on an equally 
weighted and a value weighted basis we find that capital gains have been largely 
supported by earnings growth. 
There are strengths and weaknesses to using earnings growth rather than 
dividend growth to estimate expected retums48 . However, the empirical analysis of 
this Chapter suggests that the evidence for the equity premium declining over the 
latter part of the 20th Century is mixed in the case of the UK and certainly the support 
for this hypothesis is not as strong as suggested by prior aggregate market studies 
(Jagannathan et al. (2001 ), Fama and French (2002)). Therefore from a UK corporate 
treasurer's perspective this suggests that the cost of equity capital might not have 
fallen over recent decades across UK industries. Thus, within many UK industries 
firms may not necessarily have benefitted from being able to raise equity funds more 
cheaply, as could be expected if there is a pervasive fall in equity premium across 
industries. 
Nevertheless, in some industries we find a discrepancy between equity premia 
estimates especially when the dividend measure is used to estimate expected equity 
premia. We therefore investigate the cause of this finding. Was the average stock 
return since 1966 above (or below) investors' expectations because of either a) 
expectations of higher (lower) growth rates in the future or b) a decline (rise) in the 
48 See Chapter 4.1 for a fuller discussion of these points. 
50 GP, = (p,- P,-1)/ Pt-1 
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discount rate. We include all industries in these investigations since industries which 
had approximately similar equity premia estimates can act as controls. 
Industry panel results indicate both medium term dividend growth and 
earnings growth are highly predictable in the time-series. In particular, the 
consumption-fundamental ratio is the most important regressor underpinning findings 
of predictability. Forecasts of dividend and earnings growth from these models for the 
both one and five year horizons provide mixed evidence as to whether or not a change 
in expectations of future earnings growth can explain the remaining inconsistencies in 
our equity premia results. 
At the industry level structural break tests indicate, firstly there have been 
multiple regimes for the valuation ratios over 1966-2002 and secondly the net impact 
of these multiple regimes depends on which measure of fundamental-price is 
examined. For earnings-price ratios the net impact has been marginal for most 
industries, whereas for dividend-price ratios the net impact has been a marked decline. 
Importantly, our evidence demonstrates that findings of a permanent decline in the 
aggregate market ratio of fundamental-price offered by studies of US and UK 
(Carlson et al. (2002), Vivian (2005)) during the 1990s does not translate well to 
industry earnings-price data. This finding casts doubt on aspersions that findings from 
previous studies were driven by a change in expected return since if the risk factor 
was systematic then this change should be felt across industry groupings. 
Nevertheless we do find common breaks in the industry valuation ratios, but these are 
not necessarily downwards as found in previous studies. The first major break, in fact, 
is upwards in 1973 just prior to the first OPEC Oil Crisis and is uniform across 
industries. A second major break is found in almost all industries during the early 
1980s, which can again be linked to underlying economic conditions. These findings 
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of common structural breaks, are suggestive that there was a systematic economic risk 
factor at work that affected expected returns in all industries. 
The structural break results provide key new insights into the time-series 
variation in the equity premium. The empirical results suggest that there were 
movements in the UK expected equity premium during the 1970s and the 1980s as 
these were periods where almost all industries experienced shifts in valuation ratio. 
However, the structural break results also question whether there was any change in 
the expected equity premium during the 1990s (contrary to the US findings of Lettau 
et al. (2006). This is because during the 1990s only a small number of industries' 
valuation ratios experienced a regime change, whereas if there were a change in the 
equity premium one would expect almost all industries to be affected. Finally, 
structural break tests re-inforce the results from average equity premium estimates. 
Over the full sample period there is evidence for the majority of industries of 
substantive falls in the mean of the dividend-price ratio but there is limited evidence 
of falls for the earnings-price ratio. Hence the results are mixed, evidence from 
dividend-price ratio suggests a fall in equity premium whereas earnings-price 
evidence is more consistent with there being no change in equity premium. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE EXPECTED SIZE PREMIUM: 
1966-2002 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter we extend our previous analyses of the expected UK equity 
premium in an important direction to examine the "the premier stock market anomaly 
-the striking outperformance of smaller companies" (Dimson and Marsh (1999) p54). 
Our main research questions are important and hitherto appear to receive little 
attention in the literature. Are historical equity premia earnt by size portfolios 
expected? Is the the size premium itself expected? This Chapter examines if the 
historical performance of size sorted portfolios is consistent with the expected equity 
premium implied by fundamentals. Is it simply the case that the returns earnt by small 
companies are commensurate with them achieving superior underlying performance 
in terms of dividend growth or earnings growth than large corporations? 
Our examination of the relationship between the historical premia and the 
fundamental performance of size portfolios is an avenue that has not previously been 
explored in the literature. Consequently, it promises to shed new light upon the size 
"anomaly" and deepen our understanding of the phenomena. If small firms have 
stronger fundamental growth than large firms then this could be an important first step 
towards explaining why on average small firms earn higher returns than large firms. 
In Chapter 3 we discovered evidence suggesting that a decline in the UK 
market equity premium (rm-rf) occurred during the latter part of the 20th Century. This 
thesis extends the analysis further and novelly to examine the equity premium 
amongst different sub-sets of the aggregate market. We intend to determine how 
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widespread this decline in equity premium actually is. In the current chapter, we 
conduct an analysis across portfolios formed on the basis of market capitalisation. If a 
decline in equity premia is apparent across the full range of firm size portfolios, this 
would also give us an indication as to whether or not the market equity premium 
decline was due to a systematic economic risk factor. This is because if there was a 
decline in equity premium then we would expect all firms regardless of size to be 
affected. 
Whether or not the historical equity premium eamt by firms of different sizes 
is approximately equal to that which could be expected is of importance to various 
stakeholders. Firstly, the equity premium is a key determinant of a company's cost of 
equity capital. Thus from corporate financial management perspective then this study 
would be of use to those seeking to determine their cost of capital by observing the 
equity premium eamt by firms with similar size or size-value characteristics. 
However, if the historical equity premium mis-measures or is a poor guide to the 
expected equity premium then corporate managers could make sub-optimal financing 
decisions. For instance, if manager's made financing decisions based upon historical 
data that overestimated the cost of equity capital then ceteris paribus they would 
choose to use more debt financing for new investment projects. Secondly, from an 
asset allocation point of view it is of importance to ascertain whether past equity 
premia eamt by firms (of various sizes) could be expected or not. For instance if good 
past performance of small firms could be expected then asset allocation could be tilted 
towards such firms, however, if in contrast the good past performance of small firms 
could not be expected then an adjustment to asset allocation wouldn't be justified. 
Thus far the literature on the equity premium focuses upon the market index 
and neglects to examine the cross-sectional implications if a fall in the market equity 
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premium were to occur (with the notable exception of Chapter 4 of this thesis). If the 
equity premium declines, as the empirical analysis of the aggregate market in Chapter 
3 implies, then this should impact all firms at a common time. We empirically 
investigate if this is the case for UK size and size-value sorted portfolios. 
The main finding is that the very largest firms drive the fall in UK aggregate 
market valuation ratios during the 1990s. Given that firms in the smallest four 
quintiles do not experience shifts in valuation ratios during the 1990s, we question 
whether the move in UK market valuation ratios during the 1990s is really caused by 
a change in risk. Our results suggest the consumption risk explanation of Lettau et al. 
(2006) doesn't travel well. 
However, by examining size portfolios, this Chapter also enables one of the 
most infamous stock market anomalies, the size premium, to be examined. The size 
premium, the return differential between small and large firms is a puzzle in its own 
right and has been referred to as such since its discovery by Banz (1981 ). This is 
because the size premium is a persistent pattern in stock returns that appears 
inconsistent with existing financial theory. Although Fama and French (1993, 1996) 
purport size to be an economic risk factor (in their three factor model), little empirical 
evidence has yet emerged as to what precisely this economic factor might be. 
As Haugen (1995) mentions, "In the course of the last 10 years, financial 
economists have been struggling to explain ... the huge, predictable premiums in the 
cross-section of equity returns." 
In this Chapter we thus have the additional goal also of discovering if the 
seeming decline in the expected equity premium during recent decades has been 
accompanied by a similar decline in the expected size premium. This would be of 
particular importance since recent studies of the cross-section of returns find size to 
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play a vital role in explaining share performance and in combination with book-to-
market ratio can explain as much, if not more, of cross-sectional returns than the 
market portfolio itself (Fama and French (1993)). 
Has the size premium declined over recent years? This issue, of whether the 
return differential between small and large firms is time-varying has received some 
attention in the prior literature. Specifically in the US, Horowitz et al. (2000) find the 
size premium disappeared after its discovery in 1981, whilst Dimson and Marsh 
(1999) contend that the size premium went into reverse following its discovery in both 
the US and UK. Dimson and Marsh's post-discovery sample for the UK (1989-1997) 
is rather short covering just 9 years and hence we propose it is both legitimate and 
necessary to re-visit their propositions in light of a longer dataset that encompasses 
more recent market behaviour especially the adverse trading conditions of the new 
millennia. We are also able to extend prior research to examine if a change in size 
premia was expected. While a change in the size premium is interesting in its own 
right, it also potentially has important implications for the equity risk premium itself. 
Specifically if there is a shift in the size premium then this could be symptomatic of a 
change in the expected equity risk premium. This is an issue we examine in Section 
5.4.2. 
5.2 MODEL AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
In this section we first outline the models used in this chapter, we then proceed 
to describe the data utilised in this study before assessing the statistical properties of 
this data. Finally we examine in detail the methodologies utilised in this chapter. 
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5.2.1 MODEL 
In finance, the return in any time period, is given by equation 5.1. The simple 
proportion return (R1) is the dividend paid (d1) during that time period plus the change 
stock price (p1-p1_1) during that time period expres_sed as a proportion of the previous 
periods asset price (p1_1) either as a decimal or percentage. 
Simple Return Equation 
(38) Rr = (dr + Pr- Pr-1)/ Pr-1 
Rt = dt / Pr-1 + (p,- Pr-1 )/ Pr-1 
In (38) we can separate the proportional return (R1) into two distinct parts. The 
first part is the dividend yield (d1 I Pr-1 ) which is the dividend paid during the current 
time period t divided by the original asset price at time t-1. The second is the 
proportional capital gain (p1 - Pt-1 I Pr-J ) given by the change in price between time t-1 
and t divided by the original asset price. 
This chapter focuses upon the expected equity premium following the 
approach of Fama and French (2002) to derive estimates of average stock returns. In 
their average return model, the average stock return (R1) is simply the average 
dividend yield (d1 I Pt-J) plus the average growth of prices (GP1). 
Average Return Model 
(39) A(~)= A(d,/ p1_1)+A(GE:) 
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Equation 39 shows the average return model, where A ( ) is the arithmetic 
average, d1 is real dividend payments during the current time period t, Pr-J is the price 
index at the previous time period t-1 and d1 I Pt-I is the dividend yield. GP/0 is the 
proportional capital gain in timet as defined in equation 5.1. 
If the dividend-price ratio (d1 I p1) has a constant mean then over extended 
periods of time the proportional change in prices must be matched by an almost 
equivalent proportional change in dividends. Since a constant mean is one condition 
that stationary variables must satisfy, it follows that if we have a stationary dividend-
price series then dividend growth will give us an estimate of the expected growth of 
the share price. Consequently, we can obtain estimates from fundamentals of expected 
capital gains. 
Similar intuition applies to any other variable that is in a long-term stable 
relationship with prices. Another possible and suitable candidate variable is earnings. 
As long as the earnings-price ratio has a constant mean then share price growth can be 
estimated using earnings growth, providing us with an alternative estimate of 
expected capital gains from underlying financial performance. 
Dividend Growth Model 
(40) 
The Fama-French Dividend Growth Model is defined in equation 40 with the 
return of the dividend model (RDr) being given by the average dividend yield (d1 lp1_1) 
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plus the average dividend growth rate (GD1). For a full description of the derivation of 
the dividend growth model see Chapter 3.2.1. 
Earnings Growth Model 
(41) 
The earnings growth model is given by equation 41 where the return of the 
earnings growth model (RY,) is defined as the average dividend yield (d,! p1_1) plus the 
earnings growth rate (GY1). For a full description of the derivation of the earnings 
growth model see Chapter 4.2.2. 
These models are derived using a minimal number of assumptions. The main 
assumption made is simply that the ratio of dividends to price or earnings to price 
respectively is stationary. In such circumstances dividend growth or earnings growth 
will provide an approximation of capital gains. Even if the series are not stationary, 
Fama and French (2002) claim the approach can still be employed provided the 
weaker condition that the series is mean-reverting or mean-reverting during each 
regime. They make the case that one can rationally expect there to be different 
regimes in the valuation ratios, primarily brought about because of permanent or 
highly persistent changes in factors determining asset prices. For example, if investors 
believed growth of fundamentals to have permanently increased then prices would 
rationally shift upward perhaps causing the appearance of a non-stationary section in 
the dividend-price and earnings-price ratio. Therefore, as long as valuation ratios 
exhibit mean-reversion during regimes it is posited that dividend growth and earnings 
growth will provide reasonable approximations of capital gains and the models 
developed by Fama and French can be employed. 
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Actually, when there are price shifts caused by rational factors Fama and 
French (2002) suggest that fundamentals are a superior way to estimate expected 
equity returns. Since, in the preceding example the increase in the growth rate was 
unexpected, investors' returns would be inflated due to the equity price rise which 
was due to good look in terms of favourable economic news. 
This, however, poses a considerable challenge for the researcher to 
demonstrate that their use of the models in the place of any non-stationarities in the 
data is justified on the basis of rational price adjustment to unanticipated factors. If 
movements in valuation ratios were caused primarily by factors other than rational 
price adjustment, such as market optimism or mis-pricing then the Fama-French 
model will be inappropriate and yield defective results. Hence in section II.3 we 
address these issues in detail not only conducting unit-root tests on the base series but 
also analysing the impact of adjusting these series for the impact of outliers to 
establish when the valuation ratios are stationary and during which periods they are 
non-stationary. 
5.2.2 DATA DESCRIPTION 
Our data for this chapter is drawn from the same set of firms as in chapter 4 
which studied the industry equity premium. However, in this chapter we analyse the 
data in terms of size and size-value sorted portfolios rather than based upon industry 
classifications. For a full description of the basic data sample used see Chapter 4.2.1. 
To review our sample comprises all UK non-financials (in the Datastream 
database) trading on the LSE at any time between 1966-2002. Firms from financial 
industries are discarded, in ·line with similar studies, due to them having much greater 
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scope for earnings management than 'real' economy firms. The sample includes 
delisted companies as well as those still trading. A total of 2,925 firms are included in 
the sample, of which 1 ,920 had delisted and 1 ,005 were still trading. For each of these 
firms, we collected price, dividend-price, price-earnings and market capitalisation 
data from the Datastream database. Importantly, our dataset is free from the survivor 
bias in many quoted indices. 
Horowitz et al. (2000) found that if firms with market capitalisation below 
$5m are removed from the sample then over recent years the size premium has largely 
disappeared. Moreover, the majority of the extant literature finds that the size 
premium is largely concentrated in the very smallest equities. In order to re-examine 
if the UK size premium has disappeared, or even reversed (as suggested by Dimson 
and Marsh (1999)) we exclude the very smallest firms, those with market 
capitalisations below £5m (real 2002 £'s) from our sample. We can report without 
showing the details here that if these smallest firms are included then the results are 
more in favour of a positive size premium, in line with the prior literature. By 
excluding firms with market capitalisation below £5m we provide ourselves with the 
best opportunity of discovering a disappearing or reversing size premium. If we were 
to find a positive size premium is evident even after the very smallest firms are 
removed this simply strengthens the case of the existence of a positive size premium. 
We use two separate methods to divide the firms into portfolios. Firstly, we 
used a one-way sort on market capitalisation to divide firms into five quintile 
portfolios based upon their market capitalisation at the end of the preceding year t-1 
for the purposes of analysis during year t. We also calculate a size premium measure 
from the one way sort as the difference between the smallest and largest quintile 
portfolios (Q5-Q1). 
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Secondly, we conducted a two-way independent sort on firm size and value 
following Fama and French (1993). We divide firms into two size categories, small 
and big, using the median firm size at the end of period t-1 as the breakpoint. All 
firms are then independently sorted on the value measure and divided into three value 
categories, low, medium and high, with breakpoints at the 30th and 701h percentile. 
This prc;>vides six portfolios: small-low (SL), small-medium (SM), small-high (SH), 
big-low (BL), big-medium (BM) and big-high (BH). We use these portfolios to 
calculate the small minus big (SMB) portfolio in the same manner as Fama and 
French (1993): 
((SL+SM +SH)/3)-((BL+BM +BH)/3) (42) 
For our value metric, unfortunately, we are not able to follow Fama and 
French (1993) who use the book-to-market ratio since Datastream currently only has 
very limited coverage of the book-to-market ratio; specifically book-to-market is not 
available from Datastream for any UK firms prior to 1980 and even for the first 
decade 1980-1990, it appears to cover only a limited sub-set of firms quoted on 
Datastream. However, two other variables which have also been extensively used as 
· value indicators in the literature, namely the earnings-price and dividend-price ratio 
are available for our whole sample period. In this chapter we report the results using 
the earnings-price ratio as the value indicator, although we can report without 
showing the details here that the use of dividend-price as the value indicator has very 
little influence upon our results. 
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TABLE 5.1: FIRM COUNT 
Ful.lSample Sub- ~.mpl e h;eraEfs 
Portfolio i 1Lvet<tEf Ivlin I\llax 1966-1978 1979-1990 1991-2002 
Size (;}uintiles 16354 51 233 110.00 179.65 205 20 
SL 86.41 18 158 49.23 112.00 101 D8 
BL 141 D8 55 218 106.62 143.92 17558 
SM 185.68 72 270 117.77 201.33 24358 
BM 118 JJ3 49 177 89.85 135.00 13158 
SH 107.77 64 152 97.73 109.83 10950 
BH 11996 38 186 69.88 136.33 157.83 
Table 5.1 provides descriptive statistics on the numbers of firms within each 
size quintile and two way sorted size-value portfolio during the sample period. Of 
course on average each size quintile has the same number of firms and so just a single 
figure is reported in the table. For the full sample, on average there are approximately 
164 firms in each size quintile. However, the number of LSE listed non-financial 
firms on Datastream appears to have increased over time. Over 1966-1978 on average 
there were 110 firms in each size quintile rising to 179.65 for 1979-1990 and reaching 
205.20 for 1991-2002. This reflects the relatively limited coverage of firms by 
Datastream prior to the early 1970s. 
For the size-value sorted portfolios there is also a tendency for the number of 
firms to increase after the 1966-1978 period. In fact, for almost all portfolios the 
minimum number of firms is during 1966-1978. We see that there is a cross 
relationship between size and value. This relationship is most apparent amongst the 
low value firms, for which there are a disproportionately low number of small firms; 
on average there are 86.41 firms in SL portfolio but 141.08 in BL portfolio. If there 
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were no correlation between size and value these numbers would be equal51 . 
However, we also find that there are a disproportionately large number of small firms 
in the middle value category during all periods and generally a slightly smaller 
number of small firms in the high value group. Thus although there does seem to be a 
relationship between size and value amongst UK non-financials, the relationship 
appears to be neither linear nor monotonic. 
Annually rebalanced value-weighted price, earnings-price, dividend-price, 
earnings and dividends were then calculated for all portfolios, using the same method 
as in section 2.1 of chapter 4. To be included in the sample each firm must have been 
trading for at least four quarters to be included in the sample for the next year. The 
series we calculate are a portfolio concept and relate to the firms in that portfolio 
during the current year t. The weight attributed to each firm is based on the previous 
year end market capitalisation as a proportion of the relevant portfolio total 
capitalisation. We stress that the earnings attributed to the portfolios during year t are 
those which have been reported to the market during year t. Consequently the growth 
measures used in this study refer to the earnings of portfolio z in timet relative to the 
earnings of portfolio z in time t-1. And analogously for dividend growth, we calculate 
the total dividends accruing to portfolio z in time t relative to the total dividends of 
portfolio z in time t-1. 
UK data on the consumer price index and three-month treasury bill rate were 
gathered from the IMF' s International Financial Statistics database. Consumption data 
on individual series for non-durables and for services were taken from the UK Office 
for National Statistics (ONS) and these series were combined to form our measure of 
consumer expenditure. Similarly to the previous empirical chapters, we examine the 
51 In other words of the 30% firms with lowest earnings-price ratios, approximately two-thirds of these 
are larger than median market value (Big) and about one-third littler than median market value (Small). 
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data in real terms throughout since we believe economic agents are primarily 
concerned about the purchasing power of their income, although our ~ethodology is 
equally applicable to nominal values. 
5.2.3 UNIT ROOT TESTS 
Stationarity, in so much as the relevant valuation ratios having a constant 
mean is a central issue for our dividend growth and earnings growth models, as 
outlined in Chapter 5.2.1. These models are based upon the assumption that the ratio 
of fundamental to price having a constant mean in order for dividend growth or 
earnings growth to give accurate estimates of the capital gain of the share index. 
Although, Fama and French (2002) forcefully assert that their method is robust to 
reasonable forms of non-stationarity. More generally, stationarity is an important 
issue since it is a pre-requisite for OLS regression analysis to be reliably conducted. 
5.2.3.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF UNIT ROOT TESTS: 1966-2002 
For the dividend-price ratio, Table 5.2 panel A indicates that the four largest 
quintiles dividend-price ratios are stationary. However, the smallest quintile (Q5) has 
a non-stationary dividend-price ratio. The quintile size premium (Q5-Ql) dividend 
price ratio is also non-stationary. However, these apparent non-stationarities could be 
caused by shifts in the means of the variables, quite possibly this could be caused by 
changes in payout policy. We'll proceed with our analysis and carefully interpret the 
results relating to these· portfolios. 
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The dividend-price ratios for the two-way sorted size-value portfolios are all 
found to be stationary apart from the small size, low value firms (SL). However, SL 
firms are perhaps the most likely to adopt a zero-dividend policy since these are firms 
with high growth opportunities and potential to expand and thus the most likely to 
retain all earnings within the firm. However, the two size premium measures here also 
have stationary dividend-price ratios and thus the analysis of these can proceed 
normally. 
For the earnings-price ratio we find that all five size quintiles are stationary. 
However, the smallest quintile (Q5) is only stationary at the 10% significance level. 
Similarly, the quintile size premium (Q5-Q1) earnings price ratio is also stationary at 
the 10% significance level. Given the notoriously poor size and power properties of 
the ADF tests we proceed as ordinary with the empirical work for these portfolios 
The earnings-price ratios of the two-way sorted size-value portfolios are all 
found to have stationary earnings price ratios. The SMB earnings-price ratio is also 
stationary, however the 1 WSMB earnings-price ratio just fails to reject the null of 
non-stationarity at the 10% level. This will be borne in mind in the interpretation of 
the subsequent analysis. 
To clarify, we produce estimates of the equity premia even if the relevant 
valuation ratios are found to be non-stationary since the models employed are, "robust 
to reasonable non-stationarity of D/P1 and Y /P1." (Fama and French, 2002 p642) We 
also provide regression results for individual portfolio regressions even when a series 
is suspected to be non-stationary, the results of which are interpreted with care. 
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TABLE 5.2: UNIT ROOT TESTS ON SIZE PORTFOLIOS (1966-2002) 
Panel A: Augumented Dickey Fuller Tests on Dividend-price ratio and Constant 
p 
A (D./ P,) = 11 + OJ. ( D ,_,I P,_,) + L OJ ,A ( D 1-p I P,_,) + E, 
p=l 
Size Quintile Portfolios Test Test Stat Critical Value Decision Inference 
Ql ADF(O) -3.93 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Q2 ADF(O) -3.71 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Q3 ADF(O) -4.11 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Q4 ADF(O) -3.58 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Q5 ADF(O) -2.54 -2.96 Acceptho Non-stationary 
Q5-Ql ADF(O) -2.30 -2.96 Accept ho Non-stationary 
Size-Value Portfolios Test Test Stat Critical Value Decision Inference 
SL ADF (0) -2.32 -2.96 Acceptho Non-stationary 
BL ADF(O) -3.64 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
SM ADF(O) -3.35 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
BM ADF(O) -4.19 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
SH ADF(O) -4.17 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
BH ADF(O) -4.18 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
SMB ADF(O) -3.28 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
1S-B ADF(O) -3.12 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Panel B: Augumented Dickey Fuller Tests on Earnings-price ratio and Constant 
p 
A (Y, 1 P,) = 11 +OJ· (Y,_, 1 P,_,) + L OJ ,A (r,_, 1 P,_,) + e, 
p =I 
Size Quintile Portfolios Test Test Stat Critical Value Decision Inference 
Ql ADF(O) -3.60 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Q2 ADF(O) -3.61 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Q3 ADF(O) -3.47 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Q4 ADF(O) -3.29 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
Q5 ADF(O) -2.88 -2.96 Reject ho *Stationary 
Q5-Ql ADF(O) -2.82 -2.96 Reject ho *Stationary 
Size-Value Portfolios Test Test Stat Critical Value Decision Inference 
SL ADF(O) -3.06 -2.96 Reject h0 Stationary 
BL ADF(O) -3.29 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
SM ADF(O) -3.47 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
BM ADF(O) -3.74 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
SH ADF(O) -3.32 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
BH ADF(O) -3.77 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
SMB ADF(O) -3.96 -2.96 Reject ho Stationary 
IS-B ADF(O) -2.61 -2.96 Accept ho Non-stationary 
* Indicates inference of stationary at the 10% significance level 
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5.3 ANNUAL SIZE PORTFOLIO RETURNS 
5.3.1.1 SIZE PORTFOLIOS: ONE WAY SORT 
Our results find a strong positive equity premium in all portfolios over 1966-
2002. The equity premium is increasing as firm size decreases from 6.73% p.a. for the 
largest quintile (Q1) to 9.83% p.a. for Q3 to 14.21% for the smallest quintile (Q5), 
which amongst the size quintiles is monotonic. This is suggestive of a pervasive 
relationship between size and returns. Moreover, the size premium, as measured by 
the difference between Q5 and Q1 is 7.48% p.a., which is even larger than the equity 
premium for the largest firms (6.93% p.a.). An interesting feature of the results for 
other size portfolios is that the returns for Q2 and Q4 are much closer to Q3 indicating 
that it is really the quintile of largest firms alone that have particularly low returns and 
the quintile of smallest firms that have exceptionally high returns. This can be 
illustrated by the fact the Q4-Q2 return premium is less than 1.5% p.a., whilst the Q5-
Q1 return premium is almost 7.5% p.a. 
In terms of the expected equity premium over 1966-2002, this is also found to 
be positive for all size quintiles and a positive size premium is found. Expected 
returns increase monotonically across size quintiles. However the estimated expected 
returns especially by the dividend growth method and also, if to a lesser degree, by the 
earnings growth approach are smaller than the historical average return. For the 
largest firms Q 1 the dividend growth equity premium estimate is 3.11 %, the earnings 
growth equity premium estimate is 4.66% and the historical premium was 6.73%. 
Thus the expected premium was more than 2% less than the historical premia if 
calculated by the earnings growth model and more than 3.5% less than the historical 
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premia if calculated by the dividend growth model. The scale of this discrepancy 
between historical and expected equity premia generally decrease as size declines for 
the earnings growth model but generally increase as size falls for the dividend growth 
model. Therefore, for smallest quintile (Q5), the equity premia estimates are 9.49% 
for the dividend growth model, 12.79% for the earnings growth model and 14.21% for 
the historical average model. However, there is consensus amongst the three differing 
methods that a considerable size premium existed over 1966-2002 and the magnitudes 
of this premium are fairly similar. The historical average size premium was 7.48% 
p.a., whilst that implied by dividend growth was 6.38% and that implied by earnings 
growth was 8.12%. 
5.3.1.2 IMPACT OF 1974 STOCK MARKET CRASH 
There was a stock market crash in 1974, which reversed almost entirely the 
following year. Such a substantial decline, followed by a rapid rise could have inflated 
our average historical returns since these are based on the arithmetic average. We use 
the same method to neutralise the impact of this as in our empirical analysis of 
industry portfolios in Chapter 4. We refer readers to section 4.3 of Chapter 4 for a 
fuller explanation. Intuitively, the impact of such a temporary inverse spike in stock 
prices upon our results can be simply illustrated. Assume there were a 50% fall in 
stock prices during 1974 followed by a 100% rise in 1975 would leave prices in 
December 1975 the same as in December 1973. However, the arithmetic average 
would give an average capital gain of 25% p.a. over the two years. Consequently, 
such extreme movements in share prices can bias upwards the arithmetic average. 
This bias could be large, in the example above it would be in excess of 1% p.a. even 
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when averaged over the whole sample period. If we neutralise the impact of this shock 
to share prices, do our equity premia estimates align themselves more closely? 
Similar to our results in Chapter 4 relating to the industry equity premium, we 
also find for size portfolios that the estimated values of historical returns are 
substantially affected and biased upwards by the 1974 market crash. The impact of the 
market turbulence of 1974-5 seems to be most acutely felt by the larger stocks. The 
adjustment reduces the largest quintile (Q1) historical average premia from 6.73% to 
5.25%, a difference of 1.48% and the second largest from 9.24% to 7.36%, a change 
of approaching 2%. Whereas for the smallest stocks (Q5) the premia falls less than a 
percent from 14.21% to 13.28% and for the second smallest quintile (Q4) by slightly 
more than one percent from 10.65% to 9.38%. These results imply a further difficulty 
for economic explanations of the size premium, namely they imply that returns of 
large stocks were affected more than small stocks by this extreme adverse market 
movement. That is, during this financial market crash then large companies are more 
sensitive to its impact than small companies. Asset pricing theory would suggest a 
size premium could be justified if small stocks performed worse than large stocks 
during bad times. If one defines a stock market fall as a bad time, then according to 
this theory clearly small firms should be more sensitive to it than large firms. Our 
empirical evidence, however, points completely to the contrary. 
We find estimates of expected returns via dividends or earnings are only 
marginally affected, if at all by the 1974 market crash. In fact, none of the expected 
equity premia estimates are affected by more than 0.1 %. This supports Fama and 
French's (2002) assertion that dividends and earnings can provide more precise 
estimates of expected returns since they are relatively insensitive to the extreme 
market movements during 1974-1975. 
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TABLE 5.3: ONE-WAY SIZE SORTED PORTFOLIO ESTIMATES OF 
FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH RATES AND VALUATION RATIOS 
P.;;ne1 A: 195tS-2002 
S auple h\( 
Q1 1966-2))2 7CG"% 
Q2 1966-2))2 7JJ3'/., 
0::!3 1966-2))2 7.CG"/.:. 
Q4 1966-2))2 7Cl1% 
QS. 1966-2))2 7.rJ3Wo 
Q5-Q1 1966-2JJ2 O.CO>.<. 
P arel B 1956-2002 spik: a:ljust 
Ql 
Q3 
Q4 
QS. 
Q5-Q1 
Sanp1e hU: 
1966-2))2 7.ffi% 
1966-2))2 7.CG"/., 
1966-2))2 7.CG"/o 
1966-2))2 
1966-2))2 
1966-2))2 (I ((r:~;; 
Panel C: 1956-1984 spik: aijust 
Sanple ill£ 
Q 1 1966-1984 9 .76',1:, 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
QS 
Q5-Ql 
1966-1984 
1966-1984 
1966-1984 
1966-1984 
9.7&/;, 
9 76'/o 
9.7t..'o//o 
9.76'/., 
1966-1984 occw;. 
Pan~! D: 1988.1998 
Sanple 
Ql 1989-1998 
ill£ 
·4.33',1;; 
4.:3'3::1~~ 
4.33'/(. 
4.Y..1% 
433% 
Q2 1989-1998 
Q3 1989-1998 
Q4 1989-1998 
QS. 1989-1998 
QS·Ql 1989-1998 O.CO% 
Panel E 1935-2J02 
Ql 
Q2 
Q3 
Q4 
Q.S 
Q5-Ql 
San-ple ill£ 
1985-2))2 3:=3'/(. 
1985-2))2 3.ffi:~··(, 
198.: ... 2))2 3.23% 
198.:>-2))2 3.C$(,; 
1922...2))2 3.ffi'..<;, 
1985-2C02 1}(1)>;:, 
F, 
1.61% 
1.61% 
1.61% 
1.61% 
1.61% 
F. 
1.61% 
1.61% 
1.61 ~;;; 
1.61% 
1.61% 
F. 
-Cl j)o/.; 
-0:0% 
-0.:0'>..<, 
-0:0% 
-Cl:O% 
I}(IJ% 
F, 
3./'S% 
3.78~/~ 
3./'8"/(. 
3.iS% 
3.~r.; 
F, 
3.92~1~, 
3.fJZ/~ 
3.92'% 
3.92% 
3.92'/o 
O.CO% 
DY, 
4.5:U 
5.0W. 
5.34% 
5.64% 
5.59% 
1.04% 
DY, 
4.5.f.'(. 
5.00% 
5.34% 
5.64% 
5.59'/.:. 
1.04% 
DY. 
5.21%. 
5.91~1., 
62e'<. 
671~·· 
70'M ..
4.39% 
4.4ctr.; 
3.97% 
DY, 
3.9SP.;;:, 
4.3~;;;, 
4.44% 
3nr.; 
For variable descriptions see notes to Table 3.3. 
DJP, 
4.18"'/., 
4.55% 
4.86*,.-;; 
5.10% 
4.8-r/..; 
069% 
DJI\ 
4.18'?:; 
4.5.5'% 
4.86% 
5.10% 
4.87% 
0.69'1(. 
DJP, 
4.75% 
5.27% 
5.52% 
5.96%, 
604'% 
DJP, 
3.79% 
409% 
4.35.% 
444%; 
3.90% 
DJP, 
3.60% 
3.77}~~ 
4.11% 
4.17% 
3.5.8"'/(. 
-0.01~;;:, 
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Y /P, DJY, GD, 
7.37% 5.8.72% 0.17% 
7.ffi% 5.9.45% 1.54% 
8.0+% 6227% 2.28% 
8.47% 61 94% 2.2J% 
8.01% 62 23% 5..5.0% 
YIP. 
7.37% 
7.ffi% 
8.0+% 
8.47% 
8.01% 
0.63% 
YiP, 
8.::::2% 
8.Yl-% 
8.20%. 
9.Il% 
9.18% 
0.95% 
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TABLE 5.4: ONE-WAY SORTED SIZE PORTFOLIO ESTIMATES OF 
EQUITY RETURNS AND EQUITY PREMIA (1966-2002) 
Panel A: 1966-2002 
Portfolio Sample RDt RYt Rt RXDt RXYt RXt RXt-RXDt RXt-RXYt 
Q1 1966-2004 4.71% 6.27% 8.34% 3.11% 4.66% 6.73% 3.63% 2.07% 
Q2 1966-2004 6.54% 8.76% 10.85% 4.93% 7.15% 9.24% 4.31% 2.09% 
Q3 1966-2004 7.62% 9.79% 11.44% 6.01% 8.19% 9.83% 3.82% 1.65% 
Q4 1966-2004 7.83% 10.70% 12.25% 6.23% 9.10% 10.65% 4.42% 1.55% 
Q5 1966-2004 11.10% 14.39% 15.82% 9.49% 12.79% 14.21% 4.72% 1.42% 
Q5-Ql 1966-2004 6.38% 8.12% 7.48% 6.38% 8.12% 7.48% 1.09% -0.65% 
Panel B: 1966-2002 Spike adjusted 
Portfolio Sample RDt RYt Rt RXDt RXYt RXt RXt-RXDt RXt-RXYt 
Q1 1966-2004 4.71% 6.25% 6.86% 3.10% 4.65% 5.25% 2.15% 0.60% 
Q2 1966-2004 6.51% 8.73% 8.96% 4.91% 7.12% 7.36% 2.45% 0.23% 
Q3 1966-2004 7.62% 9.75% 9.96% 6.01% 8.14% 8.35% 2.34% 0.21% 
Q4 1966-2004 7.83% 10.67% 10.98% 6.22% 9.06% 9.38% 3.15% 0.31% 
Q5 1966-2004 11.07% 14.37% 14.88% 9.46% 12.76% 13.28% 3.81% 0.52% 
Q5-Q1 1966-2004 6.36% 8.11% 8.03% 6.36% 8.11% 8.03% 1.67% -0.09% 
Panel C: 1966-1984 Spike adjusted 
Portfolio Sample ROt RYt Rt RXDt RXYt RXt RXt-RXDt RXt-RXYt 
Q1 1966-2004 4.15% 7.21% 6.81% 4.65% 7.71% 7.32% 2.66% -0.39% 
Q2 1966-2004 6.81% 8.35% 10.24% 7.31% 8.85% 10.74% 3.43% 1.89% 
Q3 1966-2004 9.02% 11.02% 11.75% 9.53% 11.53% 12.25% 2.72% 0.73% 
Q4 1966-2004 9.31% 11.59% 12.39% 9.82% 12.10% 12.89% 3.07% 0.80% 
Q5 1966-2004 14.15% 16.91% 16.84% 14.65% 17.41% 17.34% 2.69% -0.07% 
Q5-Q1 1966-2004 10.00% 9.71% 10.02% 10.00% 9.71% 10.02% 0.02% 0.32% 
Panel D: 1985-2002 
Portfolio Sample RDt RYt Rt RXDt RXYt RXt RXt-RXDt RXt-RXYt 
Q1 1966-2004 5.31% 5.26% 6.92% 1.39% 1.34% 3.00% 1.61% 1.65% 
Q2 1966-2004 6.16% 9.08% 7.57% 2.24% 5.17% 3.65% 1.42% -1.51% 
Q3 1966-2004 6.07% 8.34% 8.00% 2.15% 4.42% 4.08% 1.94% .{).34% 
Q4 1966-2004 6.20% 9.63% 9.43% 2.28% 5.71% 5.52% 3.23% .{).19% 
Q5 1966-2004 7.73% 11.60% 12.74% 3.81% 7.68% 8.82% 5.01% 1.14% 
Q5-Ql 1966-2004 2.42% 6.34% 5.82% 2.42% 6.34% 5.82% 3.40% -0.51% 
Panel E: 1989-1998 
Portfolio Sample RDt RYt Rt RXDt RXYt RXt RXt-RXDt RXt-RXYt 
Ql 1966-2004 7.59% 5.05% 10.78% 3.81% 1.27% 7.00% 3.20% 5.73% 
Q2 1966-2004 7.64% 6.63% 5.44% 3.87% 2.85% 1.66% -2.20% -1.19% 
Q3 1966-2004 6.35% 5.86% 3.78% 2.57% 2.09% 0.00% -2.57% -2.09% 
Q4 1966-2004 6.15% 4.05% 2.87% 2.37% 0.27% -0.91% -3.28% -1.18% 
Q5 1966-2004 7.04% 7.15% 4.86% 3.26% 3.37% 1.08% -2.18% -2.29% 
Q5-QI 1966-2004 -0.55% 2.10% -5.93% -0.55% 2.10% -5.93% -5.38% -8.02% 
For variable descriptions see notes to Table 3.3. 
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The net result is that the divergence between equity premia estimates narrows 
considerably after the impact of the 1974 market crash is neutralised. In fact, Panel B 
Table 5.4 indicates the expected equity premia from the earnings growth model and 
the historical average premia are quite close to one another for the full sample period. 
For instance, for the smallest firms it is 0.52% p.a. whilst the largest discrepancy for 
any of the size quintiles is for the largest firms is a modest 0.60% p.a. Consequently, 
the divergence between these models estimate of the size premium is just 0.08%, the 
historical premia is 8.03% and the earnings growth premia is 8.11 %. 
However, the dividend growth estimate of equity premia is still considerably 
below that of the other methods. For the size premium it implies a value of 6.36%, 
more than 150 basis points below that given by the other methods. For the size 
quintiles the discrepancy between the dividend growth model estimates and the actual 
returns are substantial across all size quintiles. Dividend growth implies a premia of 
3.10% for the largest firms (Q1) rising to 6.01% for the median quintile (Q3) and is 
9.46% for the smallest firms (Q5). However, the discrepancies between these 
estimates and the historical premia are 2.15%, 2.34% and 3.81% respectively. Thus 
the tendency is for this discrepancy in the estimates to increase in absolute terms as 
size decreases. 
An important factor behind these findings is likely to be the growth of share 
repurchases in the UK which has been particularly evident since 1995. However, this 
data on precise firm-level share repurchases is not readily available and hence we are 
unable to include this in our analysis. If firms have been substituting dividends for 
share repurchases, as indeed it appears they have, then this would bias downwards the 
dividend growth rates and thus potentially explain why the dividend growth model 
estimates are substantially below those of the other models. It is also plausible that the 
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reason why the disparity is largest for the smallest stocks is perhaps that these have 
particularly prompt and expeditious in their use of share repurchases. Although 
another trend apparent in both the UK (Ap Gwilym et al. (2004)) and US (DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo and Skinner (2004)) is that of dividend concentration, whereby larger firms 
have tended to increase the amount of dividends they payout relative to earnings, 
whereas the reverse trend appears true of smaller firms. 
It is possible that this is because there has been a shift in expected returns or 
expected fundamental growth. However, a shift in expected returns seems less likely 
given the earnings growth model, our alternative method for estimating expected 
equity premia, provides estimates consistent with the historical returns. However, we 
should also bear in mind that the earnings growth estimates are likely to be an upper 
limit on the equity premium that could be expected. This is because earnings can be 
managed, and the tendency for earnings management appears to have increased 
during our sample period (Berenson (2004)). We examine in more detail if there 
appear to be shifts in expected returns using structural break tests on valuation ratios 
in Chapter 5.4.2. 
5.3.1.3 PRE-DISCOVERY PERIOD: 1966-1984 (INCLUDING IMPACT 
OF MARKEl' CRASH) 
The historical real equity premia for 1966-1984 is above that for the whole 
sample period across all size quintiles. A similar pattern is found in the expected 
equity premia implied by dividend growth and earnings growth and is apparent across 
all size quintiles. For instance for the largest firms (Ql) the equity premia for 1966-
1984 is 7.3'2%, 7.71% and 4.65% according to the historical average, earnings growth 
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and dividend growth methods respectively compared to 5.25%, 4.65% and 3.10% for 
the whole 1966-2002 sample. Similarly for the smallest firms (Q5) the premia for 
historical average, earnings growth and dividend growth were 17.34%, 17.41%, · 
14.65% over 1966-1984 but for 1966-2002 were 13.28%, 12.76% and 9.46%. 
However, the differences between equity returns (which exclude the risk-free 
rate) were actually much closer. In fact, it seems that most of the difference between 
the two periods equity premia results can be attributed to performance of the average 
risk-free rate over the two periods considered, rather than the return earnt by equities. 
The risk-free rate, proxied for by the three-month treasury bill was actually negative 
in real terms over 1966-1984 averaging -0.50%, whilst over the whole sample period 
it was 1.61 %. Consequently this can account for 2.11% of the difference in equity 
premia figures. If we simply compare the returns earnt by the size portfolios which 
ignores the risk-free rate, then we can examine if substantial discrepancies remain 
after this is accounted for. This reveals that for the largest firms (Ql) the returns earnt 
by all three measures are fairly similar for 1966-1984 and for 1966-2002. However, 
for the smaller quintiles from Q3 to Q5 there remains a substantial discrepancy 
between the return estimates for the different periods. This suggests for smaller firms 
there has been a change in the return characteristics between the two periods. 
Has there been any change in the size premium? For the one-way sorted 
portfolios we measure the size premium as the difference in return between the 
smallest and largest size quintiles. The size premium was, on average larger over 
1966:-1984 than 1966-2002, being 10.02%, 9.71 %, 10.00% according to historical 
average, earnings growth and dividend growth models in the earlier period and 8.03%, 
8.11% and 6.36% for the whole sample period. Thus it appears the size premium on 
average did decline from 1985. This issue is explored further in the next section. 
229 
5.3.1.4 POST-DISCOVERY PERIOD: 1985-2002 
We view 1985 onwards as the period after which the size premium had been 
discovered and documented in the literature, since this was when Mario Levis' article 
on the UK Size Premium was published in a leading practitioner journal. Furthermore, 
this is several years after the phenomenon was first discovered in the US by Banz 
(1981) and Reinganum (1981 ). However, for the UK, Dimson and Marsh (1999) 
suggest that this might not be the case, and advocate a starting date after the Hoare-
Govett smaller companies index was launched in 1987. Nevertheless, similar funds 
had been launched in the US several years earlier as well, famously the Dimensional 
Small Cap fund started in 1983. It seems rather unlikely that by 1985 UK investment 
professionals would be unaware of the 'size' anomaly. However, we do also discuss 
the results of Dimson and Marsh (1999) presenting new evidence and interpretation of 
their findings in Chapter 5.3.1.5. 
The equity premia estimates for 1985-2002 are much lower than for the earlier 
period 1966-1984, across all size quintiles (or deciles ). The historical average premia 
over 1985-2002 was 3% and 8.82% for the largest (Q1) and smallest (Q5) size 
quintiles respectively compared to 7.32% and 17.34% over 1966-1984. A similar 
pattern can be found for the expected equity, premia. The earnings growth model 
figures were 1.34% (7 .68%) for the largest (smallest) firms over 1985-2002 compared 
to 7.71% (17.41%) for 1966-1984. These results are qualitatively the same as for the 
dividend growth model which estimates 1.39% (4.65%) for the largest (smallest) 
firms over 1985-2002 compared to 3.81% (14.65%) for 1966-1984. These results add 
extra credence to the view that the equity premium has declined over recent years. 
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Although we find evidence that the equity premium has declined, the decline 
in equity returns is less pronounced. Since the risk-free rate has particularly low on 
average prior to 1984 and particularly high since 1985, then this is an important factor 
behind the fall in equity premia as suggested in 5.3.1.3. However equity returns 
themselves do appear to have fallen on average in all except the largest stocks (Q1). 
For the largest stocks the results suggest approximately similar returns during both 
periods. 
The estimates of the equity premia from dividend growth are again further 
from the historical average than those from earnings growth over 1985-2002; as we 
also found over the earlier period 1966-1984 and over the whole sample period. The 
largest discrepancy between the historical average and either the dividend growth or 
earnings growth model is found for the smallest firms. Particularly for the dividend 
model estimates this discrepancy seems to increase as firm size falls. For the smallest 
firms (Q5) the difference between dividend and historical average estimates exceeds 
5%, which is extremely large indeed. This is most likely due to recent changes in 
corporate payout policy. This finding is consistent with the work of DeAngelo et al. 
(2004) and Ap. Gwilym et al. (2004) who report that while a larger proportion of big 
companies are paying dividends, a lesser proportion of small firms are doing so. 
Payout ratios reported in Table 5.3 also support this view since prior to 1984 payout 
ratios were on average higher for smaller firms whereas since 1985 payout ratios have 
been about the same for firms in each size quintile.52 
However, our results for the size premium suggest that this also has fallen over 
the recent period by all three measures. The size premium according to the historical 
average was 5.82% over 1985-2002 but 10.02% over 1966-1984, by earnings growth 
52 Since 1985 all size quintiles have average dividend payout ratios of about 55%. Prior to 1984 the 
average is about 60% for the largest size quintile but almost 70% for the largest size quintile. 
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was 6.34% over 1985-2002 and for 1966-1984 was 9.71 %, whilst most striking is the 
decline by the dividend growth model which suggests it was only 2.42% over 1985-
2002 but 10.00% for 1966-1984. The size premium estimates for the earnings growth 
and historical return models are broadly similar, both being around 6% p.a. and are 
within 0.52% of each other. However, there is a substantial discrepancy between the 
dividend growth model estimate of the size premium and either the historical average 
or the earnings growth model estimates. In fact the dividend growth model estimate of 
2.42% is less than half that of either of the other models and almost 4% less than the 
historical average. As discussed in the previous section and as will be further 
discussed later in this chapter, we suggest the primary reason for this discrepancy is 
likely to be recent changes in corporate payout policy. 
Nevertheless, the finding that a size premium remains following its discovery 
is important and contrary to some prior research based on a shorter time span. Black 
(1993) claims that market 'anomalies' vanish after they're discovered, Horowitz et al. 
(2000) provided some US empirical evidence substantiating this view for the size 
'anomaly', whilst Dimson and Marsh (1999) suggested the size premium had actually 
gone into reverse in both the UK and the US following its discovery. Our results 
conflict with all these prior studies. We find a positive size premium is still very much 
in existence following its discovery, moreover our results suggest that a positive size 
premium can be expected and can be justified on the basis of the stronger relative 
growth of fundamentals in small companies compared to large companies. We 
suggest our use of a longer sample period provides a more reliable basis for analysis. 
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5.3.1.5 PERFORMANCE OF 1989-1998: COMPARISON WITH 
DIMSON AND MARSH (1999) 
Dimson and Marsh (1999) claimed that the size premium went into reverse 
following its discovery, both in the UK and the US. In their paper they propose a post-
discovery period from 1989 onwards until the end of their sample in 1997. In order to 
compare our data with theirs we examine the 10-year period from 1989-1998. This is 
the 10-year period during our sample that large firms most strongly outperform small 
firms (using quintiles and arithmetic annual averages); the size premium is -5.93%. In 
fact only the second, 1988-1997 is the other, over which large firms outperform small 
firms. Therefore we find in our sample that for this period specifically, the 10 years 
from the late-eighties to the late-nineties that large firms did outperform small. 
However, this seems to be merely an exception to the rule that small firms outperform 
large. 
Dimson and Marsh (1999) also found that such an outperformance of large 
firms could be supported by dividend growth. In this respect our results challenge 
theirs. We find that this reversal of the size premium was not expected nor can be 
justified by growth in fundamentals. In terms of dividend growth there seems to be 
very little variation in relative growth rates across the size quintiles. Specifically, the 
small firm quintile dividend premia was 3.26% only 0.55% below that of the largest 
quintile (3.81% ), which cannot explain nor justify a historical return differential of 
5.93% between the largest and smallest size quintiles. In terms of earnings growth 
there is variation across the quintiles however, this does not seem to conform to any 
particular trend. However, the earnings growth size premia for 1989-1998 was a 
positive if modest 2.10%, indicating the earnings profiles of small firms rose more 
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rapidly than those of large firms. This is stark contrast to the 5.93% discount indicated 
by the average return. In this case it is the large firms average return which appears to 
be the main cause of this discrepancy since it exceeds that implied by earnings growth 
by almost 6%. In contrast for the other quintiles (Q2-Q5) average returns are less than 
those implied by earnings growth for 1989-1998. 
Our three premia measures suggest three distinct conclusions about the size 
premia. The historical average indicates the actual size premium reversed being -
5.93% was economically substantially negative. Our fundamental measures suggest a 
more modest premium I discount, the dividend model indicates a negative if minimal 
discount of -0.55% while the earnings model suggests a modest size premium of 
2.10%. Therefore both the expected premia measures, dividend growth and earnings 
growth, point to the high levels of historical returns earnt by the largest firms not 
being supported by growth in fundamentals. This begs the question then, why did the 
largest firms enjoy such a high (relative) premium during this period? Is this 
phenomena anything other than a purely chance occurrence? We investigate these 
questions by examining structural breaks on the valuation ratios in chapter 5.4.2. 
5.3.2.1 TWO WAY SORTED SIZE-VALUE PORTFOLIOS: 
In this section we examine the size premium once value has been controlled 
for. This is an important control since there does appear to be a relationship between 
firm size and value. Specifically we find a tendency for size and earnings-price to be 
negatively correlated. This can be seen from the descriptive statistics pertaining to one 
way sorted size portfolios since the smaller quintiles tend to have higher earnings-
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price ratios on average for the whole sample period than the larger size quintiles. A 
similar pattern can be seen in the dividend-price ratios. These observations can be 
paralleled to the comments of Dimson, Nagel and Quigley (2003) who also report that 
size and value are negatively correlated in the UK. As discussed in the data and 
methodology section we use the earnings-price ratio as our measure of value, which is 
a commonly used measure of value in the extant literature. 
The Fama-French (1993) small minus big (SMB) portfolio is not directly 
comparable to our measures of the size premium from the one-way size sort. The 
Fama-French style size sort is dependent on whether the firm is in the largest 50% of 
the sample or the smallest 50%, whereas for the one-way sort we focussed upon the 
difference between largest and smallest quintiles (20% of observations). Therefore in 
the interests of comparability for this section, we also report the results from a purely 
one-way sort on size defined as the smallest 50% - largest 50%, which should act to 
highlight the impact that controlling for value has upon our equity premia estimates. 
This one-way sorted small minus big portfolio is referred to as 1 WSMB. 
5.3.2.2 FULL SAMPLE PERIOD 1966-2002 
Our results find a strong positive equity premium in all size/value sorted 
portfolios over 1966-2002. The equity premium monotonically increases with 
earnings-price groupings. The equity premium is always larger for the smaller firms 
relative to the large firms when value is held constant. For instance, the small size-low 
earnings-price portfolio (SL) historical average premia of 8.14% p.a. while the large 
size-low earnings-price portfolio (BL) earns 4.54% p.a. As one would expect given 
235 
the extensive literature on the properties of size and value returns, the small size-high 
earnings-price portfolio earns the highest historical premia of all, 13.40%. The second 
highest return is earnt by the large size-high earnings-price portfolio, which is 
11.11%. This is further evidence suggestive that the relationship between size and 
returns is pervasive, in this case to controlling for value. 
Moreover, the historical size premium measured by SMB, is 3.41 %, which is 
considerably smaller, less than half the 7.48% size premium measured as the 
difference between the extreme quintile portfolios (Q5-Ql). However, since the size 
breakpoints are in different positions for the two portfolios these figures, cannot 
actually be directly compared. In fact, the single sort premium on size using the FF 
breakpoints is 3.97% (for 1 WSMB), indicating that only a small portion of the overall 
size premium, 0.56%, can be attributed to the differing value characteristics of the 
portfolios. In other words the overwhelming majority of the single size-sort size 
premium seems due to the difference in size between the portfolios, rather than simply 
be explained away be the tendency of small firms to have higher earnings-price ratios. 
In terms of the expected size premium over 1966-2002, this also tends to be 
positive once value is controlled for. For the earnings growth measure of the equity 
premia this is positive across value categories. Overall the SMB size premium 
according to this measure is 2.82%, which is of similar magnitude to the 3.41% 
historical average premium. However the earnings growth expected equity premia 
between small and large firms varies to a degree across value categories. The 
premium for the highest earnings-price ratios firms is 2.01 %, but is higher for the 
medium value firms being 3.76% and is 2.68% for the lowest earnings-price ratio 
firms. Overall the earnings growth SMB premium of 2.82% is smaller than the 4.22% 
expected premium of 1 WSMB which fails to account for differences in value . 
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TABLE 5.5: TWO-WAY SIZE SORTED PORTFOLIO ESTIMATES OF 
FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH RATES AND VALUATION RATIOS (1966-2002) 
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TABLE 5.6: TWO-WAY SORTED SIZE PORTFOLIO ESTIMATES OF 
FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH RATES AND VALUATION RATIOS (1966-2002) 
Panel A: Equity Return and Equity Premia Estimates 1966-2002 
Sample ROt RYt Rt 
S/L 1966-2002 3.44% 7.74% 9.75% 
BIL 1966-2002 5.12% 5.05% 6.14% 
SIM 1966-2002 7.76% 10.71% 12.53% 
B/M 1966-2002 5.28% 6.94% 8.21% 
S/H 1966-2002 11.30% 13.55% 15.01% 
B/H 1966-2002 9.82% 11.54% 12.71% 
SMB 
1S-B 
1966-2002 0. 76% 
1966-2002 3.19% 
2.82% 
4.22% 
3.41% 
3.97% 
Panel B: Equity Return and Equity Premia Estimates 1966-2002 spike adjust 
RXDt 
1.83% 
3.51% 
6.15% 
3.67% 
9.70% 
8.21% 
0.76% 
3.19% 
RXYt 
6.13% 
3.45% 
9.10% 
5.34% 
11.94% 
9.93% 
2.82% 
4.22% 
RXt 
8.14% 
4.54% 
10.92% 
6.60% 
13.40% 
11.11% 
3.41% 
3.97% 
Sample RDt RYt Rt RXDt RXYt 
6.12% 
3.44% 
9.10% 
5.26% 
11.80% 
9.92% 
RXt 
7.41% 
3.23% 
9.74% 
5.28% 
11.92% 
9.33% 
SIL 1966-2002 3.43% 7.73% 9.02% 1.83% 
BIL 1966-2002 5.12% 5.05% 4.84% 3.51% 
SIM 1966-2002 7.76% 10.71% 11.34% 6.15% 
B/M 1966-2002 5.25% 6.86% 6.89% 3.65% 
S/H 1966-2002 11.28% 13.40% 13.53% 9.68% 
B/H 1966-2002 9.81% 11.53% 10.94% 8.21% 
SMB 
IS-B 
1966-2002 0.53% 
1966-2002 3.05% 
Panel C: 1966-1984 spike adjust 
Sample RDt 
5.47% 
3.14% 
9.99% 
4.22% 
12.55% 
9.06% 
S/L I 966-1984 
B/L 
SIM 
B/M 
S/H 
B/H 
SMB 
IS-B 
Panel D: 1989-1998 
S/L 
BIL 
SIM 
B/M 
S/H 
B/H 
SMB 
IS-B 
Panel E: 1985-2002 
S/L 
B/L 
SIM 
B/M 
S/H 
B/H 
SMB 
IS-B 
1966-1984 
1966-1984 
1966-1984 
1966-1984 
1966-1984 
1966-1984 3.52% 
1966-1984 4.55% 
Sample RD( 
1989-1998 3.71% 
1989-1998 14.33% 
1989-1998 5.47% 
1989-1998 8.71% 
1989-1998 5.41% 
1989-1998 11.75% 
1989-1998 -6.73% 
1989-1998 -1.61% 
Sample RDt 
1985-2002 1.26% 
1985-2002 7.20% 
1985-2002 5.32% 
1985-2002 6.33% 
1985-2002 9.86% 
1985-2002 10.59% 
1985-2002 -2.56% 
1985-2002 1.37% 
2.57% 
4.05% 
RYt 
9.47% 
3.34% 
10.80% 
6.96% 
15.26% 
12.74% 
3.82% 
3.63% 
RYt 
1.87% 
7.96% 
5.85% 
7.07% 
3.62% 
9.22% 
-4.30% 
-0.07% 
RYt 
5.87% 
6.86% 
10.52% 
6.76% 
11.35% 
10.22% 
1.30% 
4.40% 
3.51% 
4.16% 
Rt 
9.54% 
5.66% 
12.47% 
6.88% 
15.16% 
10.88% 
4.24% 
4.97% 
Rt 
3.08% 
11.33% 
3.85% 
10.31% 
2.46% 
6.73% 
-6.33% 
-7.12% 
Rt 
8.45% 
3.96% 
10.08% 
6.89% 
11.71% 
10.98% 
2.80% 
3.20% 
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0.53% 
3.05% 
RXDt 
5.97% 
3.64% 
10.50% 
4.72% 
13.05% 
9.56% 
3.52% 
4.55% 
2.57% 
4.05% 
RXYt 
9.98% 
3.84% 
11.31% 
7.46% 
15.76% 
13.25% 
3.82% 
3.63% 
3.51% 
4.16% 
RXt 
10.04% 
6.17% 
12.97% 
7.38% 
15.67% 
11.38% 
4.24% 
4.97% 
RXDt RXYt RXt 
-0.07% -1.91% -0.70% 
10.55% 4.18% 7.55% 
1.70% 2.07% 0.07% 
4.93% 3.30% 6.53% 
1.63% -0.15% -1.32% 
7.97% 5.44% 2.96% 
-6.73% 
-1.61% 
RXDt 
-2.66% 
3.29% 
1.40% 
2.41% 
5.94% 
6.67% 
-2.56% 
1.37% 
-4.30% 
-0.07% 
RXYt 
1.95% 
2.94% 
6.61% 
2.84% 
7.43% 
6.30% 
1.30% 
4.40% 
-6.33% 
-7.12% 
RXt 
4.53% 
0.05% 
6.16% 
2.97% 
7.79% 
7.06% 
2.80% 
3.20% 
RXt- RXDt RXt- RXYt 
6.31% 2.01% 
1.02% 1.09% 
4.77% 1.82% 
2.93% 1.26% 
3.71% 1.46% 
2.89% 1.17% 
2.65% 
0.78% 
0.59% 
-0.25% 
RXt- RXDt RXt- RXYt 
5.59% 1.29% 
-0.28% -0.21% 
3.59% 0.64% 
1.64% 0.02% 
2.24% 0.13% 
1.12% -0.59% 
2.98% 
1.11% 
0.94% 
0.10% 
RXt- RXDt RXt- RXYt 
4.07% 0.06% 
2.52% 2.32% 
2.47% 1.66% 
2.65% -0.08% 
2.62% -0.10% 
1.82% -1.87% 
0.72% 
0.42% 
0.42% 
1.33% 
RXt- RXDt RXt- RXYt 
-0.63% 1.22% 
-3.00% 
-1.63% 
1.60% 
-2.95% 
-5.02% 
0.41% 
-5.51% 
3.37% 
-2.00% 
3.23% 
,1.16% 
-2.48% 
-2.02% 
-7.05% 
RXt- RXDt RXt- RXYt 
7.19% 2.58% 
-3.24% -2.89% 
4.76% -0.45% 
0.56% 0.14% 
1.85% 0.36% 
0.39% 0.76% 
5.36% 
1.84% 
1.50% 
-1.19% 
In terms of the dividend growth measure of the SMB expected equity premia 
this is positive overall, but of small magnitude being just 0.76%. The dividend model 
results suggest that once value is controlled for overall then the size premium 
becomes much smaller, since by the SMB method it is 0.76% compared to the 3.19% 
implied by 1WSMB. However, this doesn't provide a full overview of what is found 
across the value groupings, since the difference between small and large firm 
performance appears dependent upon the value classification of the portfolio. 
In actual fact the expected size premium varies even more when measured 
using dividend growth than when earnings growth was used once value is controlled 
for. For high earnings-price firms the size premium is expected to be 1.51 %, whilst 
for medium earnings-price firms it is 2.58%. However, for the lowest earnings-price 
firms it is negative being -1.68%, thus amongst glamour stocks large corporations 
actually have higher expected premia than small firms. Therefore although expected 
SMB size premium appears much smaller by the dividend measure (only 0.76%), a 
more detailed examination of the data across value groupings suggests that the 
performance of big and small companies varied substantially over 1966-2002. 
Why do the patterns we find exist? What appears to be causing them? Why 
does the small-low portfolio have such a low dividend model equity premia relative to 
the much higher values found by the earnings model and the historical average model. 
We now tum to look at the impact of the 1974 market crash on the results and then a 
more detailed sub-period analysis. 
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5.3.2.3 IMPACT OF 1974 STOCK MARKET CRASH 
As mentioned in the previous section relating to the one-way sort on size, the 
1974 stock market crash has the potential to substantially impact upon our results. We 
therefore examine if the main trends found in the previous section are robust to the 
neutralisation of this crash in the current section using the same method to correct for 
this as in our second empirical chapter for industry groupings. Similar to our results in 
the Chapter 4, we also find for size portfolios that the estimated values of historical 
returns are substantially affected and biased upwards by the 1974 market crash. 
Table 5.6 Panel C demonstrates the adjustment increases the SMB historical 
average premium from 3.41% to 3.51 %; this is only a marginal change in the size 
premium after the 1974 crash is adjusted for. This finding doesn't appear to be driven 
by the value sort, since the 1WSMB premium also rises marginally by 0.19%, from 
3.97% to 4.16%. These results are contrary to those find according to the one-way 
size premium between the extreme quintiles (Q5-Q1), which suggested the size 
premium fell after the 1974 crash was adjusted for. Consequently these results for the 
SMB and 1 WSMB portfolios are more favourable towards the hypothesis that small 
firms are more sensitive to market crashes than large firms and such an economic 
explanation for the size premium. However, overall, given both sets of results, we find 
mixed evidence that the size premium could be a premium for the higher risk of 
holding small firms if there is an extreme movement in the market. 
The expected estimates of the equity premia are also affected by the crash. 
However, they are also only marginally affected, but in contrast to the historical 
average estimates these estimates of the size premium fall rather than increase. The 
expected SMB earnings growth premia falls from 2.82% to 2.57% and from 0.76% to 
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0.53% for SMB dividend growth premia. Slightly smaller drops are found for the 
1 WSMB premia from 4.22% to 4.05% for earnings growth whilst for dividend growth 
the fall was from 3.19% to 3.05%. Consequently in terms of fundamentals it appears 
that large firms are more affected than small companies when there is a large adverse 
stock market shock. 
The net impact of these results on the difference between SMB equity premia 
estimates is that they increase from 0.59% to 0.94% between the historical average 
and earnings growth method and also increase from 2.65% to 2.98% between the 
historical average and dividend growth method. For 1 WSMB equity premia there is 
also an increase for the dividend growth method from 0.78% to 1.11 %. However, 
1WSMB earnings growth premia the discrepancy changes from -0.25% to 0.10% and 
so the absolute difference between the estimates actually falls. Thus for the overview 
of size premia it appears that these generally increase once the 1974 crash is removed. 
Is this also true of the individual portfolios? 
In actuality the reverse is true for the 6 size-value portfolios. When the 1974 
crash is neutralised then for each portfolio, and whether by the earnings growth or 
dividend growth measure then the absolute discrepancy between the estimates falls. 
However, and importantly, the dividend growth measure remains a considerable 
distance from the historical average across almost all portfolios. Only for large firms 
with low earnings-price ratios is it within 1% of the historical average. In contrast the 
earnings growth model has a discrepancy greater than 1% for only one portfolio, the 
small-low earnings-price group. The earnings growth model estimates for the other 
portfolios are also close to the historical average. Consequently there is disagreement 
between our measures of expected returns as to whether or not the historical average 
was close to what could have been expected. As previously discussed an important 
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factor that could impact upon the dividend growth measure is the impact of recent 
changes in dividend payout policy. 
5.3.2.4 PRE-DISCOVERY PERIOD: 1966-1984 (INCLUDING IMPACT 
OF MARKET CRASH) 
Similarly to the results found from the one-way sort, the historical equity 
premia for 1966-1984 for each and every size-value portfolio is greater than the whole 
sample period value. Parallel results are found in the expected equity premia implied 
by dividend growth and earnings growth and is apparent across all size-value 
portfolios. For instance for the big-high portfolio the equity premia for 1966-1984 is 
9.56%, 13.25% and 11.38% according to the historical average, earnings growth and 
dividend growth methods respectively compared to 8.21 %, 9.92% and 9.33% for the 
whole 1966-2002 sample. Similarly for the small-high portfolio the premia for 
historical average, earnings growth and dividend growth were 13.05%, 15.76%, 
15.67% over 1966-1984 but for 1966-2002 were 9.68%, 11.80% and 11.92%. 
However, again paralleling the one-way sort results, the differences between 
equity returns (which exclude the risk-free rate) were actually much closer. In fact, it 
seems that most of the difference between the two periods equity premia results can 
be attributed to performance of the average risk-free rate over the two periods 
considered, rather than the return earnt by equities. The risk-free rate was negative in 
real terms over 1966-1984 averaging -0.50%, whilst over the whole sample period it 
was 1.61 %. Consequently this can account for 2.11% of the difference in equity 
premia figures. 
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Turning our attention to the scale of the size premium, the SMB size premium 
is, on average larger over 1966-1984 than 1966-2002 according to all three models. 
For 1966-1984 the size premium is 4.24%, 3.82%, 3.52% according to historical 
average, earnings growth and dividend growth models, whilst for the whole sample 
period the premium is 3.51 %, 2.57%, 0.53%. The 1 WSMB also tended to be larger 
over 1966-1984 than 1966-2002; it is 4.97%, 3.63%, 4.55% according to historical 
average, earnings growth and dividend growth models in the earlier period and 4.16%, 
4.05%, 3.05% for the whole sample period. Here the earnings-growth premia is larger 
for the earlier period than the latter period although the reverse is true of the other 
measures. Nevertheless, the 1 WSMB grouping suggests at best a marginally lower 
size premium for the whole sample period than 1966-1984. However, the two-way 
sort makes any decline in the size premium more pronounced. That is if value is 
controlled for then there does seem to have been a drop in the size premium that is 
somewhat obscured if just a one-way sort is used with the median size breakpoint. 
5.3.2.5 POST -DISCOVERY PERIOD: 1985-2002 
As discussed in the Chapter 5.3.1.4 we view 1985 onwards as the period after 
which the size premium had been discovered and documented in the literature. The 
equity premia estimates for 1985-2002 are much lower than for the earlier period 
1966-1984, across all size quintiles (or deciles ). The historical average premia for the 
big-high (BH), small-high (SH) portfolios were 7.79% and 7.06% over 1985-2002 
compared to 15.67% cmd 11.38% over 1966-1984. For the big-Iow (BL) and small-
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low (SL) portfolios the premia for 1985-2002 were 4.53% and 0.05% substantially 
less than the 10.04% and 6.17% earnt over 1966-1984. 
A similar pattern can be found for the expected equity premia. The earnings 
growth model figures were 7.43% (6.30%) for the BH (LH) firms over 1985-2002 are 
lower compared to 13.25% (15.76%) for 1966-1984. These results are qualitatively 
the same as for the dividend growth model which estimates 5.94% (6.67%) for the BH 
(LH) portfolio over 1985-2002 are also less than the 9.56% (13.05%) for 1966-1984. 
The earnings growth model figures were 2.94% (1.95%) for the BL (SL) firms over 
1985-2002 are lower when compared to 3.84% (9.98%) for 1966-1984. These results 
are qualitatively similar as for the dividend growth model which estimates 3.20% (-
2.66%) for the BL (SL) portfolio over 1985-2002 less than the 3.64% (5.97%) for 
1966-1984. These results add extra credence to the view that the equity premium has 
declined over recent years. 
The estimates of the equity premia from dividend growth are again further 
from the historical average than those from earnings growth over 1985-2002. As we 
also found over the earlier period 1966-1984 over the whole sample period. The 
largest discrepancy between the historical average and either the dividend growth or 
earnings growth model is found for the SL portfolio. More generally, the lowest 
earnings-price groupings the discrepancies are largest. Particularly for the dividend 
model estimates this discrepancy seems to increase as the earnings-price ratio 
grouping falls. However, for the BL portfolio the difference is negative and 
substantial economically ( -3.24%) suggesting expected returns were appreciably 
above historical returns. Whereas for the SL portfolio the difference is positive and 
substantial economically (7 .19% ). There is also positive and of large magnitude 
(4.76%) for the small-medium value (SM) portfolio. As previously articulated, this is 
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most likely due to recent changes in corporate payout policy. These findings are 
consistent with the work of DeAngelo et al. (2004) who report that while a larger 
proportion of big companies are paying dividends, a lesser proportion of small firms 
are doing so. 
However, our results for the size premium suggest that this also has fallen over 
the recent period by all three measures. The SMB size premium according to the 
historical average was 2.80% over 1985-2002 but 4.24% over 1966-1984, by earnings 
growth 1.30% over 1985-2002 and for 1966-1984 3.82%, whilst most striking is the 
decline by the dividend growth model which suggests it was -2.56% over 1985-2002 
but 3.52% for 1966-1984. The size premium estimates for the earnings growth and 
historical return models are broadly similar for the earlier period, both being around 
4% p.a. and are within 0.42% of each other. There is a difference of 1.50% over 1985-
2002 though, but both suggest a substantial fall. However, there is a substantial 
discrepancy between the dividend growth model estimate of the size premium and 
either the historical average or the earnings growth model estimates. While the other 
models suggest a modest positive premium, in fact the dividend growth model 
estimate is negative for 1985-2002 -2.56% which is more than 5% less than that 
implied by the historical average. A negative size premium, however, is something 
that has been advocated in the literature by Dimson and Marsh (1999) and something 
we shall return to in the next section. As discussed in the previous section and as will 
be further discussed later in this chapter, we suggest the primary reason for this 
discrepancy is likely to be recent changes in corporate payout policy. 
Our results for the one-way median break-point size premium also suggests 
that the historical average premium fell over the most recent period. The 1 WSMB size 
premium according to the historical average was 3.20% over 1985-2002 but 4.97% 
245 
over 1966-1984. However, the earnings growth premia estimate was 4.40% over 
1985-2002 and 3.63% for 1966-1984, thus this was actually slightly higher during the 
later period. There was a substantial decline in dividend growth model premia 
estimate from 4.55% over 1966-1984 to 1.37% over 1985-2002, however this 
remained positive for the latter period. 
The latter period, 1985-2002 appears to be when the divergences between the 
estimates occur. For the former period, 1966-1984 there seems to be a consensus 
amongst the estimates that the SMB size premium was 3.52-4.24% and the 1 WSMB 
premium was 3.63-4.97%. Particular once value is controlled for the (SMB) premium 
falls within a relatively narrow range. Over 1985-2002 there seems to be substantial 
discrepancies between the estimates. The historical premium by both methods was 
around 3%. However, the dividend growth model estimates were both substantially 
below this, for SMB the premia was negative to the tune of -2.56%. While the 
earnings growth model estimate for SMB is 1.50% below the historical equity premia 
for 1985-2002, its estimate for 1 WSMB is 1.20% above, therefore both appear to 
deviate some distance from the historical average, but is unclear as to what is most 
likely to be driving those findings. 
Here we find that the ex-post size premium remains positive following its 
discovery is important and contrary to some prior research based on a shorter time 
span. However, we do find the dividend growth model provides estimates of premia 
that are either negative or small for the post-discovery period as suggested by Dimson 
and Marsh (1999) and Black (1993) respectively. The question for the dividend model 
is are these results driven simply by arbitrary managerial decisions vis-a-vis payout 
policy or real underlying economic conditions. Our use of the earnings growth model, 
provides a suggestion that for the earnings model at least a positive, if perhaps 
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modest, size premium is implied for the latter period. Although, the magnitude of this 
is substantially smaller than 1966-1984 once value is controlled for. 
5.3.2.6 PERFORMANCE OF 1989-1998: COMPARISON WITH 
DIMSON AND MARSH (1999) 
Dimson and Marsh (1999) claimed that the size premium went into reverse 
following its discovery, both in the UK and the US. In their paper they propose a post-
. discovery period from 1989 onwards until the end of their sample in 1997. For 
comparability we examine the 10-year period from 1989-1998, which is the 10-year 
period that provides the strongest evidence in favour of their hypothesis. 
Similarly to our results from the one-way quintile sort on size we find that 
large firms did outperform small firms over the period 1989-1998 when the median 
break point is used. The historical average size premium was -6.33% by the SMB 
measure and -7.12% by the 1WSMB method. Therefore the margin by which large 
firms outperformed small during this 10-year period appears to be substantial 
economically since it is in excess of 6%. Furthermore, the impact of controlling for 
value on the historical average size premium appears slight, causing difference 
between size portfolio returns to be reduced by just 0.79%. 
From the one-way size-quintile sort in the previous section we found that this 
outperformance of large firms in terms of historical returns did not translate into 
outperformance in terms of fundamentals and the implied equity premia estimates. 
The results for the 1 WSMB expected size premium are in line with those conclusions 
since premia estimates are fairly close to zero being -0.07% and -1.61% respectively 
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for the earnings growth and dividend growth method. However, this view changes 
when value is controlled for. A SMB expected size premium is -4.30% and -6.73% for 
the earnings growth and dividend growth methods respectively. This suggests that 
once value is controlled for then the historical return during this ten-year period was 
essentially supported by fundamentals. The difference in returns between firms of 
similar value characteristics over 1989-1998 can be largely explained by the 
difference in growth rates of dividends and earnings. 
5.4 EXPLAINING UK EQUITY RETURNS 
5.4.1 WHAT CAUSES THE DISCREPANCIES WE FOUND IN UK 
EQUITY PREMIA? 
Our expected return models, particularly the dividend growth model, often 
produce estimates rather different from the historical average model. In this section 
we attempt to uncover what has caused these discrepancies. Our approach is based on 
the Campbell (1991) return decomposition, which posits that a deviation of actual 
returns from expectations can be caused by either: 
A) the expected future growth of fundamentals being unusually high. 
B) a decline in expected unconditional stock returns during the sample period. 
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5.4.1.1 ARE POST 2000 EXPECTED DIVIDEND AND EARNINGS 
GROWTH RATES UNUSUALLY IDGH? 
It has been argued we have entered a new economic era, which has enabled 
higher rates of economic growth to be attained. One claim is that the ever increasing 
pace of technological developments has facilitated more rapid productivity growth 
(Jagannathan et al, 2001). An alternative argument is that increasing globalisation as 
witnessed by growing moves towards a truly globally integrated economic system in 
which resources can be allocated more efficiently due to previous barriers being 
removed and in which companies are able to locate production internationally in order 
to minimise costs. A final assertion is that substantial declines in inflation during the 
latter part of the 20th Century in many developed economies has set the footing for 
more stable and higher economic growth in the future, economic policymak:ers have 
argued. These three factors have lead to hopes that higher levels of economic growth 
can be achieved and sustained long into the future. 
However, if higher future growth rates had not been anticipated or expected at 
the beginning of our sample period then this would lead to unexpected capital gains 
for those who invested in that portfolio. These unexpected capital . gains will be 
realised as the potential for extended periods of high economic growth became known 
to investors and incorporated into their expectations. We examine the predictability of 
the dividend growth rate and the earnings growth rate from variables known one year 
in advance in a similar manner as Fama-French (2002) and then proceed to examine if 
end of sample forecasts are different from the norm. 
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5.4.1.2 IN-SAMPLE PREDICTABILITY USING ALL POSSIBLE 
CANDIDATE VARIABLES 
Initially we include all the available variables which we believe could have 
predictability over future fundamental growth rates. We use: i) the dividend-price or 
earnings-price ratio, ii) the dividend-payout ratio and iii) the consumption-dividend or 
consumption-earnings ratio. These have all been documented in the literature to have 
explanatory power over future returns. Here we assess if they are able to predict future 
growth rates of earnings or dividends. We also include prior fundamental growth rates 
since it is quite conceivable the previous time-series data will contain information 
about the future series and particularly for dividends the case has been made that we 
should expect some persistence in the time-series. 
Table 5.7 reports the results of regression (43). Panel A indicates that for one-
year dividend growth that although most of the dependent variables predict dividend 
growth with the correct sign, relatively few are statistically significant. For example 
the dividend-price ratio has the correct sign in all but two of the regressions, however 
it is only statistically significant in 3 out of 14 cases. The exceptions seem to be for 
the consumption-dividend ratio, which is significant in 9 of 14 cases and lagged 
dividend growth, which is significant in 8 of 14 cases. Given that for most of the 
regressions R2 is above 0.2 and relatively few coefficients are individually significant, 
the classic symptoms of multicollinearity are apparent in Panel A. This suggests that a 
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more parsimonious specification might enable us to uncover the tme nature of the 
relationship between dividend growth and the individual variables. 
TABLE 5.7: FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH PREDICTABILITY WITH 
ALI. V ARIABI.ES 
Panel A: One-year Dividend Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample Constant R-bar 
Variable Period Dt-1/Yt-1 Dt-1/Pt-1 GDt-1 CDDT1_1 squared 
Q1 GDI 1966-2002 0.10 -0.06 -1.52 0.37 O.Ql 0.1204 
(0.94) (0.37) (1.64) (2.19) (1.69) 
Q2GD1 1966-2002 0.09 -0.12 -0.06 0.67 0.02 0.4110 
(0.99) (0.99) (0.08) (4.25) (5.45) 
Q3GD1 1966-2002 0.14 -0.13 -0.88 0.55 0.02 0.3290 
(1.55) (1.07) (1.88) (3.29) (3.74) 
Q4GD1 1966-2002 0.10 -0.17 0.43 0.61 0.02 0.3534 
(0.79) (1.04) (0.56) (3.57) (4.36) 
Q5GD1 1966-2002 0.05 -0.05 0.41 0.39 0.03 0.1544 
(0.43) (0.40) (0.34) (2.64) (3.02) 
QPREMGD1 1966-2002 -0.04 0.00 -1.24 0.05 0.00 -0.0533 
(1.31) (0.13) (0.46) (0.36) (1.81) 
SLGD1 1966-2002 0.07 -0.09 -0.10 0.11 0.00 -0.0306 
(0.54) (0.49) (0.07) (0.93) (1.49) 
BLGDI 1966-2002 0.27 -0.23 -3.33 -0.08 0.00 0.2048 
1.49 (0.97) (2.06) (0.49) (2.17) 
SMGDI 1966-2002 0.05 -0.02 -0.47 0.40 0.01 0.0730 
0.51 (0.14) (0.74) (2.40) (2.12) 
BMGD1 1966-2002 0.41 -0.32 -4.71 0.29 O.Ql 0.4284 
(3.44) (2.39) (4.80) (2.09) (2.63) 
SHGD1 1966-2002 0.21 -0.20 -1.08 0.37 0.02 0.2965 
(1.68) (1.16) (0.98) (2.67) (3.55) 
BHGD1 1966-2002 0.35 -0.32 -2.60 0.20 0.01 0.3152 
(2.75) (1.52) (2.88) (1.42) (2.42) 
SMBGD1 1966-2002 0.03 0.00 -4.72 0.15 0.00 0.0679 
(1.20) (0.19) (1.92) (0.82) (1.89) 
lWSMB GDI 1966-2002 -0.02 0.01 -0.10 0.20 0.01 0.0856 
( 1.21) (1.76) (0.05) ( 1.15) (2.71) 
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TABLE 5.7 (CONTINUED) 
Panel B: Five-year Dividend Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample R-bar 
Variable Period Constant D,_/Yt-1 D,_1/Pt-1 GD51_5 • CDDT1_1 squared 
Q1 GD51 1971-1998 0.00 0.02 -0.12 0.67 0.01 0.5213 
(0.02) (0.33) (0.27) (5.09) (8.24) 
Q2GD51 1971-1998 0.03 0.01 -0.34 0.35 0.01 0.6711 
(0.60) (0.16) (1.58) (1.97) (5.86) 
Q3 GD51 1971-1998 -0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.09 O.Ql 0.4814 
(1.07) (3.44) (0.14) (0.41) (2.85) 
Q4GD51 1971-1998 0.00 0.03 0.60 -0.56 0.01 0.7464 
(0.03) (0.85) (2.62) (1.71) (1.56) 
Q5 GD51 1971-1998 0.00 0.09 0.51 -0.34 0.01 0.6283 
(0.06) (2.22) (1.59) (1.53) (2.31) 
QPREM GD5 1971-1998 -0.04 0.01 -2.89 -0.26 0.00 0.1847 
(3.14) (1.25) (3.00) (1.37) (1.83) 
SLGD51 1971-1998 -0.02 0.05 0.26 -0.44 0.00 0.7751 
(1.29) (2.08) (0.48) (1.56) (2.26) 
BLGD51 1971-1998 0.07 -0.06 -0.41 0.43 0.00 0.6060 
(1.11) (0.68) (1.21) (3.44) (5.00) 
SMGD51 1971-1998 -0.07 0.14 0.27 -0.21 0.00 0.5285 
(2.35) (3.57) (1.05) (1.1 0) ( 1.30) 
BMGD51 1971-1998 0.03 -0.01 -0.55 0.18 0.01 0.5263 
(0.79) (0.10) (0.75) (1.57) (5.11) 
SHGD51 1971-1998 -0.02 0.12 0.19 -0.13 0.01 0.4441 
(0.64) (1.46) (0.68) (0.41) (1.35) 
BHGD51 1971-1998 0.00 0.05 0.20 -0.09 0.01 0.5118 
(0.06) (0.92) (0.61) (0.38) (3.52) 
SMB GD51 1971-1998 0.00 0.00 2.15 -0.01 0.00 0.2929 
(0.24) (1.56) (2.21) (0.05) (2.18) 
1WSMB 1971-1998 -0.01 0.00 1.18 -0.13 0.00 0.2444 
GD51 (0.91) (1.70) (1.13) (0.48) (2.29) 
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TABLE 5.7 (CONTINUED) 
Panel C: One-year Earnings Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample Constant R-bar 
Variable Period D,-tfYt-1 Yt-1/Pt-1 GY,_I CYDT1-1 squared 
Q1 GY1 1966-2002 0.20 -0.15 -1.20 0.15 0.02 0.1533 
(0.83) (0.48) ( 1.61) (1.16) (3.01) 
Q2GY1 1966-2002 0.35 -0.44 -0.78 0.42 0.02 0.3171 
(1.64) ( 1.48) (0.86) (2.98) (3.50) 
Q3GY1 1966-2002 0.15 -0.24 0.25 0.66 0.03 0.4100 
(0.82) (0.86) (0.24) (4.24) (3.21) 
Q4GY1 1966-2002 0.22 -0.27 -0.16 0.40 0.02 0.1928 
(1.04) (0.80) (0.11) (2.31) (1.93) 
Q5GY1 1966-2002 0.09 -0.03 -0.26 0.47 0.04 0.2312 
(0.46) (0.10) (0.16) (3.29) (1.79) 
QPREMGY1 1966-2002 -0.06 0.00 2.07 0.17 0.01 -0.0196 
(1.93) (0.15) (1.21) (0.90) (1.79) 
SLGY1 1966-2002 0.27 -0.39 0.51 0.32 0.02 0.2636 
(1.85) (1.88) (0.35) (1.88) (3.20) 
BLGY1 1966-2002 0.22 -0.10 -2.51 0.03 0.01 0.1451 
(0.73) (0.28) ( 1.85) (0.15) (2.61) 
SMGY, 1966-2002 0.14 -0.19 -0.04 0.69 0.03 0.4692 
(1.13) (0.86) (0.04) (5.43) (2.61) 
BMGY, 1966-2002 0.36 -0.28 -2.26 0.18 0.01 0.2368 
(1.70) (0.89) (3.42) (1.02) (2.76) 
SHGY1 1966-2002 -0.02 0.27 -0.89 0.36 0.02 0.1520 
(0.05) (0.55) (0.53) (1.55) (0.67) 
BHGY, 1966-2002 0.51 -0.51 -1.65 0.05 0.03 0.2581 
(2.18) (1.68) (2.03) (0.22) (2.64) 
SMBGY, 1966-2002 0.03 0.00 -7.51 0.18 -0.01 0.2209 
(1.24) (0.12) (4.05) (1.09) (1.34) 
1WSMB GY, 1966-2002 -0.01 0.02 0.57 0.50 0.02 0.2137 
(0.32) (2.40) (0.45) (2.67) (2.87) 
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TABLE 5.7 (CONTINUED) 
Panel 0: Five-year Earnings Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample R-bar 
Variable Period Constant Dt-INt-1 yt-1/Pt-1 GY51_5 CYDT1_1 squared 
Q1 GY5t 1971-1998 -0.03 0.10 0.02 0.02 O.Ql 0.6540 
(0.26) (0.56) ( 1.21) (0.23) (5.07) 
Q2 GY5t 1971-1998 0.01 0.08 -0.29 0.08 0.01 0.7653 
(0.11) (0.58) (1.34) (0.45) (5.15) 
Q3 GY5t 1971-1998 -0.05 0.21 -0.23 -0.06 0.01 0.6910 
(0.58) (1.35) (1.01) (0.42) (2.20) 
Q4 GY5t 1971-1998 -0.05 0.18 -0.02 0.04 0.01 0.7165 
(0.77) (1.68) (0.09) (0.15) (2.88) 
Q5 GY5t 1971-1998 -0.09 0.29 0.18 -0.19 O.QJ 0.6842 
(1.35) (3.12) (0.45) (1.05) (1.57) 
QPREMGY5 1971-1998 -0.10 0.00 1.13 -0.58 0.00 0.3942 
(8.09) (0.14) (1.78) (3.68) (1.08) 
SLGY5t 1971-1998 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.05 0.01 0.7732 
(0.81) (0.06) (0.32) (0.23) (3.43) 
BLGY5t 1971-1998 -0.09 0.27 -0.95 0.60 0.01 0.6916 
(1.36) (2.95) (2.93) (6.18) (6.56) 
SM GY5t 1971-1998 -0.15 0.32 -0.09 0.01 0.01 0.7663 
(1.93) (2.68) (0.31) (0.09) (2.00) 
BMGY5t 1971-1998 0.03 0.06 -0.44 -0.14 O.Ql 0.7175 
(0.22) (0.44) (1.02) (0.76) (3.54) 
SH GY5t 1971-1998 -0.22 0.53 -0.05 -0.13 0.00 0.5456 
(2.61) (3.03) (0.21) (0.75) (0.55) 
BH GY5t 1971-1998 0.02 0.02 0.18 -0.03 0.01 0.3973 
(0.90) (0.41) (1.19) (0.09) (1.95) 
SMB GY5t 1971-1998 0.03 0.00 -1.05 -0.52 0.00 0.3044 
(2.29) (1.60) (1.53) ( 1.84) (0.35) 
1WSMB 1971-1998 -0.04 0.01 -0.20 -0.53 0.00 0.5408 
GY51 (3.55) (2.67) (0.37) (2.11) (1.14) 
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When considering the five-year average dividend growth in Panel B of Table 
5. 7, there is also a suspicion that there is multicollinearity in the results. Although 
regression indicate an adjusted goodness of fit of above 50% in many cases, few of 
the coefficients are individually significant. The main variable which appears to be the 
most significant predictor of longer-term dividend growth is the consumption-
dividend ratio, being statistically different from zero and intuitively signed in 10 of 
the 14 regressions. There is also an increase in the incidents of perverse coefficient 
signs being found especially on the payout ratio and on the dividend-price ratio, 
which could suggest that perhaps suggests that the model over-fits the data and that a 
more carefully specified model might be preferable. 
Panel C of Table 5.7 presents evidence of predictability of single year earnings 
growth. Similar to one-year dividend growth with find that R2 is relatively high for 
most regressions, in general being above 0.2. The exception appears to be for the 
quintile size premium where the adjusted R 2 is negative. We also find some further 
evidence of individually significant variables. For example, 10 out of 14 
consumption-earnings ratios are statistically significant with the correct sign. 
However, a lot of the variables are insignificantly different from zero. The results for 
five-year earnings growth shown in Panel D indicates the goodness of fit is extremely 
high, being above 0.65 in 10 of 14 portfolios. Similar to previous results in this 
section, few individual coefficients are statistically significant. Although 9 of 14 
industries have statistically significant consumption-earnings ratios. Thus, this once 
more indicates a strong possibility of multicollinearity being present in the regression. 
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5.4.1.3 IN-SAMPLE PREDICTABILITY US:O:NG GENERAL-TO-
SPECIFIC APPROACH 
Given the regressions including all variables appear subject to 
multicollinearity, we sequentially removed the variable which appears least 
significant across all the regressions until we arrived at a specification where the 
majority of variables were significant. As mentioned in the previous section it appears 
that the ratio of consumption-fundamental is particularly important for predicting 
future fundamental growth. 
In table 5.8 panel A we report that consumption-dividend and prior dividend 
growth are the only variables important for predicting one-year ahead dividend 
growth for most portfolios. The consumption-dividend ratio is significant in all but 
two regressions. Nevertheless the adjusted R2 in general is slightly lower than the 
original specification including all variables. 
However, panel B illustrates that for predicting five-year dividend growth, the 
consumption-dividend ratio is the only variable that is significant for the majority of 
portfolios. However, it is significant for all portfolios and moreover it can predict a 
large portion of future variability in longer-term dividend growth since adjusted R2 is 
around 0.5 or higher for most portfolios. The adjusted R2's do appear in general to be 
slightly smaller than when all potential predictors were included in the regression 
equation. 
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TABLE 5.8: FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH PREDICTABILITY WITH 
PARSIMONIOUS MODELS 
Panel A: One-year Dividend Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample Constant R-bar 
Variable Period Dt-1/Yt-1 DrJPt-1 GDt-1 CDDT1_1 squared 
Ql GD1 1966-2002 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.1201 
(0.33) (2.59) (2.18) 
Q2GD1 1966-2002 O.Ql 0.68 O.Ql 0.4305 
(0.74) (4.78) (5.24) 
Q3GD1 1966-2002 O.Ql 0.62 0.02 0.3160 
(0.98) ( 4.58) (4.11) 
Q4GD1 1966-2002 0.01 0.64 0.01 0.3680 
(0.61) (4.60) (4.32) 
Q5GD1 1966-2002 0.04 0.39 0.02 0.2020 
(1.55) (2.97) (3.33) 
QPREM GD1 1966-2002 -0.05 0.06 0.00 0.0039 
(1.83) (0.40) (1.71) 
SLGD1 1966-2002 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.0200 
(0.08) ( 1.02) (1.51) 
BLGD1 1966-2002 0.02 -0.11 0.00 0.1982 
(0.62) (0.61) (2.39) 
SMGD1 1966-2002 0.02 0.42 O.Ql 0.1223 
(1.12) (2.60) (2.48) 
BMGD1 1966-2002 0.00 0.35 O.Ql 0.1854 
(0.20) (2.37) (3.99) 
SH GD1 1966-2002 0.02 0.52 0.02 0.2879 
(1.36) (3.85) (3 .17) 
BHGD1 1966-2002 0.03 0.27 0.02 0.2135 
(1.21) ( 1.92) (2.89) 
SMB GD1 1966-2002 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.0520 
(0.13) (0.70) (2.25) 
I WSMB GD1 1966-2002 -0.02 0.17 O.Ql 0.1164 
(0.98) (1.00) (2.79) 
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TABLE 5.8 (CONTINUED) 
Panel B: Five-year Dividend Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample R-bar 
Variable Period Constant D1-1/Y1-1 D1JP1-1 GD51_5 CDDT1_1 squared 
Q1 GD51 1971-1998 O.Dl 0.00 03376 
(1.00) (2.95) 
Q2GD51 1971-1998 0.03 0.01 0.6338 
(3.51) (7.44) 
Q3 GD51 1971-1998 0.03 0.01 0.4737 
(3.74) (834) 
Q4GD51 1971-1998 0.04 O.Dl 0.6364 
(4.92) (835) 
Q5 GD51 1971-1998 0.06 0.01 0.5038 
(6.73) (5.96) 
QPREM GD5 1971-1998 -0.05 0.00 0.1926 
(338) (2.27) 
SL GD51 1971-1998 0.02 0.00 0.6565 
(2.02) (6.91) 
BL GD51 1971-1998 0.03 0.00 0.4964 
(1.89) (4.95) 
SM GD51 1971-1998 0.04 0.01 0.4651 
(4.88) (934) 
BMGD51 1971-1998 O.Dl 0.00 0.5519 
(0.72) (7.20) 
SH GD51 1971-1998 0.05 O.Dl 0.4697 
(3.87) (4.77) 
BH GD51 1971-1998 0.04 O.Ql 0.5410 
(5.04) (8.21) 
SMB 0051 1971-1998 O.Dl 0.00 0.3808 
(0.54) (2.64) 
1WSMB 1971-1998 -0.02 0.00 03090 
GD51 (1.92) (3.99) 
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TABLE 5.8 (CONTINUED) 
Panel C: One-year Earnings Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample Constant R-bar 
Variable Period Dt-1/Yt-1 yt-1/Pt-1 GYt-1 CYDT1_1 squared 
Q1 GY1 1966-2002 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.1601 
(0.89) (1.42) (3.39) 
Q2GY1 1966-2002 0.02 0.51 0.02 0.3123 
(1.03) (3.66) (3.78) 
Q3GY1 1966-2002 0.02 0.66 0.02 0.4363 
(0.99) (4.67) (4.93) 
Q4GY1 1966-2002 0.03 0.44 0.02 0.2318 
(1.02) (3 .21) (3 .41) 
Q5GY1 1966-2002 0.05 0.49 0.04 0.2768 
(1.21) (3.24) (3.60) 
QPREM GY1 1966-2002 -0.06 0.14 0.02 0.0040 
(1.50) (0.76) (1.90) 
SLGY1 1966-2002 0.03 0.33 O.Ql 0.2627 
(0.87) (1.97) (2.64) 
BLGY1 1966-2002 0.02 0.08 O.Ql 0.1115 
(0.75) (0.38) (2.40) 
SMGY1 1966-2002 0.02 0.69 0.02 0.4943 
(0.89) (5.97) (4.57) 
BMGY1 1966-2002 0.02 0.25 0.01 0.1474 
(0.64) ( 1.44) (4.32) 
SH GYI 1966-2002 . 0.04 0.41 0.03 0.1810 
(1.36) (2.23) (2.88) 
BHGY1 1966-2002 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.2172 
(1.25) ( 1.16) (3.69) 
SMB GY1 1966-2002 0.02 0.18 -0.01 0.0030 
(0.71) ( 1.07) (1.36) 
IWSMB GY1 1966-2002 -0.01 0.39 0.02 0.1938 
(0.78) (2.09) (2.98) 
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TABLE 5.8 (CONTINUED) 
Panel D: Five-year Earnings Growth Predictability 
Dependent Sample R-bar 
Variable Period Constant DtjYt-1 YtJPt-1 GY5t-s CYDTt-l squared 
Q1 GY5t 1971-1998 0.03 O.Ql 0.6187 
(3.90) (10.32) 
Q2 GY5t 1971-1998 0.04 O.Ql 0.7699 
(4.61) (11.16) 
Q3 GY5t 1971-1998 0.06 0.02 0.7143 
(5.20) ( 12.42) 
Q4GY5t 1971-1998 0.06 0.02 0.7521 
(5.39) (8 .15) 
Q5 GY5t 1971-1998 0.10 0.03 0.6473 
(6.99) (6.68) 
QPREM GY5 1971-1998 -0.07 0.00 -0.0292 
(4.08) (0.25) 
SL GY5t 1971-1998 0.05 O.Ql 0.7745 
(4.94) (14.07) 
BL GY5t 1971-1998 0.03 0.00 0.3957 
(1.92) (4.77) 
SM GY5t 1971-1998 0.06 0.02 0.7667 
(6.26) (9.84) 
BM GY5t 1971-1998 0.02 O.Ql 0.6507 
(1.96) (5.95) 
SH GY5t 1971-1998 0.08 0.02 0.5581 
(4.15) (6.77) 
BH GY5t 1971-1998 0.05 0.01 0.4961 
(5.50) (5.13) 
SMB GY5t 1971-1998 0.02 -0.01 0.1093 
(1.51) (1.81) 
1WSMB 1971-1998 -0.03 O.Ql 0.3413 
GY5t (2.52) (6.42) 
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Panel C of Table 5.8 illustrates that consumption-earnings and prior earnings 
growth are the only variables important for one-year earnings growth predictability. 
The consumption-dividend ratio is significant in all but two regressions. Nevertheless 
the adjusted R2 in general is slightly lower than the original specification including all 
variables but apart from for the size premium portfolios is generally above 0.15. 
However, panel D illustrates that for predicting five-year earnings growth, the 
consumption-earnings ratio is the only variable that is significant for the majority of 
portfolios. However, it is significant for all portfolios and moreover it can predict a 
large portion of future variability in longer-term earnings growth since adjusted R2 is 
around 0.5 or higher for most portfolios. The adjusted R2's do appear in general to be 
slightly smaller than when all potential predictors were included in the regression 
equation. Furthermore, it should also be noted that the size premium portfolios are 
those which have the smallest proportion of variation that is predictable. 
5.4.1.4 FORECASTING FUTURE FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH 
The empirical evidence for fundamental growth predictability of size 
portfolios indicates that a large portion of future fundamental growth is predictable. 
However, the evidence on the preferred model specification is mixed. We find when 
all four variables are included in the model then relatively few coefficients are 
significant but the adjusted R2's are very high and in fact tend to be higher than for 
more parsimonious versions of the model. These findings are classic symptoms of 
multicollinearity. Table 5.9 provides average correlations between the predictor 
variable and illustrates that indeed some of the regressors are highly correlated. For 
example the de-trended consumption-earnings ratio is highly correlated with the 
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payout ratio and moderately correlated with earnings-price ratio and contemporaneous 
dividend growth. There are also moderate correlations between the de-trended 
consumption-dividend ratio and contemporaneous dividend growth as well as between 
the payout ratio and the earnings-price ratio. Hence it would appear that 
multicollinearity is present in the results reported in Section 5.4.1.2. 
TABLE 5.9 AVERAGE CORRELATIONS OF REGRESSORS 
Panei .~:.. A'Jetage Correlations of 5 Size (:!uinti1e pottfolios 
[\/Pt yt /Pt CJDt GYt L\1 Yt CDDT CYDT 
Cl/Pt 1.00 0.88 -0. 11 0.13 0.08 -0.12 -0.14 
Yt /Pt 0 88 1. 00 -0.01 0.01 -0.38 -0.17 
-0.47 
GDt -0.11 -0.01 1.00 -0.05 -0.22 -0.41 -0.44 
GYt 0.13 001 -0.05 1.00 0 19 OJ 0 0.09 
Dt I yt 0.08 -0.38 -0.22 0.19 1. 00 OJ 0 0.70 
CDDT -0.12 -0.17 -0.41 0.1 (I 0.10 1.00 0.69 
CYDT -0.14 -0.47 -0.44 0.09 070 0.69 1.00 
Panei B• A'.ot1age Ccnel.ations of 6 Size-\lalue portfolios 
Dt/Pt Yt /Pt CJD t GYt Dt / 1\ CDDT Cl.·TH 
[\/Pt 1.00 1}86 
-0.02 0.13 0.15 -0.17 
-0.10 
Yt /Pt 0.86 1. [II] 0.01 0.01 -0.34 -0.13 -0.42 
G[\ -0.02 0.01 1.00 -0 03 -0.05 -0.43 -1135 
GYt 013 0. 01 
-0.03 1 00 0. 18 0.08 0.09 
C~ I yt 0.15 -0.34 
-0.05 0.18 1. 00 -0.05 0.65 
CDQT -0.17 
-0.13 -0.43 0.08 -0.05 1.00 0.62 
CYDT -0.10 -0.42 -0.35 0.09 0 65 062 1 (II) 
However, the model where the majority of variables are significant generally 
has a noticeably poorer (adjusted) goodness of fit than the all-variable model. The 
issue relating to the parsimonious model is that it possibly suffers from variable 
omission bias, which could lead to biased coefficient estimates. Whereas, for the full-
variable model that seems to suffer from multicollinearity then at least in this situation 
the coefficient estimates are unbiased. Nevertheless given that both sets of predictive 
regressions are subject to econometric issues this weakens the evidence provided from 
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forecasts. It is therefore re-assuring that the results from both models are qualitatively 
very similar. We report the forecasting results from the full-variable model in the text 
since multicollinearity is a less serious problem than variable omission. We place 
results from the parsimonious model in appendix 5.1; the results from both models are 
similar and we discuss the major difference in the following text. 
Table 5.10 gives forecasted excess future fundamental growth rates, where 
they are measured as the forecasted fundamental growth minus the average growth 
rate. Hence a positive value indicates fundamental growth is expected to be above 
average in the future and thus is deemed to be an "optimistic" forecast. Conversely, 
we deem forecasts of fundamental growth below the historical average to be 
"pessimistic". 
Panel A of Table 5.10 indicates an optimistic forecast of one-year dividend 
growth for 2003 across all portfolios apart from the Big-High portfolio. Furthermore 
the average for 2001-2003 indicates that this trend has been apparent over recent years 
in almost all portfolios. The magnitude predicted for dividend growth is also large 
commonly being forecasted to be 5% or more higher than average. Nevertheless we 
should be somewhat cautious as to how we interpret these results as the accuracy of 
the forecasts might be somewhat suspect due to the recent changes in corporate 
dividend policy. 
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TABLE 5.10: FORECASTS OF FUNDAMENTAL GROWTH 
Panel A: 1-year Dividend Growth Forecasts including all variables 
2002 A v. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Q1 10.71% 6.26% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q2 18.50% 3.62% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q3 16.26% 5.33% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q4 9.13% -2.28% Optimistic Pessimistic 
Q5 7.94% 2.23% Optimistic Optimistic 
QEQPREM 7.20% 7.88% Optimistic Optimistic 
SL 26.75% 15.91% Optimistic Optimistic 
BL 6.46% 10.48% Optimistic Optimistic 
SM 16.85% 7.14% Optimistic Optimistic 
BM 12.61% 4.03% Optimistic Optimistic 
SH 4.33% 3.32% Optimistic Optimistic 
BH -2.68% -2.71% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
SMB 1.85% 2.05% Optimistic Optimistic 
1WSMB 9.56% 8.79% Optimistic Optimistic 
Panel B: 1-year Earnings Growth Forecasts including all variables 
2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Q1 16.71% 12.78% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q2 13.26% 4.72% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q3 17.90% 2.53% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q4 9.62% -0.31% Optimistic Pessimistic 
Q5 1.72% 0.02% Optimistic Optimistic 
QEQPREM 9.53% 8.42% Optimistic Optimistic 
SL 24.67% 12.24% Optimistic Optimistic 
BL 19.63% 25.72% Optimistic Optimistic 
SM 11.00% 2.57% Optimistic Optimistic 
BM 10.27% 3.64% Optimistic Optimistic 
SH 1.88% 0.76% Optimistic Optimistic 
BH -2.38% -3.40% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
SMB 10.38% 12.09% Optimistic Optimistic 
1WSMB 17.79% 13.21% Optimistic Optimistic 
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TABLE 5.10 (CONTINUED) 
Panel C: 5-year Dividend Growth Forecasts including all variables 
2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 Av. 2000-2002 
QI 7.71% 6.66% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q2 11.62% 7.69% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q3 8.77% 5.60% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q4 10.42% 2.35% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q5 5.89% 2.24% Optimistic Optimistic 
QEQPREM 4.91% 7.63% Optimistic Optimistic 
SL 23.87% 14.07% Optimistic Optimistic 
BL 4.42% 5.96% Optimistic Optimistic 
SM 3.61% 1.59% Optimistic Optimistic 
BM 11.34% 3.45% Optimistic Optimistic 
SH 3.56% 2.36% Optimistic Optimistic 
BH -2.23% -3.46% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
SMB 2.10% 1.13% Optimistic Optimistic 
IWSMB 3.76% 5.14% Optimistic Optimistic 
Panel D: 5-year Earnings Growth Forecasts including all variables 
2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Q1 9.26% 6.55% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q2 -1.29% -0.61% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
Q3 2.97% 2.37% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q4 0.66% -0.97% Optimistic Pessimistic 
Q5 -3.60% -3.41% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
QEQPREM -2.13% -3.27% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
SL 1.31% 0.62% Optimistic Optimistic 
BL 19.98% 17.71% Optimistic Optimistic 
SM -7.42% -4.64% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
BM 5.27% 1.66% Optimistic Optimistic 
SH -1.34% 0.07% Pessimistic Optimistic 
BH -1.70% -3.03% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
SMB ..Q.37% -1.90% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
IWSMB 7.07% 4.63% Optimistic Optimistic 
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Table 5.10 Panel B also supports the suggestion that future one-year 
fundamental growth could be higher in the near future than the past. An optimistic 
forecast of one-year earnings growth for 2003 is found across all portfolios apart from 
for the Big-High portfolio, mirroring the one-year dividend growth results. 
Furthermore the average for 2001-2003 indicates that this trend has been apparent 
over recent years in almost all portfolios. Earnings growth is forecasted to be 
substantially above average for 2003 in almost all portfolios. Although the average 
forecast for one-year earnings growth for 2001-2003 is in almost all cases smaller 
than for just 2003, but is nevertheless still "optimistic" for almost all portfolios. 
Therefore it appears there are grounds to suspect that short-term fundamental growth 
is expected to be above average in the short-term. 
However, the longer term outlook is of greater interest in relation to our equity 
premium results. Panel C of Table 5.10 indicates that five-year dividend growth is 
also forecast to be substantially above average both for 2003-2008 and also for 
averages beginning in 2001, 2002 and 2003. The only exception is for the BH 
portfolio, which thus far has provided results contrary to the consensus in all our 
forecasts thus far. Another common pattern is also apparent, namely, that the 2003-
2008 forecast is of greater magnitude than the average of the forecasts beginning in 
2001, 2002 and 2003. 
Table 5.10 Panel D, however indicates that the longer term outlook for 
earnings growth is rather mixed across the different size and size-value portfolios. In 
fact the results found don't exhibit many strong patterns across portfolios. 
Nevertheless, the largest firms from the one-way sort (Ql) are forecast to have 
substantially higher than average earnings growth over the next five years, whereas 
the smallest firms from the one-way sort (Q5) are forecast to have substantially lower 
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than average earnings growth. For the two-way sorted there is little clear pattern in the 
results. The big-low portfolio is forecast to have exceptionally high earnings growth 
over the next five years, whereas the big-high portfolio is forecast to have below 
average earnings growth. The other two-way forecasts are somewhat mixed except for 
the small-medium portfolio which is forecast to have extremely low earnings growth. 
Overall, the forecasts are rather mixed. However, this set of forecasts for longer term 
earnings growth are the only ones where there is a substantial discrepancy with those 
from the more parsimonious model depicted in appendix 5.1. The more parsimonious 
model results are much more consistent with the previous findings and suggest that 
longer-term earnings growth can be expected to be substantially above average in 
most portfolios. 
Panel D of Table 5.10 also supports the suggestion that future five-year 
fundamental growth could be higher in the near future than the past. An optimistic 
forecast of one-year earnings growth for 2003 is found across all portfolios apart from 
like one-year dividend growth for the Big-High portfolio. Furthermore the average for 
2001-2003 indicates that this trend has been apparent over recent years in almost all 
portfolios. Earnings growth is forecasted to be substantially above average for 2003 in 
almost all portfolios. Although the average forecast for one-year earnings growth for 
2001-2003 is in almost all cases smaller than for just 2003, but is nevertheless still 
"optimistic" for almost all portfolios. Therefore it appears there are grounds to suspect 
that short-term fundamental growth is expected to be above average in the short-term. 
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5.4.1.5 CONCLUSION 
Our empirical analysis finds that dividend growth and earnings growth are 
predictable in-sample, especially for longer horizons and for the individual size 
portfolios. The degree of predictability is markedly lower for the size premium 
portfolios. Nevertheless, we find evidence suggestive of multicollinearity when we 
include all relevant variables, since the goodness-of-fit is high but relatively few 
regressors are significant. When insignificant variables are removed we find that the 
role of the consumption-fundamental ratio as a key determinant of future fundamental 
growth at both horizons is further underlined. This adds to recent US-centric literature 
that identifies consumption as playing a key role in predicting future stock prices and 
fundamental growth rates. We also find that at the one-year horizon lagged 
fundamental growth is an important adjunct to the consumption-fundamental ratio for 
predictability. 
Whilst, this evidence of fundamental growth predictability is interesting and 
important, in relation to the equity premium the forecasts of future fundamental 
growth rates are most pertinent. Our dividend growth equity premia results can be 
reconciled with the higher historical average equity premia results if high future 
dividend growth is expected. In fact, we do find evidence supportive of higher than 
average dividend growth for most portfolios with the exception of the big-high 
portfolio. This suggests that at least part of the discrepancy in the dividend equity 
premia results appears due to future dividend growth being forecast to be high. 
For earnings growth our results are more mixed especially at the longer 
horizon. At the one-year horizon earnings growth is found to generally forecast to be 
above average. However, at the five-year horizon the all-variable model results are 
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very mixed, although the forecasts from the more parsimonious model are consistent 
with an above-average forecast of fundamental growth. Our equity premia results 
from the earnings growth model were broadly in-line with the historical average once 
the 1974 crash was adjusted for, and thus we would not necessarily expect future 
earnings growth to be particularly different from average. 
5.4.2 DO EXPECTED STOCK RETURNS FALL DURING THE 1966-
2002 PERIOD? 
If expected returns have declined on average over time then a stream of 
unexpected capital gains may have been triggered causing realised historical returns to 
be substantially above investors' expectations. In these circumstances estimations of 
the equity premium implied by fundamentals, which are essentially unaffected by 
changes in expected returns, will give us estimates of the true ex ante risk premium 
that are not contaminated by unanticipated share price appreciation. 
There have been a number structural changes to the economies of the World's 
leading nations over the last century, which could have caused the cost of equity 
capital to fall. For example, over recent decades markets around the world have 
become increasingly open and integrated (Stulz, (1999)), there are now much greater 
opportunities for portfolio diversification (Merton, (1987)), the conditional variance 
of global real cashflow growth has declined (Bansal and Lundblad, (2002)) and 
finally, transaction costs have declined effectively lowering the rate of return 
demanded by investors (Aiyagari and Gertler, (1993) and Jones (2000)). 
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If factors such as these have occurred, then it is quite plausible that the cost of 
equity capital has fallen or our future growth expectations have risen. If either or both 
have occurred during the latter part of the 20th Century, then this would stimulate rises 
in the equity price index unforeseen by rational investors. Thus, the true ex-ante 
equity premia might be considerably below the 6-8% estimates based upon historical 
investment returns. If this is the case then the magnitude of the equity premium puzzle 
will have been overstated by studies which have employed historical returns. Thus, 
the equity premium puzzle is likely to be smaller than previously thought. 
The prior literature, based almost exclusively on studies of the US suggests 
that there has been a fall in expected returns over recent decades. Studies which 
attempt to identify the underlying economic causes of such a change in expected 
return identify the 1990s as the time when this shift occurred (Lettau et al. (2006), 
Bansal and Lundblad (2002)). This literature can be connected to a related literature 
which has studied structural breaks in valuation ratios via the present value 
framework. If there is a shift in the dividend-price (or earnings-price) ratio then this 
suggests that there has been a change in expected returns. This is given the perceived 
wisdom that the dividend-price ratio fails to predict long-term future dividend growth. 
Previous studies have found a downward break in ratios of fundamentals-price for the 
aggregate US (Carlson et al. (2002)) and UK (Vivian (2005)) markets during the 
1990s. 
We provide new evidence on whether there has been a change in expected 
returns by examining if there has been any structural breaks in the fundamental-price 
ratios of size and size-value portfolios. If the market results of Carlson et al. (2002) 
for the US and our results from empirical chapter 3 are really in response to a 
pervasive economic risk factor, we should find breaks in the same direction at a 
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similar time to be evident across diversified portfolios of stocks however formed. 
This, of course, includes portfolios formed on the basis of size and size-value. 
Consequently our analysis here could shed new light upon whether the market fall in 
fundamental-price ratios were due to a change in risk or if not due to a change in risk 
then highlight the characteristics of the firms causing this result. 
We use the procedures developed by Bai and Perron ((1998), (2003)) to 
investigate the possibility of multiple regimes in UK earnings-price ratios. For a full 
description of these procedures see Chapter 4.2.4. In order to determine the number of 
breaks in the series Bai and Perron (1998) advocate the use of the SupFT(l) test 
followed by sequential SupFT(l+ III) tests to determine the appropriate Onumber of 
breaks. However, they also acknowledge that Bayesian information criteria or 
modified Bayesian information criteria could be useful for determining the number of 
breaks. We report modified Bayesian information (LWZ) criterion of Liu et al. 
(1997), to help verify our results. However, we do note that as found by Perron (1997) 
that the LWZ criterion could over-estimate the number of breaks in the presence of 
autocorrelation, which regressions with our application to earnings-price ratios are 
highly prone to. 
5.4.2.1 SIZE PORTFOLIOS 
Table 5.11 reports results from SupFT, SupFT(l+ 111) tests and L WZ criterion 
over the period 1965-2002. For the dividend-price ratio we find, as in the previous 
chapter 4, that the SupFT(l) indicates there is no structural break for some portfolios, 
specifically the second largest firm quintile (Q2) and the middle quintile (Q3). 
However, for both Q2 and Q3 dividend-price ratios the SupFT(2) and SupFT(3) tests 
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indicate that there are structural breaks in the series, The SupFT(2) indicates 2 rather 
than 0 and the SupFT(3) suggests 3 rather than 0 breaks. The failure of the SupFT(l) 
test to reject the null of 0 breaks in favour of the alternative of 1 could be due to the 
series we examine appearing to go through a period of high earnings-price ratio 
during the 1970s and then reverting back towards its previous mean in the 1980s or 
1990s. The alternative hypothesis would have to allow for two breaks in the series in 
order to capture such a phenomena. Therefore we modify the procedure advocated by 
Bai and Perron (1998) to select the appropriate number of breaks in the series if and 
only if the SupFT(l) indicates there are no breaks we use the SupFT(2) test to identify 
if there were at least two breaks in the series and then use the SupFT(3I2) test to 
examine if there were three rather than two breaks. 
For all the size quintiles the modified sequential procedure indicates two 
breaks in the dividend-price ratio apart from for the largest firms (Q1). The LWZ 
modified information criterion also indicates two breaks for all quintile dividend-price 
ratio apart from for the largest firms (Q1) for which a single break is supported. There 
also appears to be multiple breaks in the quintile size premium dividend-price ratio, 
where according to all three criterion there is a single break. 
For the quintile earnings-price ratios two breaks are found by the modified 
sequential procedure for all portfolios. The LWZ modified information criterion also 
indicates there is 2 breaks for all the portfolios apart from for the largest firms where 
it finds 3 breaks. There are also multiple breaks found in the quintile size premium 
earnings-price ratio by both the modified sequential and LWZ criterion. However, 
there is disagreement over the number of breaks. The modified sequential approach 
suggests 3 breaks, but the LWZ criterion only 2. It is unusual for the LWZ criterion to 
suggest a smaller number of breaks than the modified sequential approach since the 
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simulation results of Perron (1997) indicate the LWZ criterion tends to be upwardly 
biased in series which are highly persistent, such as earnings-price ratios. 
TABLE 5.11: BAI-PERRON TESTS OF MULTIPLE STRUCTURAL BREAKS 
Panel A: Size Portfolio Dividend-Price Ratios 
No. of Breaks Selected 
SupFf(l) SupFf(2) SupFf(3) SupF(2jJ) SupF(3j2) Modified LWZ BIC 
Size Quintile Portfolios Sequential Sequ entia! 
QI 5.18 7.30 7.23 0.98 4.34 I I I 3 
Q2 4.23 14.82 29.44 7.50 1.13 0 2 2 2 
Q3 3.77 13.55 12.34 7.11 1.51 0 2 2 2 
Q4 6.01 13.00 9.79 10.87 0.43 2 2 2 2 
Q5 18.56 17.01 26.68 9.34 1.46 2 2 2 2 
Q5-Q1 16.49 8.70 7.72 1.92 1.11 
Size-Value Portfolios 
SL 11.35 9.15 7.70 4.59 4.59 2 
BL 12.75 11 .81 16.11 2.26 1.31 I I I 
SM 6.01 9.38 15.70 8.16 1.57 2 2 2 3 
BM 3.27 9.25 10.29 7.00 3.00 0 2 2 2 
SH 2.13 10.20 6.33 9.72 0.50 0 2 0 2 
BH 1.22 0.66 9.64 1.18 0.01 0 0 0 0 
SMB 7.77 5.29 2.50 1.04 0.51 1 I I 
1S-B 2.87 4.16 2.90 4.81 1.01 0 0 0 
Panel B: Size Portfolio Earnings-Price Ratios 
No. of Breaks Selected 
SupFf(1) SupFf(2) SupFT(3) SupF(2j1) SupF(3j2) Modified LWZ BIC 
Size Quintile Portfolios Sequential Sequential 
QJ 4.47 9.98 14.42 15.35 5.10 2 2 3 3 
Q2 4.56 10.39 6.89 13.34 0.18 2 2 2 2 
Q3 6.59 15.96 10.96 16.49 0.08 2 2 2 2 
Q4 1.54 14.38 16.30 26.38 6.01 0 2 2 2 
Q5 6.53 20.49 15.82 22.88 1.74 2 2 2 2 
Q5-Ql 4.19 15.22 32.60 14.42 8.34 0 3 2 3 
Size-Value Portfolios 
SL 7.72 12.03 9.20 6.62 1.86 I 2 2 2 
BL 3.59 13.73 12.04 16.89 5.82 0 2 2 2 
SM 1.15 13.11 11.28 24.58 2.67 0 2 2 2 
BM 3.26 9.01 8.09 4.17 6.25 0 I 2 2 
SH 7.86 25.71 17.35 21.60 2.15 2 2 2 2 
BH 12.84 14.98 11.99 15.05 7.56 3 3 2 2 
SMB 3.16 19.23 15.09 22.29 2.07 0 2 2 2 
IS-B 5.68 7.30 28.98 9.51 5.70 2 2 2 3 
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TABLE 5.12 STRUCTURAL BREAK TIMINGS AND MAGNITUDES 
Panel A: Size Portfolio Dividend-Price Ratios 
1965-2( No. of BREAK 1 BREAK2 OVERALL 
Break DATE +or- SIZE DATE +or- SIZE +or- CHANGE 
Size Quintile Portfolios 
Ql I 1992 Down -1.18% Down -1.18% 
Q2 2 1974 Up 1.61% 1982 Down -2.06% Down -0.45% 
Q3 2 1974 Up 1.76% 1981 Down -2.05% Down -0.29% 
Q4 2 1974 Up 1.61% 1981 Down -2.34% Down -0.73% 
Q5 2 1974 Up 1.53% 1981 Down -3.00% Down -1.47% 
Q5-QI 1980 Down -1.39% Down -1.39% 
Size-Value Portfolios 
SL 1 1982 Down -2.19% Down -2.19% 
BL I 1982 Down -1.20% Down -1.20% 
SM 2 1974 Up 1.77% 1983 Down -2.46% Down -0.69% 
BM 2 1974 Up 1.35% 1981 Down -1.88% Down -0.53% 
SH 0 No Change 
BH 0 No Change 
SMB 1984 Down -0.73% Down -0.73% 
IS-B 0 
Panel B: Size Portfolio Earnings-Price Ratios 
1965-2CNo. of BREAK I BREAK2 OVERALL 
Break DATE +or- SIZE DATE +or- SIZE +or- CHANGE 
Size Quintile Portfolios 
Ql 2 1972 Up 3.30% 1990 Down -3.05% Up 0.24% 
Q2 2 1972 Up 4.92% 1979 Down -3.77% Up 1.15% 
Q3 2 1972 Up 4.90% 1979 Down -3.61% Up 1.29% 
Q4 2 1972 Up 4.54% 1980 Down -3.94% Up 0.60% 
Q5 2 1972 Up 3.88% 1980 Down -4.81% Down -0.94% 
Q5-Q1 2 1979 Down -2.87% 1995 Up 2.75% Down -0.12% 
Size-Value Portfolios 
SL 2 1972 Up 2.32% 1979 Down -3.25% Down -0.92% 
BL 2 1972 Up 3.21% 1979 Down -3.33% Down -0.12% 
SM 2 1972 Up 4.49% 1980 Down -3.83% Up 0.66% 
BM 2 1972 Up 4.87% 1980 Down -4.09% Up 0.78% 
SH 2 1972 Up 6.13% 1980 Down -4.41% Up 1.72% 
BH 2 1972 Up 6.68% 1981 Down -4.12% Up 2.56% 
SMB 2 1976 Down -1.51% 1987 Up 1.36% Down -0.15% 
IS-B 2 1978 Down -1.74% 1995 Up 2.64% Up 0.90% 
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For the two-way sorted size-value portfolios dividend-price ratios we report 
that the number of breaks to some extent appears to depend upon the value 
characteristic of the portfolio. For dividend-price both low-value portfolios small-low 
(SL) and big-low (BL), a single break is found by all three methods. For both 
medium-value portfolios, SM and BM, two breaks are found by both the modified 
sequential method and the LWZ criterion. Whereas for the high-value portfolios, no 
breaks are found by any measure of the three measures for the large firms (BH). 
Although for the small-high portfolio (SH) the LWZ criterion suggests that there is a 
single break, similar to the BH portfolio, as does the standard sequential procedure. 
However, the SupFT(2) test indicates there are 2 rather than 0 breaks and thus 
suggests there are multiple breaks in the ratio. In terms of the size premium there is a 
single break in the SMB size premium according to all 3 methods, in line with the 
quintile size premium finding. Although for the one-way sorted median size 
breakpoint portfolio (1 WSMB) we find no breaks whatsoever in the premium. 
For the earnings-price ratio, there is evidence in favour of multiple breaks in 
the two-way sorted portfolios, as we found for the size quintile portfolios. The LWZ 
modified Bayesian information criterion indicates two breaks for all six size-value 
portfolios. The finding of two breaks is also supported by the modified sequential 
approach for the three small portfolios. In contrast, out of the large firms only the big-
low (BL) portfolio is deemed to have two breaks by the modified sequential method. 
By the modified sequential approach, the BM portfolio is found to have just a single 
break and the BH portfolio is found to have three breaks. In terms of the measures of 
the size premium, both SMB and 1 WSMB portfolios are found to have two breaks in 
their earnings price ratio by both the modified sequential and the L WZ criterion. 
Thus, multiple breaks in the size premium earnings-price ratio are endorsed. 
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Our empirical analysis reported in Table 5.11 , general! y finds structural breaks 
in the means of the valuation ratios examined and in many cases provides evidence of 
multiple breaks in these series. We now progress to examine the timing and direction 
of these structural breaks. 
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In Table 5 .12, we find that size portfolio dividend-price ratio breaks tend to 
occur at approximately the same time. For the quintile dividend-price ratios we find 
two breaks in all the ratios apart from the largest (Q1). For Q2-Q5 the timings of these 
breaks occur at almost precisely the same time. There is an upward mean-break in 
1974 in the four smallest quintiles of approximately 1.6%, suggesting that firms of 
these sizes were approximately equally hit by the OPEC oil crisis. The four smallest 
quintiles also report an almost common downward break in the dividend-price ratio in 
1981-2, which seems to be greater in magnitude for all groups than the first break. 
The second break also appears asymmetric in magnitude, particularly the sharpest fall 
is for the smallest quintile (Q5) of 3% and the second smallest group (Q4) also 
experiences a sharper fall (2.34%) than the larger groups (Q2 and Q3) which both 
have falls of little more than 2%, 2.05% and 2.06% respectively. The very largest 
firms (Q1) appear to have an idiosyncratic break in 1992, at the same time as we 
found for the market overall in our first empirical chapter. However, this doesn't seem 
to translate well to the other size deciles. 
Overall, it appears that firms smaller than the middle quintile experienced 
larger declines in their dividend-price ratios. Particularly the smallest quintile (Q5) 
has the largest decline in dividend-price ratio of all. However, the largest firms have a 
statistically significant break at a different, later time than the other size quintiles and 
this decline in terms of magnitude is greater than the middle quintile. Whilst this is the 
case, however, the quintile size premium (Q5-Q1) dividend-price ratio only has a 
single significant break in 1980, of -1.39%. This suggests the differential between the 
smallest and largest firms dividend-price ratios declined substantially in 1980 and that 
the other breaks in the individual series didn't have a statistically significant impact 
upon the differential between dividend-price ratios. 
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FIGURE 5.2: ONE-WAY SORTED EARNINGS-PRICE RATIOS 
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The size earnings-price ratios breaks also usually appear to have a common 
timing, although the break timings differ slightly between dividend-price and 
earnings-price. The quintile earnings-price ratios reveal two breaks for all size groups, 
even the largest firms. Again the timings of these breaks are virtually identical across 
groups and similar to those found in their dividend-price ratios. A common upward 
break is found across all quintiles in 1972, slightly prior to the first break found in 
most dividend price ratios in 1974. Unlike the 1974 break in dividend-price ratio, this 
break appears to hit the quintiles asymmetrically, the impact is lowest for the largest 
firms (3 .30% ), high for the middle quintile ( 4.90% ), but also less severe for the 
smallest quintile (3.88% ). The second break is uniformly downwards and for the four 
smallest quintiles it occurs in 1979-1980, again slightly prior to the dividend-price 
break. For the largest firms the second break which is downward occurs in 1990. The 
impact of this second break appears strongest for the smallest firms ( 4.81% ), has 
approximately the same impact upon the middle three size quintiles (3.61-3.94%), 
whilst the later break for the largest firms is of smaller magnitude (3% ). The quintile 
size premium also has two breaks, in 1979 and 1995. This first break coincides with 
the downward break of the smallest quintile in 1980, and the second a little after the 
downward break of the largest firms in 1990. These breaks in the quintile size 
premium (Q5-Ql) earnings-price ratio almost entirely offset each other, the 1979 
break being -2.87% and the 1995 break being 2.75%. Consequently, this suggests 
little change in the mean earnings-price ratio between the beginning and end of the 
sample period overall. Thus this implication of the earnings-price ratio of little change 
is contrary to that implied by the dividend-price ratio, which did suggest a significant 
fall. 
279 
FIGURE 5.3: TWO-WAY SORTED DIVIDEND-PRICE RATIOS 
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For the two-way sorted portfolios the number of breaks in dividend-price 
appears to depend on the value characteristics of the portfolio. For both size 
categories, no breaks are found for the high-value portfolios, one break for the low-
value portfolio and two breaks for the middle-value portfolios. The timings of these 
breaks, where they are found, is consistent with the one-way sorted results. An 
upward break is found for the middle-value portfolios of both sizes with the timing 
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between 1974 being the same as for most of the one-way sorted portfolios. A 
downward break is found for both low-value and both middle-value portfolios during 
1981-83, again at a very similar timing to most one-way sorted portfolios. 
However, the net impact53 of these breaks is asymmetric across portfolios and 
seems to be related both to size and value. Specifically the change in dividend-price 
mean is negatively related to value; the strongest fall is found for the low-value 
(growth) portfolios and, of course, no fall is found for high-value (glamour) portfolios 
since there aren't any structural breaks. For portfolios where structural breaks were 
found the impact is stronger for the small portfolios than the large, hence the impact 
appears also to be inversely related to size. This is also borne out in the change in the 
SMB dividend-price ratio which fell 0.73%, although given the timing of the fall in 
1974, it suggests this change is driven by the middle-value portfolios since these were 
the only ones to experience a break around this time. Therefore, it is perhaps, not that 
unsurprising that no break at all was found in the one-way sorted median breakpoint 
size premium's (1WSMB) dividend-price ratio given the SMB break occurred when 
only the middle value-portfolios experienced a break. 
For the two-way sorted portfolios earnings-price ratios the number of breaks 
appears to be two for almost all portfolios. A downward break is found for all 6 
portfolios during 1972 and all portfolios also have an upward break between 1979-
1981. The net impact of these breaks similarly to the dividend-price results, appear to 
be related both to size and value. Specifically the change in earnings-price mean is 
negatively related to value; falls are only found for the low-value (growth) portfolios 
and, the largest rises are found for high-value (glamour) portfolios. For portfolios 
where structural breaks were found the impact is also inversely related to size; the SL 
53 that is the change in mean from the beginning of the sample period to the end 
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portfolio has a lower change (a larger fall) than the BL portfolio, while the rise in the 
earnings-price ratio is smaller for the SH portfolio than the BH portfolio. 
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Two breaks are also found in the SMB earnings-price ratio, however, these are 
found to occur in 1976 and 1987 at times when none of the individual series have 
breaks. Although, actually the net impact of these changes are marginal ( -0.15%) and 
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so overall there seems to be little clear change overall in this indicator. The 1 WSMB 
earnings-price ratio also appears to have two breaks one an upward one in 1978, and a 
downward one in 1995. These differences in timings are somewhat difficult to 
reconcile. The net impact is larger for the 1 WSMB portfolio, but is not really that 
substantially different from that of SMB. Therefore, overall, there doesn't appear to 
have much of a decline in the size premium from sample start to sample end. 
However, it does appear that the lower mean during the 1980s is consistent with a 
lower expected size premium during that period. 
5.4.2.2 SUMMARY 
Firstly, an upward break is found in the valuation ratios of most size and size-
value portfolios during the early1970s around the time of the first OPEC oil crisis in 
1974 and the ensuing period of high inflation and economic instability and uncertainty 
in the UK economy. This effect is found to be substantial across all individual size 
and size-value earnings price ratios. It is also evident in the dividend-price ratios of 
the one-way size sorted portfolios apart from the very largest firms (Q1). However, 
for the dividend-price ratio there is less evidence of a break in the 1970s amongst the 
size-value two-way sorted portfolios since only the middle-value portfolios (SM and 
BM) have an upward break at this time. Overall, though, these findings are of interest 
particularly since prior studies only find evidence of mean-breaks indicating a fall in 
expected returns whereas we provide some evidence of an upward mean break 
implying a rise in expected returns. 
Secondly, in almost all size and size-value portfolios there is a downward 
break in valuation ratios during the early 1980s. For portfolios, which experienced an 
283 
upward break in the early 1970s this break tends to be of an approximately equal 
magnitude, thus largely counteracting the previous break. In terms of the dividend-
price ratio, all size portfolios except for the largest firms (Q1)have a downward break 
in the early 1980s and there is also a downward break in the quintile size premium. 
The size-value dividend-price ratios tend to have a downward break between 1981-84 
as well apart from the high-value portfolios. The SMB size premium though does 
have a downward break in dividend-price in 1984. For the earnings-price ratios there 
is a downward break in all size and size-value portfolios (except the largest size 
quintile) between 1979-1981. Consequently these results provide evidence suggestive 
that these breaks were in response to a common economic factor since almost all 
portfolios were affected at approximately the same time. It is purported that this break 
could simply have occurred due to the resolution the economic instability and 
uncertainty faced by the UK economy in the mid-to-late 1970s. 
Thirdly, however, we find very limited evidence of a break in valuation ratios 
during the 1990s. Only in the largest single size sorted portfolio (Q 1) do we find a 
break in the 1990s, although for this portfolio both the dividend-price and earnings-
price ratio have downward breaks. Therefore, in stark contrast, to studies of the 
aggregate market. For instance, Carlson, Pelz and Wohar (2002) report a downward 
structural break in the mean of fundamental-price ratios during the early 1990s in the 
US while Vivian (2005) finds a downward break in the UK dividend-price ratio at a 
similar time. The general· interpretation of a shift in a valuation ratio is that it is 
indicative of a change in expected return, particularly since fundamental growth is 
difficult to predict. However, our size portfolio results question whether this could 
have been the case for the break in the early 1990s in the UK since we find little 
evidence of a common downward break in valuation ratios in the 1990s. Rather the 
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break appears to be concentrated purely in the largest firms by market capitalisation. 
Since the remaining size portfolio valuation ratios were relatively unaffected, it 
suggests that this result was not caused by a pervasive economic risk factor causing a 
change in expected returns. This is because if a change in expected returns had been 
caused by a pervasive economic risk factor then one would expect the valuation ratios 
of all industries to be affected. However, our results indicate that only the very largest 
firms experience a statistically significant shift in their earnings-price ratio during the 
1990s. Perhaps, it is more likely this episode can be ascribed to a change in 
expectations of future fundamental growth affecting the largest corporations. 
The overall net changes to the valuation ratios from the structural breaks are 
somewhat mixed. For the dividend-price ratios, if there are any breaks then the net 
effect of these are downwards. The biggest net downward shifts for the one-way 
sorted size portfolios are for the largest and smallest quintiles. The results for the size-
value portfolios indicate that the impact is substantial (greater than 1%) only for the 
low value (earnings-price) portfolios rather than the impact being consistent across all 
value groupings. Consequently it seems as if glamour firms (low earnings-price) are 
tending on average to pay lower dividends, if they pay any at all given the rising 
instances of zero-dividend firms. 
The overall net changes for the earnings-price ratios tend to be positive in 
general, although there are few instances where there is a large change. Hence, our 
earnings-price results, in general, are not supportive that expected returns fell overall 
during the period 1966-2002. However, there is not much evidence either of a 
substantive overall net rise in earnings-price ratios either. Only in the second (Q2) and 
third (Q3) largest size quintiles is there an upward net movement in earnings-price of 
more than 1%. For the two-way sorted size-value portfolios there is a substantial 
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upward movement for both the high-value (value) portfolios, but only a slight upward 
movement in the middle-value portfolios and slight downward movement in the low-
value portfolio. Furthermore, there are disparities between the earnings-price results 
and the dividend-price results in terms of the net impact of the structural breaks 
discovered. 
Overall, the net impact of the change in valuation ratio seems to depend on 
whether one is looking at dividend-price or earnings price. For earnings-price the net 
changes are generally positive but of rather small magnitude. In contrast for dividend-
price we find the net changes are generally negative and sometimes of large 
magnitude. Hence, the results are rather mixed. Nevertheless, the timing of the breaks 
where they are found have a strong degree if commonality. In almost all cases 
structural breaks occur are prior to the 1990s, contrary to existing literature. The 
exception to this is for the very largest firms where a downward break is found in the 
early 1990s at a similar time as the aggregate market. 
Nevertheless, the structural break results appear generally consistent with the 
equity premia results. There is generally little overall change in the earnings-price 
ratio which supports the finding that the earnings model provides very similar equity 
premia estimates to the historical average model. Whereas, there tends to be a general 
net decline in the dividend-price ratio over 1966-2002 which is consistent with the 
equity premia findings that dividend growth estimates are less than the historical 
average. Therefore the overall picture is somewhat mixed, but there is limited support 
for an overall fall in expected returns over 1966-2002; support which is further 
qualified by the drawbacks of dividend method inherent due to the changing nature of 
payout policy during this period. 
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5.5 CONCLUSION 
The empirical analysis suggests that the degree to which historical equity 
premia have been supported by fundamentals is dependent upon the measure of 
fundamentals used. If dividends are used to calculate expected returns then it appears 
that actual returns have been above expectations across size portfolios as we found for 
examining the aggregate market equity premium in chapter 3. The dividend growth 
model also suggests the historical size premium was also above investors' 
expectations. However, if earnings are used as an alternative proxy of underlying 
performance, then the historical estimates are largely consistent with those implied by 
earnings growth and in fact few large deviations exist between these estimates. 
Nevertheless there are drawbacks to using either dividends or earnings to measure 
fundamental performance; hence both sets of results require consideration. Thus, our 
results are mixed on the main issue addressed in this thesis: whether or not the 
historical equity premium accurately estimates the expected equity premium. 
These differences between the results of the dividend and earnings growth 
model are similar to those reported in Chapter 4 for industry portfolios. In Chapter 4 
we also found a disparity between dividend growth and historical equity premia 
estimates but no substantive difference between earnings growth and historical equity 
premia estimates. Whilst it is plausible that a primary cause of this is the recent trends 
in corporate payout policy that affect the dividend estimates it is also possible that 
earnings management, for instance, could have inflated earnings estimates. Hence, 
this appears an area which could benefit from further research, perhaps including 
share repurchases into dividends would circumvent the major failings of the dividend 
method and provide a more accurate estimate of the expected equity premium. 
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In terms of the size premium we find that a positive size premium could be 
expected for the full sample. Small firms do have higher earnings and dividend 
growth than large firms and this result for the full sample period is robust when the 
value grouping of stocks is held constant. We also find that only a small proportion of 
the raw size premium is due to systematic differences in exposure to the value 
premium as is demonstrated by size-value sorted SMB equity premium estimates 
being only slightly smaller than the one way sorted 1 WSMB equity premium. 
Our results also indicate that both the historical size premium and expected 
size premium is positive overall in both the pre-discovery (1966-1984) and post-
discovery (1985-2002) sub-periods. However, we also report findings consistent with 
Dimson and Marsh (1999) that the historical UK size premium did go into reverse 
over 1989-1998. Our results for the expected size premium 1989-1998 indicate that 
this was negative only once value is controlled; the results are mixed for the one-way 
size sorted premium but they provide paltry support for a strong positive expected size 
premium during 1989-1998. Thus, we find the nature of both the expected and 
historical size premium appear to deviate from the norm of a strong positive premium 
for 1989-1998. 
Our overall results shed important new light on the nature of the size premium. 
They reject the assertion that the size premium is simply a statistical artefact borne 
from the data-mining exploits of over-exuberant researchers. Instead our results 
suggest that small firms not only on average received higher returns than large firms 
but furthermore they indicate that small firms can be expected to earn higher returns 
than large firms during both pre-discovery and post-discovery sub-periods. This is 
because small firms have superior underlying fundamental performance than large 
firms and thus earn higher capital gains. In this sense a size premium can be expected. 
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We examine if there are structural breaks in the ratios of fundamental to price 
which could help explain our equity premia results and why we find the patterns in 
dividend growth and earnings growth portfolios we do. 
The structural break results for the dividend-price ratio are consistent with the 
equity premia results we report. There is a decline in the dividend-price ratio in almost 
all portfolios and in most cases this is of substantial magnitude. Moreover for the size 
premium we also find a decline in the dividend-price ratio for our main measures the 
quintile premium and SMB premium. The timing of these declines are fairly 
consistent across portfolio, generally occurring in the early-1980s, with the exception 
being the largest firm portfolio which has a decline in 199254• Thus, these results are 
consistent with the discrepancy between dividend growth equity premia and historical 
average premia. In general, such declines in the dividend-price ratio are interpreted as 
a decline expected returns (e.g. Fama and French (2002)), that has caused prices to 
rise unexpectedly. However, there are other possible explanations for this result 
especially given that the size premium has thus far evaded an adequate explanation in 
terms of an economic risk factor. 
In terms of the dividend yield on the size premium our descriptive statistics 
also indicated that, small firms had higher yields than large firms during the pre-
discovery period (1966-1984 ). However, since 1985 this differential has disappeared 
and both small and large firms offer very similar yields. These results are consistent 
across both the size and size-value sorted results. It is tempting to interpret these 
results as following the discovery of the size premium small firms are priced such that 
they no longer have to offer such higher yields than large firms to entice shareholders 
54 The large ftrm portfolio break is found to occur at precisely the same time as the dividend-price 
break we ftnd for the market overall. 
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to hold them. Thus, it is possible that the result comes from a re-evaluation of smaller 
company prices in light of the size premium discovery. 
However, there is good reason to suspect that it is not a change in prices but a 
change in dividends that has played an important role in explaining the decline in 
dividend-price ratio. Recent changes in corporate dividend policy appear not to have 
been symmetrical impact across firms of different sizes. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and 
Skinner (2004) demonstrate there is an increasing concentration of dividend payouts 
amongst the very largest US firms. Ap Gwilym et al. (2002) provide evidence that 
such a trend is also apparent in the UK and also note that small firms are more likely 
to be non-payers of cash dividends than large firms. Consequently, it appears 
plausible that changing dividend policy has made a large contribution to the 
disappearance of the difference in yield between small and large firms during the 
sample period 55• 
The hypothesis that the disappearance of the dividend yield differential 
between small and large firms is caused primarily by dividend behaviour rather than 
prices is further supported if one examines the earnings yield. We find that overall, a 
differential between earnings yield remains at the end of the sample period. Since 
prices are common components to both earnings and dividend yields this suggests the 
change in dividend yield on the size premium is not mainly due to a move in prices. 
For the earnings-price ratio structural break tests on the size premium 
portfolios, also indicate that the differential in the final regime is approximately the 
same as the initial regime. This is also consistent with our equity premia results for 
the size premium that earnings growth and historical average estimates were broadly 
similar. However, we find there tend to be multiple regimes in the earnings-price 
55 Or alternatively why the differential which disappeared in the 1980s didn't re-appear in the 1990s 
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ratios. The difference in earnings-price ratios between small and large firms turns 
negative around 1980 and then turns positive again during the 1990s. These appear to 
more or less to coincide with the structural breaks on the individual portfolios. Small 
portfolios have a downward break around 1980 but large firms have a later downward 
break in the early 1990s. However, overall for the one-way sorted size portfolios there 
is relatively little change in the earnings-price ratio between first and final regimes 
consistent with the equity premia results. Although for the two-way sorted portfolios 
these show an increasing spread of earnings-price ratios in the cross-section of firms. 
High earnings-price portfolios have higher final than first regime values while for the 
low earnings-price ratio portfolios have the lowest net changes. These results appear 
consistent with Pastor and Veronesi (2003) who find US firm earnings tend to have 
experienced an increase in volatility over recent years. 
We find further evidence of fundamental growth predictability, in this instance 
for size and size-value portfolios. We find the consumption-fundamental ratio is the 
most important variable for predicting future fundamental growth at both short and 
medium term horizons. Additionally, at the short one-year horizon, we find lagged 
fundamental growth rates act as an important adjunct to the consumption-fundamental 
ratio for predictability. However, predicting fundamental growth for the size premium 
portfolios, our regression results indicate is a more difficult task. 
In terms of forecasting future fundamental growth rates, dividend growth 
forecasts suggest that in general above average growth can be expected. This is 
supportive of the hypothesis that the discrepancy between our dividend growth and 
historical average equity premia estimates is partly due to the anticipation of higher 
future dividend growth. However, for earnings growth the results are more mixed 
especially when the longer term outlook is considered. Although above average 
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earnings growth is forecast at the one-year horizon, at longer horizons the support for 
above average fundamental growth is much weaker. Nevertheless, since the equity 
premia results were similar for the earnings growth model and the historical average 
model once the 1974 crash was adjusted for, and thus we would not necessarily expect 
future earnings growth to be particularly different from average. 
Therefore forecasts of future fundamental growth are generally consistent with 
our equity premia results. However, it isn't clear whether they are able to offer close 
to a full explanation of the equity premia results. This is because although strong 
future dividend growth is forecast this could be in part due to the recent rise in UK 
share repurchase activity (Oswald and Young (2004)), which appears to have reduced 
the total cash dividends paid. This would affect the predicted mean reversion of the 
consumption-dividend, dividend-price and payout ratios since they would forecast 
total dividends to meant revert which also comprises share repurchases. Hence 
forecasts that future cash dividends will rise should be interpreted cautiously. 
Overall the empirical results are mixed on the focal issue of this thesis the 
expected equity premium. Expected equity premium results from earnings growth 
model coupled with generally little net change in the mean of earnings-price ratio 
suggests expected returns in 2002 are about the same as in 1966. However equity 
premium results from dividend growth model together with findings, generally, of 
falls in the mean of the dividend-price ratio imply a fall in expected returns during the 
sample period. There is also some, albeit weak evidence, suggesting an increase in 
expectations of future dividend growth could contribute to the dividend model equity 
premium findings. Nevertheless, on our main issue of interest the results are mixed 
with some evidence pointing to a fall in expected equity premium across size 
portfolios, whilst other results suggest there has been little change. 
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APPENDIX 5.1: FORECASTING RESULTS FROM PARSIMONIOUS MODEL 
Panel A: 1-year Dividend Growth Forecasts excluding Dividend-Price and Payout 
2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 A v. 2000-2002 
Q1 9.18% 3.86% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q2 15.50% 1.09% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q3 13.25% 1.94% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q4 3.51% -5.10% Optimistic Pessimistic 
Q5 6.71% 1.65% Optimistic Optimistic 
QEQPREM 6.77% 6.01% Optimistic Optimistic 
SL 22.41% 12.34% Optimistic Optimistic 
BL 13.73% 16.68% Optimistic Optimistic 
SM 15.73% 5.92% Optimistic Optimistic 
BM 6.88% -3.64% Optimistic Pessimistic 
SH 0.74% 2.99% Optimistic Optimistic 
BH -5.61% -7.79% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
SMB 4.81% 1.00% Optimistic Optimistic 
1WSMB 8.88% 8.22% Optimistic Optimistic 
Panel B: 1-year Earnings Growth Forecasts excluding Earnings-Price and Payout 
2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Q1 16.45% 10.06% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q2 6.93% -2.90% Optimistic Pessimistic 
Q3 11.94% -1.60% Optimistic Pessimistic 
Q4 2.92% -4.70% Optimistic Pessimistic 
Q5 0.91% -0.92% Optimistic Pessimistic 
QEQPREM 14.16% 9.29% Optimistic Optimistic 
SL 9.18% -0.41% Optimistic Pessimistic 
BL 24.44% 16.70% Optimistic Optimistic 
SM 5.05% -1.65% Optimistic Pessimistic 
BM 5.81% -2.97% Optimistic Pessimistic 
SH 6.58% 3.67% Optimistic Optimistic 
BH -5.76% -6.63% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
SMB 4.59% 1.36% Optimistic Optimistic 
1WSMB 17.35% 13.06% Optimistic Optimistic 
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APPENDIX 5.1 (CONTINUED) 
Panel C: 5-year Dividend Growth Forecasts COOT 
2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Q1 7.70% 6.86% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q2 10.49% 6.60% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q3 10.43% 6.67% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q4 12.39% 4.26% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q5 8.20% 5.31% Optimistic Optimistic 
QEQPREM 4.62% 4.59% Optimistic Optimistic 
SL 29.16% 17.84% Optimistic Optimistic 
BL 9.67% 9.53% Optimistic Optimistic 
SM 15.06% 8.53% Optimistic Optimistic 
BM 10.65% 2.70% Optimistic Optimistic 
SH 4.68% 3.09% Optimistic Optimistic 
BH -1.81% -2.75% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
SMB 3.94% 2.10% Optimistic Optimistic 
1WSMB 3.01% 4.95% Optimistic Optimistic 
Panel D: 5-year Earnings Growth Forecasts CYDT 
2002 Av. 2000-2002 
Prediction Prediction 2002 A v. 2000-2002 
Q1 10.28% 7.61% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q2 0.89% 0.47% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q3 8.09% 6.09% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q4 5.48% 1.85% Optimistic Optimistic 
Q5 4.11% 3.25% Optimistic Optimistic 
QEQPREM 1.27% 0.90% Optimistic Optimistic 
SL 2.66% 1.97% Optimistic Optimistic 
BL 18.04% 14.79% Optimistic Optimistic 
SM 3.62% 3.13% Optimistic Optimistic 
BM 6.20% l.I8% Optimistic Optimistic 
SH 5.21% 4.80% Optimistic Optimistic 
BH -1.30% -2.51% Pessimistic Pessimistic 
SMB 1.96% -0.20% Optimistic Pessimistic 
1WSMB 8.79% 7.51% Optimistic Optimistic 
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This thesis examines the equity premium in the context of the historical 
experience of the UK market. Therefore this thesis meets one of our initial objectives 
outlined in the introduction to fill part of the void in the current equity premium 
literature which thus far has been heavily centred on America. More specifically we 
set the objective to ascertain whether or not the historical equity risk premia of the 
magnitude observed is a suitable and fitting proxy for the expected UK equity risk 
premia that could have been anticipated. We examine this issue through recourse to 
the historical underlying performance of equities. To this end we posed several 
questions to stimulate the subsequent research enclosed in this thesis. 
In Chapter 2, we presented a review of the literature with a particular focus on 
the equity premium puzzle. We identified that although numerous modifications have 
been proposed to the theoretical model that these all seem to fall short of providing a 
solution that doesn't require a seemingly implausible level of risk aversion. In this 
thesis we therefore follow a different approach. We find from the literature that 
especially in the UK context little prior work has consider whether the observed 
historical equity premia is an appropriate proxy for expected returns which are 
prescribed by theoretical models. We therefore focus on this issue for the subsequent 
empirical analysis of the UK equity premium in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
• To what extent have historical equity premia been supported by the 
underlying performance of fundamentals? 
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• Are there any discrepancies between historical returns and those implied 
by fundamentals? 
• Do alternative measures of fundamentals yield results that are consistent 
with each other? 
• Do the specific characteristics of the UK market lead to results that differ 
from other markets? 
• Are the results for the aggregate market generalisable to portfolios formed 
according to cross-sectional characteristics? 
In general, we find that historical equity premia have been largely supported by 
fundamental growth in each of the empirical studies conducted in this thesis. A strong 
relationship is apparent between long run average stock returns and long run 
fundamental growth. However, while this is the case and the following remarks 
should be seen in this context, we do also find a number of cases where the 
fundamental estimates of equity premia do diverge to an economically substantial 
degree from those given by the historical average. 
In Chapter 3, we looked at the UK equity premium from a long-term 
perspective using data covering the whole of the 20th Century. Our empirical analysis 
demonstrates that during the earlier part of the 20th Century both dividend growth and 
capital gains methods provide similar estimates of the equity premia. We find that in 
the latter part of the 20th Century equity premia appeared to be above those implied by 
dividend growth. In Chapter 4 and 5 respectively we scrutinised the equity premium 
across industry portfolios and size portfolios respectively. We discovered over the 
period 1966-2002 that historical average equity premia were also above those implied 
by dividend growth for almost all industry or size portfolios. Therefore there appears 
296 
to be a strong degree of consistency in the analysis from our empirical studies 
indicating that the magnitude of the historical equity premium over recent decades 
was above investors' expectations based on dividend growth models. 
The UK has an important different key characteristic to that of the US market 
where the overwhelming majority of prior empirical studies in this area have been 
conducted. This is that changes in dividend payout policy, which could affect 
dividend growth model estimates, have been more apparent in the US. In the US 
dividends have declined dramatically since the 1970s, whilst at the same time share 
repurchases activity has proliferated. This has affected the estimates of dividend 
growth models of expected equity returns based purely on "cash" dividends. In the 
UK cash dividends have also become less important but this has been a very recent 
phenomenon, partly due to share repurchases being illegal in the UK until the 1980s. 
Consequently, UK dividend growth estimates should be substantially less affected or 
subject to these changes than US studies also based upon cash dividends. 
Nevertheless, we also examine earnings growth as an alternative measure of 
fundamentals for the period for which it is also available from 1966-2002. In spite of 
the UK market being less susceptible to any impact on dividend growth model 
estimates from changes to payout policy than the US, earnings growth is essentially 
devoid of this bias altogether. Our empirical analysis of portfolios sorted by cross-
sectional characteristics demonstrates that if earnings growth is used to measure 
expected returns then the results relating to the equity premia differ and differ to a 
substantive degree to those for which dividend growth is used. 
In Chapter 4 we find that across the majority of UK industries once the 1974 
market crash is removed then historical equity premia were approximately the same as 
those implied by earnings growth. Nevertheless, even after the 1974 outlier is 
297 
controlled for there was a divergence between the dividend growth equity premia 
estimate and the historical average estimate. We also find that for the value-weighted 
aggregate market a small discrepancy pervaded between earnings growth and 
historical average equity premia and a larger discrepancy between dividend growth 
and the historical average consistent with the aggregate findings from chapter 3. In 
Chapter 5, we considered the equity premia across size portfolios. Here we also found 
that historical average equity premia were approximately the same as that implied by 
earnings growth. However, the dividend growth estimate, once more, diverged from 
the other estimates. The key implication of these results using earnings growth as a 
measure of expected return is that these are very close in the main to the historical 
average return for cross-sectional portfolios, whether they are formed on the basis of 
industry or on market capitalisation. 
• Are deviations of historical returns from those implied by fundamentals 
due to a change in expectations of future fundamental growth? 
• Is there time variation in expectations of future fundamental growth? 
We will begin by examining the latter question. Until recently it has been 
maintained that future growth of earnings and dividends was essentially 
unpredictable. In this thesis we provide new evidence on the predictability of 
fundamental growth. We find that fundamental growth is predictable in the time series 
both in our aggregate analysis in chapter 3 and in the cross-sectional analysis of 
industry portfolios and size portfolios in chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
Our results suggest there is an important role for ratios of fundamentals in the 
predictability of future fundamental growth. For instance, ratios of aggregate 
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consumption-earnings and aggregate consumption-dividends perform extremely well 
in explaining time-series variation in fundamental growth of industry and size 
portfolios respectively. In Chapter 3, at the aggregate level we find an important role 
for a similar ratio the dividend-price ratio in predicting future fundamental growth. 
Although, the dividend-price ratio performed strongly at the aggregate level overall 
and especially in the earlier part of the 201h Century, its predictive ability has lessened 
over recent years, which we suspect is partly due to the recent changes in UK 
dividend payout policy. We also find that prior fundamental growth rates also have an 
important role to play in predicting future fundamental growth. For size and industry 
portfolios, particularly at shorter horizons, they enhance predictability conducted with 
the consumption-fundamental ratio alone. At the aggregate, lagged fundamental 
growth is important and appears to have become increasingly important for predicting 
aggregate fundamental growth during the second part of the 201h Century. 
Despite uncovering evidence indicating that fundamental growth is 
predictable, we find limited evidence that changes in expectations of future 
fundamental growth can explain the deviations of historical equity premia from those 
implied by fundamental growth. For instance, across UK industries we find that in a 
number of industries historical equity premia had diverged from those implied by 
fundamentals over 1966-2002 once appropriate adjustments for outliers had been 
made. However, although in some industries changes in expectations of future 
fundamental growth appear capable of explaining these discrepancies in some of the 
industries, it was unable to do so for others. Furthermore, in some industries where no 
discrepancies were found a changes in expected future fundamental growth was 
discovered. Such a pattern of results suggests that changing expectations of future 
fundamental growth are not the driving force behind our industry equity premia 
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results. At the aggregate level in Chapter 3 we discovered that historical equity premia 
had been on average above those implied by fundamentals since 1951. However, our 
results suggest that the historical average is the best forecaster out-of-sample, which 
predicts only a slight increase in the dividend growth rate for 2002 onwards relative to 
that predicted in 1951. Consequently, the empirical evidence from this thesis suggests 
that the ability of a change in expectations of future fundamental growth appears to 
have very limited in its ability to explain the equity premium results discovered. 
We find little support for the hypothesis that aggregate expected dividend 
growth is expected to be high post 2002. 
• Are deviations of historical returns from those implied by fundamentals 
due to a change in expectations of future returns? 
• Have there been any structural changes in the relationship between prices 
and fundamentals? 
Firstly, we provide evidence that there are structural changes between prices 
and fundamentals in the UK. Such structural change is evident across all three 
empirical chapters of this thesis. In Chapter 3 we discover a structural break in the 
market dividend-price ratio in the early 1990s. This would appear to suggest that there 
has been a change in expected return caused by a decline in the discount rate. Such 
evidence for the aggregate market is consistent with there being a decline in expected 
returns, which could have caused prices to rise unexpectedly. However, what is less 
clear is what factor precisely was behind this shift in market dividend-price and 
whether or not this shift is mirrored across different segments of the market. 
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Importantly, in chapter 4 we do not find common breaks in valuation ratios 
during the 1990s questioning whether the shift in market dividend-price was in fact 
caused by a change in risk in the 1990s. It appears more likely that this was due to a 
change in the industry composition of the market during the 1990s. An increase in the 
weight being placed on new, growing industries with low ratios of fundamental-price 
such as pharmaceuticals, telecoms and media could have caused this result. We also 
find for size portfolios, in chapter 5, that only the largest firms experience a 
downward break in their valuation ratios during the 1990s whereas smaller portfolios 
only experience breaks prior to the 1990s. Again this would suggest that the shift in 
the 1990s wasn't in fact due to a change in systematic risk but rather to some other 
factor. An intuitive explanation would be that advanced in Chapter 4 that this was due 
to an increasing proportion of large firms being from low fundamental-price industries 
such as pharmacuticals, telecoms and media. 
Although, for cross-sectional portfolios we generally fail to find structural 
breaks in valuation ratios during the 1990s, we do discover that there were earlier 
shifts in these ratios. In fact these breaks occurred at remarkably similar timings 
across portfolios. For both size and industry portfolios we find a general, pervasive 
and substantial upward shift in valuation ratios during the early 1970s around the time 
of the first OPEC oil crisis of 197 4. We also find for both size and industry portfolios 
there is a common decline in valuation ratios in the ·early 1980s. For the earnings-
price ratios these two shifts largely offset each other leading to the initial regime 
exhibiting very similar mean earnings-price to the final regime. However, in the case 
of dividend-price ratios, the tendency was for the shift in the 1980s to be of larger 
magnitude resulting in an overall decline in dividend-price ratios. Nevertheless these 
empirical results for size portfolios and industry portfolios suggest that risk induced 
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shifts in expected returns did occur during our sample period. However, the timing of 
these breaks are prior to the break in the aggregate dividend price ratio from Chapter 3 
that occurred during the early 1990s. 
The conclusions of this thesis regarding whether or not historical equity 
premia have diverged from those implied by fundamentals requires further discussion. 
Our Chapter 3 study of the aggregate market appears not to be in full agreement with 
the results of the studies from cross-sectionally formed portfolios within the market in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. There are also notable differences in the results from 
structural break tests, especially in relation to the timing of aggregate market breaks 
and those of individual portfolios. 
Therefore we should review our interpretation of the results in Chapter 3 given 
the further new light shed on the issue from our cross-sectional analyses in Chapters 4 
and 5. In particular, in Chapter 3 we discover the structural break in the aggregate 
dividend-price ratio occurs in the early 1990s and such breaks are generally ascribed 
to a permanent decline in expected returns. However, our subsequent analysis of 
cross-sectional portfolios in Chapters 4 and 5 indicates that there is little evidence for 
a downward break in ratios of fundamental-price during the 1990s across industry or 
across size groupings. Consequently the evidence that such a break did not occur 
during the 1990s in most of the individual cross-sectional portfolios questions the 
assertion that there truly was a decline in the conventional equity premium during the 
1990s due to decline in risk. 
We find in several industries a structural break is found in the early 1990s, and 
also the largest firm quintile experiences a structural break in the early 1990s. Hence 
it appears that these segments of the market appear to be driving the appearance of a 
break in the aggregate fundamental-price ratio during the early 1990s. It therefore 
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appears that the early 1990s break is not common across all parts of the market and so 
it seems unlikely that this change is due to a systematic factor impacting all areas of 
the market at the same time. If there was a common decline in a common risk factor 
during the 1990s that lead to a decline in equity premium then all portfolios should be 
affected. 
Furthermore some additional comment should be made regarding the use of 
dividend growth model in light of the analysis contained in Chapters 4 and 5. In 
Chapters 4 and 5 we find the dividend growth model for 1966-2002 implies equity 
premia are substantially below the historical average equity premia. However, the 
earnings growth model implies equity premia which are approximately the same as 
the historical average equity premia once the 1974 spike is neutralised across most 
portfolios be they based on industry or size characteristics. This suggests there's a 
possibility our results from Chapter 3 for the dividend growth model are reflecting the 
flaws of the dividend growth model. Since,· the dividend model is subject to the 
changes in corporate payout policy which have occurred over recent decades in the 
UK even though these changes haven't been as dramatic as in the US. Therefore it can 
be asserted that earnings growth is perhaps a better measure of fundamental growth 
over the more recent period. Hence if we had earnings data available for the whole of 
the 1951-2002 period then it is plausible that the earnings model might imply equity 
premia in-line with the historical average. 
Nevertheless, there is a caveat in relation to our analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. 
This is that due to data availability the analysis begins in 1966. The question which 
has to be asked is how representative was this period of earlier years. Particularly, 
were ratios of fundamental-price in the years surrounding 1966 at levels 
approximately representative of the earlier 201h Century? We can assert that equity 
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premia have been approximately equal to historical returns over 1966-2002 when 
earnings growth is used as the measure of fundamentals, but this doesn't rule out the 
possibility that there could have been a divergence between estimates for earlier 
periods. Perhaps of more importance our finding that historical equity premia have 
been approximately in-line with earnings growth could be partly attributed to unusual 
levels of valuation ratio in the 1960s. 
FIGURE 6.1 UK DIVIDEND-PRICE AND EARNINGS-PRICE RATIOS 
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In fact, when we look at the aggregate dividend-price ratio for 1901-2002, 
depicted in Figure 6.1, we discover that the late 1960s and early 1990s were both 
periods that were somewhat different from the pre-1966 period. In fact from 1967-
1973, the dividend-price ratio was substantially below its prior mean; both dividend-
price and earnings-price ratios are low over 1967-73 relative to the latter 1970s and 
the 1980s, Figure 6.1 reveals. This, therefore contributes to the findings we make in 
Chapters 4 and 5 from our earnings growth models that expected returns didn't appear 
to decline over 1966-2002. This is because 1967-1973 appears to be a regime of low 
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valuation-price ratios and hence of low expected returns relative to the earlier pre-
1965 period. Hence the fact that our cross-sectional analyses appear to begin during a 
period when valuation ratio were at then historically low levels will contribute to the 
findings reported in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Despite the efforts of this thesis, there almost inevitably remam some 
unresolved issues in relation to the equity premium. We therefore proceed to make 
some suggestions and outline a number of areas where further research is likely to 
prove both fruitful for both informing and developing our knowledge of the equity 
premium even further. 
Firstly, there is still relatively little known about the expected equity premia 
for countries outside the US and the UK. Hence analysis of countries with a different 
legal and institutional framework to the systems employed in these countries would in 
my opinion provide a fruitful area of new research. This would enable the 
identification of how far the results reported in this thesis could be generalised and 
transferred to other countries or whether they are merely a product of the legal system, 
institutional framework and historical heritage of the United Kingdom. In particular 
for such an analysis it would be important to consider both the equity premia across 
portfolios formed on characteristics as well as the aggregate market. This is 
particularly so given that this thesis identifies results for the aggregate level do not 
automatically transfer to portfolios formed on the basis of cross-sectional 
characteristics. This, therefore, would appear to be a useful and fruitful area for future 
analysis, which could build on and further expand the results and conclusions drawn 
from this thesis. 
Another issue is also in relation to the study of the equity premium in cross-
sectionally sorted portfolios. Although, our studies in Chapters 4 and 5 use as long a 
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UK dataset as can be provided by Datastream, it would be desirable to extend the 
sample period of study even further. This would be of interest and benefit given the 
focus upon the use of long-term averages in our equity premia estimates. Hence if, in 
an ideal world the sample period could be extended to a period of 50, 60 or even 100 
years, this might perhaps allow for greater accuracy in the estimation of equity 
premia. While for many countries this is likely to prove infeasible, it could be possible 
to conduct such a study in the US given both market and accounting data is available 
for a broad cross-section of firms from at least the 1940's. Hence, despite the almost 
fervent focus and fixation of the prior literature upon the equity premium in the US, 
there do still remain unexplored avenues of research even for this market. Moreover, a 
few years farther into the future such a study would also be feasible for a growing 
number of countries around the world, especially amongst those with more developed 
capital markets. 
Another possibility for future research would be to examine the predictability 
and forecastability of the aggregate historical equity premium. Most of the extant 
literature focuses upon the post-1975 period and analyses monthly or quarterly 
forecasts. There is therefore a gap in the literature for a study that examines the 
forecastability of equity returns for the pre-1975 period. Such a study could also 
contribute to our knowledge of equity returns by examining lower frequency 
forecastability rather than the high-frequency focus of the recent literature. This could 
therefore prove to be another fertile field for research which could be cultivated. 
The equity premium is a cornerstone of modem financial practice and utilised 
in numerous applications, as discussed in the Introduction of this thesis. The analysis 
conducted in this thesis therefore provides an important new resource for policy 
makers in diverse areas such as investment analysis, financial managers as well as 
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pension funds. We provide a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the UK equity 
premium. Our focus is on the past performance of the equity premium, our study 
nevertheless is of considerable value to practitioners. For instance, practitioners often 
use historical equity premia as the main foundation for predicting future equity 
premia. Hence our results have important implications for such agents. 
Firstly, our findings point to the importance of removing outliers when 
calculating historical average returns. We find in Chapters 4 and 5 that the failure to 
neutralise the impact of such outliers can cause a discrepancy between equity premia 
estimates. Secondly, once outlying observations are neutralised, since 1966 cross-
sectional historical equity premia are consistent with those implied by earnings 
growth. Thirdly, it seems important to use a reasonably long period in order to 
estimate the equity premia as this will aid the precision of the estimates. Our results 
underline that the use of just data from the late 1970s or even shorter samples could 
lead to discrepancies between equity premia estimates from the different models. 
Therefore together these results provide evidence suggesting that since 1966 and once 
outliers are neutralised that the historical average equity premia appears to be in-line 
with those that could have been reasonable expected by investors. This therefore 
serves to suggest that practitioners can place greater confidence and receive re-
assurance from these findings. 
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